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IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CHANGING 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 
John H. Jackson* 
Jean-Victor Louis** 
Mitsuo Matsushita*** 
International economic and political interdependence has in-
creased dramatically since the close of World War II. We now 
watch foreign wars on our living room television sets, move billions 
of dollars worth of funds across national borders daily, 1 and feel the 
effects of political violence in the Mideast throughout our domestic 
farmlands. A corollary to economic and political interdependence, 
however, is the less visible but equally pervasive problem of legal 
interdependence. Any attempt, in the contemporary world, to create 
new international rules or institutions necessarily depends on the na-
tional legal and constitutional systems of a number of countries. 
This Article analyzes the Tokyo Round2 negotiations of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 as a case study of the legal 
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1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1981, at D5, col. 1. 
2. See generally l DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILAT-
ERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1979); 2 DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT, THE TOKYO ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1980). 
3. Articles of Agreement for the International Monetary Fund, opened for signature Dec. 
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T:I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended in IMF Survey 97 (1978); 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The current version of 
GATT is contained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS]. 
See generally D. CARREAU, T. FLORY & P. JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIQUE 
(2d ed. 1980); K. DAM & J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS]; C. COOMBS, 
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processes and constraints that influence international economic 
negotiations. 
The interplay of national and international legal structures has 
already demonstrated its influence on global economic policy. At the 
end of the Kennedy Round of the GAIT negotiations (1962-1967), 
the United States' negotiators agreed to a separate adjunct package 
of tariff reductions and the elimination of certain nontariff barriers. 
Despite support for the package from the executive branch, congres-
sional approval was never obtained, and the package never came 
into force.4 Similarly, negotiators for the European Economic Com-
munity during the Tokyo Round were not always certain if they 
could, through their own power, bind Member States of the EEC to 
international agreements on certain subjects. As a result, the negoti-
ators chose to omit certain subject areas from the negotiation, to re-
duce the risk of "constitutional challenge."5 The Japanese 
constitutional structure imposes its own unique restraints on actions 
THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1976); G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL 
DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NA• 
TIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES (1965); J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND, 1945-1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, VOL. I: 
CHRONICLE (1969); R. HUDEC, THE GAIT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 
(1975); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
WORLD TRADE]; A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1977); 25 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF J.M. KEYNES: SHAPING THE POSTWAR WORLD (D. Moggridge ed. 
1980); F. SOUTHARD, The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund in 135 PRINCETON 
ESSAYS ON INT'L FINANCE (1979); Carreau, Flory & Juillard, Cronique de Droit International 
Economique, 1976 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique). 
4. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. NONTARIFF BARRIERS in WILLIAMS COMMISSION, 
PAPERS I at 712-14 (1971). See also S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19; S. CONG. RES. 
38, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. l; Amendment to H.R. 17324, 114 CONG. REC. 26,133 (1968); Renego-
tiations Amendment Act, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (congressional reaction to the International 
Anti-Dumping Code). 
5. The line between constitutional challenge and strong political challenge is difficult to 
draw. Often the constitutional structure is what positions the potential political challenge. For 
example, if the Constitution requires Congress to approve an agreement, then the politics of 
Congress become all-important. Some of the results of the 1967 Kennedy Round were 
strongly challenged in United States congressional and other procedures, and these challenges 
and criticisms were in part the influence for developing a new procedure in the United States 
for negotiating in the Tokyo Round. See Part IV infra (describing procedure). Since this new 
procedure depended heavily on congressional approval of the results under a normal statutory 
but "fast track" procedure, the potential for "constitutional" challenge in the courts was 
sharply reduced, so the true potential challenge in the Tokyo Round resulted from the politics 
of Congress. This clearly limited certain kinds of potential negotiations. For example, the 
1974 Act authorizing U.S. participation made it rather clear that certain industrial sectors, such 
as textiles, or certain sensitive steel products, would probably not be negotiable. The situation 
in the EEC WllS more complex and, in general, during the Kennedy Round the EEC seemed 
reluctant to embark on major reformulations of international economic rules. Even with a 
certain amount of caution, the EEC negotiators ended the Tokyo Round with a large amount 
of ambiguity as to the constitutional distribution of powers for approving the results of the 
Tokyo Round. See Part II infra. 
December 1982] Tokyo Round 269 
taken by international negotiators, and influences international 
rulemaking in the same way.6 
This experience suggests the importance of the relationship be-
tween domestic legal rules and international economic negotiations. 
Our goal in this study is to identify the legal and constitutional con-
straints on the development of international trade policy, and to ana-
lyze the degree to which those constraints are changeable. This 
analysis is conducted by considering how the various Tokyo Round 
agreements were implemented in the national legal system of each of 
the three key actors in the GA TT process. The basic technique of 
investigation was for each author to examine the procedure of im-
plementation in his own country. At the end of this process, after 
dealing with their separate national legal systems, the authors to-
gether formulated some cross-cultural conclusions comparing vari-
ous legal systems as they affect international economic rules today. 
Needless to say, it has not been possible to answer all the questions 
which motivated this study. The law in this area is very much in a 
state of transition, attempting to cope with the new and alarmingly 
difficult situations presented by ever increasing international interde-
pendence and rapidly changing economic conditions. Three general 
subject areas, however, are compared and contrasted, using the To-
kyo Round experience as the prinicipal basis for empirical evidence. 
These three subjects are: (1) the legal requirements in each legal sys-
tem for approving and accepting the various Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiation (MTN) agreements (as international law obligations); 
(2) the questions of "direct effect," that is, the legal status within 
each legal system of the MTN agreements; and (3) the question of 
"hierarchy of norms," that is, which will prevail among contradic-
tory legal instruments such as the MTN agreements, prior or later 
statutes or regulations, or each legal system's "constitution." 
These comparisons reveal some important constraints on the ne-
gotiations process by identifying the sort of international agreement 
which is precluded by domestic legal structures. This, in tum, can 
help identify areas where domestic legal systems enable and facili-
tate new initiatives in international trade negotiations. By properly 
recognizing the role of domestic legal institutions in the formulation 
of international economic policy, the authors hope to contribute to a 
better understanding, and a more fruitful pursuit, of international 
trade negotiations. 
6. See Part III infra. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international rules governing global economic activity today 
have been drafted primarily since World War II. Although there 
were a number of international congresses to coordinate customs ad-
ministration dating as far back as 1900, none of these developed a 
successful program of international discipline on international eco-
nomic behavior. This failure was viewed by many as a primary cause 
of both the Great Depression and World War IJ.7 As a result, a mul-
tinational effort at the close of World War II sought to develop a 
viable set of international economic rules. 
At the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, charters were drafted for 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. Although that conference fo-
cused primarily on financial matters, the participants publicly noted 
the need for a counterpart international institution to govern trade. 8 
As soon as the United Nations was organized, its Economic and So-
cial Council adopted a resolution calling for the convening of a 
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment." In late 
1946, a committee was convened to pave the way for such a confer-
ence. During 1947, preparatory conferences were held in New York 
and Geneva. These conferences resulted in drafts of both a charter 
for an International Trade Organization (ITO) and a multilateral re-
ciprocal tariff reduction agreement, the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Although the executive branch in the 
United States had been a major supporter of the ITO, Congress re-
fused to approve it, and the ITO failed to come into existence. Ab-
sent support from the United States, the major economic power in 
the world at the time, the ITO had no chance for success. 
The GA TT met with a more favorable response. Although the 
GA TT treaty instrument was itself never officially brought into 
force, the GA TT was applied as international law by the Protocol of 
Provisional Application. Since the GA TT was never intended to be 
the principal institution to govern international trade activity, it does 
not have extensive institutional provisions to carry out this responsi-
bility. Similarly, the Protocol of Provisional Application provides 
that Part II of the GATT will be implemented only where it is "not 
inconsistent with existing legislation." This is the source of the so-
called "grandfather rights,"9 discussed in detail below, which often 
7. WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 37-39. 
8. United Nations International Monetary and Financial Conference, July 1-22, 1944, 
U.N. Doc. 1941 (U.S. Dept. of State Pub. No. 2866, 1948). 
9. Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S. 
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limit the effectiveness of the GA TT. Despite these limitations, the 
GAIT, in conjunction with the other international economic organi-
zations, such as the IMF and the Organization for_fa:onomic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), now functions::-a:nlie backbone 
of the international economic system. 
Under the auspices of the GAIT, there have beeu--s-even major 
"rounds" of tariff and trade negotiations. 10 The first five of these 
rounds (the 1947 Geneva negotiation of the original GATT; a 1949 
round in Annecy, France; 1950 in Torquay, England; 1955 in Ge-
neva; and the 1960-1961 "Dillon Round") were primarily item-by-
item negotiations for the reduction of tariffs, with very little attention 
paid to non tariff barriers. Because of the growing complexity of this 
sort of negotiation, the sixth round of tariff reductions (the ''Ken-
nedy Round") attempted a "linear tariff reduction" approach. It set 
a goal of a fifty percent, across-the-board cut in tariffs. The Ken-
nedy Round also attempted to address major nontariff barriers. Al-
though the Round was not entirely successful, it did yield across-the-
board tariff reductions that averaged about thirty-five percent, with a 
variety of exceptions and adjustments. The only significant agree-
ment on nontariff barriers, however, was the 1967 Anti-Dumping 
Code. 
After 1967, there was a period of delay and confusion, before 
there developed an effort to launch a new round of negotiations. In 
the early 1970s, the United States took the initiative in encouraging 
a seventh round of trade negotiations. This time, it was decided to 
try to focus negotiation on nontariff barriers, because these had be-
come increasingly significant as restraints on international trade. In 
light of the successful reduction of tariffs over a period of several 
decades, nontariff barriers became major obstacles to further trade 
liberalization. The seventh trade round was launched in September 
1973 in Tokyo, and thus the name "Tokyo Round." 
Although this negotiation contained a significant element of tariff 
reduction, a large part of the activity in the Tokyo Round was fo-
cused on a variety of nontariff barriers. These proved most difficult 
to negotiate, for a number of reasons. For example, it is very hard to 
quantify. many of the nontariff barriers. Nations in previous GATT 
negotiations habitually insisted on "reciprocity." Each nation's 
negotiators wanted to be able to report home that they had obtained 
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308; WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 60; INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 401. 
10. WORLD TRADE,supra note 3, at 218-29; Jackson, The Birth of the GAIT-MTN System: 
A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 21 (1980). 
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from the negotiation at least as much as they had given up. In nego-
tiating tariffs, there were various' quantitative and statistical ways to 
support such claims. For example, the percentage reduction in the 
tariff would be multiplied by the value of the goods imported in re-
cent periods, and that would be designated as the "value of the tariff 
concession" made in the negotiations. When it came to negotiation 
of nontariff barriers, such as the rule governing how a country 
should apply its anti-dumping duties, it was hard to quantify the 
value of such rules. 
Despite these difficulties, the Tokyo Round negotiations were 
surprisingly successful in formulating a series of agreements 
designed to reduce barriers to international trade, both tariff barriers 
and nontariff barriers. Ten major agreements and several "under-
standings" resulted from the negotiations. Because of the difficulty of 
amending the GATT, 11 none of the nontariff agreements or under-
standings were incorporated into the GA TT system as a technical 
change to the text of GATT. Instead, most of the MTN agreements 
are "stand-alone" treaty instruments. The ''understandings" of the 
"Group Framework" negotiations were adopted by the GAIT Con-
tracting Parties as "decisions." The relationship of these agreements 
and decisions to the GAIT itself is not a simple subject, but it is not 
within the scope of this Article. Some of the agreements purport to 
be "interpretations" of various GA TT articles, and in a number of 
cases the agreements create problems of discriminatory treatment 
that could violate the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of GA TT. 
A few words about each of these MTN results may help the reader to 
understand materials in later sections. 
(1) Tar!ffreduction agreements: Little needs to be said about the 
Geneva (1979) Protocol and the Protocol Supplementary to the Ge-
neva (1979) Protocol. Basically, they are lists of items with the re-
duction in tariff that has been agreed to by each country. Each 
country has its own "tariff schedule" in GA TT, and the results of the 
Tokyo Round negotiations on tariffs have become incorporated as 
amendments to those tariff schedules of GAIT, through the GAIT 
processes. The negotiation was carried out on a "linear" basis, with 
a target of an overall reduction of sixty percent in tariffs (at least this 
was the target of the United States' authorizing legislation for its 
negotiators). Nevertheless, the results have generally been estimated 
as approximately a thirty-five percent reduction in the industrial tar-
11. Jackson, 17ze Birth of the GAIT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, supra note 
10, at 32. 
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iffs of the major industrial participants of the negotiations. 12 
(2) The Subsidies-Countervailing .Duty Code: officially entitled 
"Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, 
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," it is 
perhaps the most important of the nontariff barrier codes negotiated 
in the Tokyo Round. It certainly was the most difficult to negotiate. 
This Code tries to address the increasingly difficult problem of gov-
ernment subsidies to exports and other goods. 
It is very difficult to define "subsidy." A myriad of governmental 
practices could be called subsidies, including certain income tax ex-
emptions, as well as governmental support for research. Subsidies 
tend to be divided into "export subsidies," whereby the subsidy is 
obtained only for goods which are exported; and "general subsidies," 
or "production subsidies," whereby the subsidy is received for all 
goods produced. The Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code is basi-
cally divided into two subjects: (1) rules that govern the procedures 
by which a country is authorized to apply a countervailing duty to 
imports which have benefited from a subsidy; and (2) some rules 
directly applying to subsidies, along with a complaint procedure that 
allows one country to complain about the subsidy practices of an-
other which seem to be harming economic competitors in the im-
porting country. The Code is exceedingly complex, and represents a 
number of uneasy compromises between the contending interna-
tional negotiators. 
(3) Anti-Dumping Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade." Dumping is generally the practice of a firm selling its goods 
abroad at a lower price than it sells them in its home market. For 
most of a century, there has been general international agreement 
among nations that dumping is an unfair international trade prac-
tice, and that each importing country should have the right to im-
pose anti-dumping duties on goods that are dumped in its market, to 
protect its competing domestic industry. An Anti-Dumping Code 
was negotiated in the Kennedy Round (1967), but was not very suc-
cessful. Indeed, United States constitutional problems and congres-
sional antagonism prevented the United States from fully 
implementing this Code. At a late day in the Tokyo Round, it was 
decided to revise the Anti-Dumping Code, and to enter into a new 
code which embodied many of the concepts that had already been 
negotiated in the Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code. The defi.ni-
12. See note 4 supra. 
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tion 9f "injury" to domestic competing industry was copied from the 
Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code into the Anti-Dumping Code. 
This may have been an unfortunate step, since the two subjects, al-
though seemingly parallel, differ substantially in their underlying 
policy foundations. Dumping involves activity by particular, often 
private, firms. Subsidy activity, in contrast, is basically governmen-
tal activity, and can stem from legitimate internal social policies be-
ing pursued by the government. Nevertheless, the new Code brings 
a series of new rules and concepts to the anti-dumping activity of 
nations, and must be considered one of the significant results of the 
Tokyo Round. 
(4) The Government Procurement Code: officially entitled 
"Agreement on Government Procurement." For many years, it has 
been increasingly obvious that "buy-national" practices of govern-
ments are a significant obstacle to further liberalization of interna-
tional, trade. The GATT has explicit exceptions for governmental 
purchases from some of its important trade obligations (the National 
Treatment Clause). Consequently, the enactment of government 
procurement rules requiring preference for domestically produced 
goods was a major loophole in the GATT system. For many years 
there have been discussions among nations, mostly in the context of 
the OECD, with the view to developing some sort of international 
discipline on these government procurement rules. This effort was 
moved into the Tokyo Round negotiation of GATT and resulted in 
a new international agreement. The agreement, at first reading, ap-
pears to go very far in establishing a general nondiscriminatory "na-
tional treatment" rule of behavior for governments in their 
purchases of goods. However, there are important exceptions, and 
governments are bound to follow the Code only as to "entities" ex-
plicitly negotiated and placed on their respective "entities lists." 
This practice significantly narrows the initial coverage of the Gov-
ernment Procurement Code; however, it does provide a framework 
for future negotiation to expand the entities lists. 
(5) Standards Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade." A panoply of different kinds of product stan-
dards, such as food and drug standards to protect human health, 
standards for product operation to prevent pollution, or standards on 
goods to enhance their safety, have increasingly burdened the flow of 
international trade. Most standards have a legitimate policy basis, 
but standards can be written in such a way as to be an effective limi-
tation on imports, or to discriminate in favor of domestic goods over 
imports. The Tokyo Round negotiators approached this problem 
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primarily as a procedural one, establishing a new agreement which 
allows governments and other interested parties to have an opportu-
nity to protest the development of standards which unnecessarily 
discriminate against imports. 
(6) Customs Valuation Code: officially entitled "Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade." The various methods employed for valuing imported 
goods for customs purposes have served as non-tariff barriers. The 
variety of complicated valuation methods and the often arbitrary ad-
ministration of valuation rules have been an impediment to trade. 
Prior to the implementation of the Customs Valuation Code, United 
States law included nine different valuation methods - including 
the American Selling Price method that has been criticized by trad-
ing partners of the United States since before the Kennedy Round of 
trade negotiations. The Customs Valuation Code is an attempt to 
bring some uniformity to national valuation procedures by providing 
a series of procedures for valuation, ranked according to preference 
of use, i.e. , lower ranked methods of valuation cannot be used unless 
a value is not determinable under a higher ranked basis for valua-
tion. "Transaction value" is the preferred basis for valuation. The 
agreement will be administered through two committees. Dispute 
settlement will be administered by a Committee on Customs Valua-
tion under the auspices of GAIT, while technical issues will be sub-
mitted to a Technical Committee on Customs Valuation under the 
auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council. A protocol to the 
Customs Valuation Code was also negotiated which was designed to 
attract more developing countries to accept the Code. 
(1) Licensing Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Import Li-
censing Procedures." This Code expresses a concern that licensing 
procedures designed to implement a trade restriction may serve as 
additional restrictions in and of themselves. It calls for neutral rules 
and fair and equitable application and administration of those rules. 
Application forms and procedures for licensing should be as simple 
as possible. A concern for transparency of procedures is reflected in 
the Code's requirement that rules governing import licensing proce-
dures be published. 
(8) Civil Aircraft Code: officially entitled "Agreement on Trade 
in Civil Aircraft." One of the goals at the commencement of the 
Tokyo Round negotiations was to develop agreements relating to 
particular industrial sectors such as steel or chemicals. This goal was 
not achieved. The Civil Aircraft Agreement is the one agreement 
which embraces a range of trade barriers affecting a specific indus-
276 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:267 
trial sector. The Agreement eliminates duties on civil aircraft, en-
gines and parts of civil aircraft, and repairs on civil aircraft. The 
provisions of the agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and on 
Subsidies, as well as the GAIT rules relating to quantitative restric-
tions, are incorporated into the Civil Aircraft Agreement. The 
Agreement also covers government procurement of civil aircraft. 
(9) .Dairy Products Code: officially entitled "International Dairy 
Agreement." This agreement provides for a consultative arrange-
ment. The International Dairy Products Council established by the 
Agreement will serve as a forum for discussions and monitoring of 
the international dairy market. In addition, protocols attached to the 
Agreement set minimum export prices for various dairy products. 
(IO) Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat: Like the Interna-
tional Dairy Agreement, the Bovine Meat "Arrangement" sets up a 
consultative group, called the "International Meat Council." The 
Arrangement basically establishes procedures for information ex-
change and market monitoring, and consultation through meetings 
of the council, and otherwise. 
(11) Framework Arrangements: One of the negotiating commit-
tees of the MTN was called the "Group Framework" Committee, 
and was responsible for formulating four specific understandings. 
These concern differential treatment for developing countries; bal-
ance of payments measures; safeguard actions for development pur-
poses; and an understanding regarding notification, consultation, 
and settlement of disputes. These arrangements were not established 
as separate treaty agreements, but were instead accepted by a deci-
sion of the Contracting Parties (on November 28, 1979) of GAIT. 13 
As such, they do not stand alone, but are part of the totality of 
GAIT jurisprudence. For the most part, these arrangements do not 
have precise obligations; however, they do have significant impacts, 
at least in two respects: (1) the understanding with respect to differ-
ential treatment for developing countries has been deemed to perpet-
uate t:b.e GAIT 1971 waiver regarding "Generalized System of 
Preferences"; (2) the understanding with respect to dispute settle-
ment procedures, with its annex (an "Agreed Description of the Cus-
tomary Practice of GAIT in the Field of Dispute Settlement"), 
established more precisely the framework of the various procedures 
regarding dispute settlement under the GAIT Article XXII and XX-
III procedures. 
13. Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Nov. 28, 
1979, GATT Doc. L/4905 (1979), reprinted in GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 201 {26th Supp, 
1979). 
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In addition to these major "codes" and understandings, there 
were certain other multilateral agreements, and a large number of 
bilateral agreements. All of these faced similar national legal and 
constitutional constraints on their implementation. With the general 
framework of the GA TT in mind, we now tum to a comparison of 
three very different legal systems to analyze those constraints in 
more detail. 
II. IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
Jean- Victor Louis 
This section will examine the legal problems of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in connection with the conclusion and 
implementation of the agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round 
of negotiations. The most significant issues confronting the EEC in 
this context are the allocation of authority between the Community 
and its Member States, and individuals' ability to challenge the va-
lidity of a Community or national act that is alleged to be contrary to 
international agreements. 
After a short introduction on EEC commercial policy and its im-
portance in the EEC Treaty and practice, we then examine the nego-
tiating process in the Tokyo Round from 1973 to the conclusion in 
1979. There follows an analysis of the problems of the coming into 
force and the potential direct effect of the agreements which resulted 
from these negotiations. 
The EEC is a regional organization created by the Treaty of 
Rome on March 15, 1957 .14 Since its membership was enlarged in 
1973 and in 1981, the EEC includes ten West European countries as 
members.15 The EEC serves as a regional customs union for Europe, 
developing, inter a!ia, common policies between its members in the 
fields of agriculture, transportation, and external trade relations. 
A number of difficulties in implementing multilateral trade 
agreements in EEC Member States stem from the structure of the 
EEC itself. The EEC is divided into two functional elements: the 
Commission, which represents the interests of the EEC as a whole, 
14. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957. (Belgium -
Federal Republic of Germany - France - Italy - Luxembourg - Netherlands). 
IS. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded to the European Com-
munities (EEC, EURATOM, and European Coal and Steel Community) and on January I, 
1981, Greece became the tenth member of the Communities. Accession of Portugal and Spain 
is also expected. 
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and the Council, which is composed of members of the governments 
of each of the Member States. 16 There thus exists a constant tension 
between the interests of the EEC as a whole and the interests of any 
particular Member State.17 Individual nations tend to want to con-
trol their own foreign policy, since this is a 'jealously guarded area 
of national sovereignty." The Council has been diligent in keeping a 
tight rein on the Commission acting as the negotiator of the Commu-
16. Technically, there are three European Communities, based on three separate treaties: 
the Coal & Steel Community, based on the Treaty establishing the European Coal & Steel 
Community, signed in Paris, April 18, 1951; EURATOM, based on the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community, signed in Rome, March 25, 1957; and the European 
Economic Community, based on the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed in 
Rome, March 25, 1957. 
The four basic institutions of the three European Communities are the Commission, the 
Council, the Court of Justice, and the Assembly (or "European Parliament"). Although a 
convention annexed to the two Rome treaties provided for a single Court of Justice and a 
single European Parliament to apply the three Community treaties, it was not until 1965 that a 
single Council and a single Commission were established. After this merger a particular insti-
tution plays a role for all three communities, although that role will differ among the commu-
nities. The Commission has fourteen members, one from each Member State, plus an 
additional member from the four major States. It is analogous to the executive arm of govern-
ment and administers the largest bureaucracy (about 9,000 professional-level persons). The 
Council, composed of a representative from each Member State (a Minister), primarily decides 
upon policy and passes upon legislative initiatives presented to it by the Commission. 
The third institution is the Court of Justice, which sits in Luxembourg and has eleven 
judges and five Advocate Generals. The Court has fairly ample jurisdiction to decide ques-
tions of interpretation involving the basic treaties, regulations, directives, and other EEC acts, 
international agreements, and other legal matters of the EEC. Finally, there is the European 
Parliament, which since 1979 has been elected by direct elections in the Member States, but 
has limited powers, except in financial matters. 
The EEC can act by adopting various formal instruments, termed "regulations," "direc-
tives," "decisions," etc. These are normally adopted by the Council upon a proposal from the 
Commission. A "regulation" has immediate and direct applicability in the Community. The 
"directive" was designed to provide a means by which the EEC would direct Member States to 
take action to carry out the directive. However, this has not prevented the Court of Justice 
from ruling that in some cases, portions of a directive have direct effect for individuals or 
enterprises. The "decision" designates an act which applies to particular cases and particular 
persons. 
The Council, or Council of Ministers, meets with different officials of the Member States' 
governments according to the specific matter at hand. For example, when the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Member States meet, the Council is then called the Council of Ministers 
of Foreign or General Affairs. The Council also has a secretariat, including a legal service, and 
has a number of subordinate committees or bodies, such as the CO REPER (Council of Perma-
nent Representatives), or the 113 Committee, explained at Part II B infra. 
In recent years a "European Council" has evolved in which the heads of government from 
the Member States meet. Although there is no written "constitutional" status for the "Euro-
pean Council," its decisions generally have great force within the Community, since the prime 
ministers or presidents can subsequently instruct their representatives in the EEC Regular 
Council to act in accordance with the decisions of the European Council. 
Paralleling the procedures established by the treaties is the very important process of polit-
ical cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Heads of government in the European Council 
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet to coordinate the foreign policies of the Member States 
and to achieve common positions at the level of the Ten. 
17. See Weiler, The European Parliament and Foreign Affairs: External Relations of the 
European Economic Community, in PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY 151-89 
(A. Cassese & A. aan den Rijn eds. 1980). 
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nity. 18 The Tokyo Round of the GATT provides a classic example 
of the tensions between a regional organization and the member 
states that it represents in international negotiations. These tensions 
reveal themselves in the form of legal and constitutional constraints 
on the implementation of international agreements. 
A. The EEC Negotiating Process in the Tokyo Round 
1. An Overview of the Ordinary Negotiating Process 
of a Trade Agreement 
The ordinary negotiating process of a trade agreement - either 
bilateral or multilateral - concluded by the EEC generally includes 
the following stages: 
(1) Preliminary talks between the Commission and the State(s) 
concerned. 
(2) Report by the Commission to the Council including a recom-
mendation to open formal negotiations with the third State. 
(3) Authorization of the Commission by the Council to negotiate 
along the directives ("mandate") approved by the Council on 
the recommendation formulated by the Commission and, as 
usual, carefully examined by the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER). 
(4) Negotiation of the agreement by the Commission with the 
assistance of a special committee composed of representa-
tives of the Member States in charge of international eco-
nomic relations (so-called "Committee of Article 113" or 
"113 Committee"). 
(5) Authentication of the formal result of the negotiation by way 
of an exchange of letters or the initialling ("paraphe") of the 
agreement by the Commission. 
(6) Report by the Commission to the Council which approves by 
a regulation or a decision the result of the negotiation and 
decides to proceed to the final conclusion of the agreement. 
(7) Formal conclusion through a complex procedure (approba-
tion plus conclusion) or by the signature on the part of the 
Community by the persons designated by the Council. 
If the agreement is deemed to be a "mixed agreement," that is, 
for reasons of the allocation of competence between the EEC and its 
18. Weiler, note 17 supra, at 156. One could have more accurately written that the Council 
has been reluctant to authorize the Commission to open and conduct negotiations since, under 
the terms of the treaty, the Commission has the capacity to negotiate. 
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Member States the agreement (such as the LOME agreement) re-
quires not only EEC acceptance but also acceptance by Member 
States, then certain additional procedures by the Member States will 
be required. 
This ordinary procedure outlined above, which results partly 
from the joint requirements of Articles 113 and 228 of the EEC 
Treaty, and partly from the practice followed by the Community, 
has to be adapted to the process of multilateral negotiations such as 
the MTN. 
We shall look at the various stages of the MTN negotiations on 
the part of the Community, analyzing the role and influence of each 
Community institution and organ involved. 
2. The Preliminary Stages of Tokyo Round 
On February 11, 1972, the United States and the EEC issued a 
joint declaration supporting the opening of multilateral trade 
negotiations. 19 This declaration was endorsed by the first Summit of 
Heads of State and Government of the enlarged EEC on October 20, 
1972.20 The endorsement is notable because it highlights several cru-
cial aspects of the EEC's negotiating posture: first, that reciprocity 
would be demanded in all concessions;21 second, that attention 
would be paid to the link between commercial and monetary 
problems; and third, the desire to seek a reduction in both tariff and 
nontariff barriers. It was partially with these ends in mind that the 
EEC began preparing for the Tokyo Round of negotiations. 
In early April 1973 the Commission sent the Council a communi-
cation on the "elaboration of a global conception in view of the next 
multilateral negotiation." Although a majority of the members of 
the Council approved of the statement, French Minister Michel 
Jobert, supported by the Irish and Italian ministers, reproached the 
Commission for proposing compromises to be made with the rest of 
the world, rather than setting forth the EEC negotiating posture. 
J obert asked for a restatement of the goals of the EEC, emphasizing 
that the negotiations would have to be balanced, and that commer-
cial negotiations were meaningless absent consideration of the con-
vertibility of the U.S. dollar.22 Jobert insisted on the crucial 
19. 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3), 57-60 (1972). 
20. See the final declaration of the Summit, 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. IO), 14-23 (1972), 
21. This principle had also been stressed in the declaration of December 12, 1971, and in 
the joint declaration of February 11, 1972. 
22. Le Monde, May 16, 1973, at 38, col. 2; In the Same Boal, ECONOMIST, June 9, 1973, at 
11-12. 
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importance of the common tariff and on the need for respect for the 
common agricultural policy. 
The Commission then prepared a preamble to its communica-
tion, and rewrote several sections to conform to the views of the 
Council. On May 24, the communication was finally presented to 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), an in-
ternal organ of the Council.23 The final draft was clearly influenced 
by Jobert's comments in a number ofrespects.24 First, the discussion 
of the link between monetary and commercial negotiations had been 
reworded to incorporate the French view. France wanted to insist 
on a new monetary order, based on fixed but adjustable parities and 
the general convertibility of monies, before agreeing to any interna-
tional trade proposals. The Commission held a more moderate view, 
insisting only on parallel efforts during the trade negotiations to help 
create an adequate monetary system. The final text constituted a 
compromise between these two positions,25 incorporating the follow-
ing proviso into its discussion of the Tokyo Round: "The Commu-
nity shall evaluate the progress of those negotiations in the light of 
the progress which will be realized in the monetary field. When it 
will consider the result of those negotiations, it will do so taking into 
account that progress." Although these sentences do not make clear 
exactly what actions the EEC would take if an adequate monetary 
agreement was not reached, they do serve to hide the divergent opin-
ions of the Member States. 
The second split of opinion between France and the rest of the 
EEC revolved around the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.). 
The original text affirmed that the principles of the C.A.P. could not 
be put into question. The final text declared more categorically that 
the C.A.P. principles and their mechanisms were not open to negotia-
tion. The final text also did away with an earlier allusion to the pos-
sibility of a declaration of intent by the Community to consider a 
more economically oriented structural policy. Such compromises 
combined to provide the EEC with a more united common front as 
they entered the new round of negotiations. 
3. Negotiation from 1975-1979: The Actors for the EEC 
The final draft of the communication to the Coll;ncil, together 
with the approval that was granted at a meeting of the Council of 
23. Le Monde, May 27-28, 1973, at 23, col. 3. 
24. Lemaitre, Pour une Reciprocite Effective, Le Monde, May 27-28, 1973, at 23, col. 3. 
25. The text was adopted after a marathon session by the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in Luxembourg on June 26, 1973. 
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Ministers, authorized the opening of formal negotiations for the 
EEC. Throughout the negotiations that followed, the Commission 
played a prominent role. A series of initiatives directed to the Coun-
cil and the Member States resulted in acceptance of the "Swiss 
Formula" for the reduction of tariffs-greater reductions for higher 
tariffs - notwithstanding the objections of certain Member States. 
The Commission also attempted to convince the Member States of 
the desirability of selectivity in the application of the safeguard 
clause, although this effort proved unsuccessful. 
Another organ that played a surprisingly prominent role in the 
GATT negotiations was the "Committee of Article 113." Composed 
of representatives of the Member States, this Committee normally 
plays the role of a ''watchdog" of the Commission, overseeing its 
activities and suggesting interpretations of Council directives. 
Throughout the Tokyo Round, the Committee was primarily respon-
sible for a number of compromises reached between the Commission 
and the Member States. A number of reasons have been suggested 
for the prominent role played by the Committee of Article 113 dur-
ing the Tokyo Round. These include the following. 
First, the Tokyo Round negotiations, although they were initi-
ated in Japan, later tended to be localized in Geneva. This made it 
impossible for COREPER, seated in Brussels, to exert its usual polit-
ical control over the Commission. Second, the technical complexity 
of a number of issues raised, including the difficult issues of non-
tariff barriers, demanded input by experts. Since the Council was 
unable to provide specific guidance on a number of these issues, the 
Committee's influence expanded. Third, throughout the lengthy pe-
riod of negotiations, the Commission required an ongoing source of 
information as to each Member State's negotiation positions. To 
achieve this goal, the Committee was given an expanded role in the 
negotiations. The minutes of the Council meeting on January 17, 
1978, recognized this increased authority when it spoke of "a rigor-
ous coordination [of the Commission] with this country's [Federal 
Republic of Germany] delegation in the Committee of Article 113.'' 
Finally, the global conception that was set forth in the Commission's 
original communication freed the negotiators from the need to refer 
back constantly to the Member States for guidance. Thus freed from 
some political restraints, the Commission could rely more heavily on 
technical advice provided by the Committee . 
. Just as these factors tended to increase the Committee's power, 
they tended to undercut the role of the usually influential 
COREPER. A number of Member States, particularly France, ob-
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jected to this redistribution of power, and often raised questions in 
this regard. When these issues proved irresolvable, or when the 
Committee itself was unable to agree on policy issues, the disputes 
were brought to the attention of the Council as a whole. 
The Council devoted many deliberations to the Tokyo Round. It 
examined related problems 
on February 10, 1975, when it adopted the directives for the ne-
gotiations of the MTN in the GAIT following the adoption of 
the Trade Act by the American Congress; 
on January 17, 1978, before the beginning of the substantial part 
of the negotiations. It examined the "working hypothesis" elab-
orated by the groups or sub-groups of negotiation; 
on April 4, 1978, when it analyzed the tariff offers made by the 
main participants in the negotiation. It decided to authorize the 
Commission to present demands to its partners to improve their 
offers and to envisage a list of possible retractions of 
concessions; 
on June 27, 1978, for the adoption of a schema of global agree-
ment with the hope of soon concluding the negotiations; 
on September 19, 1978, after the adoption of the Declaration of 
July 13, it expressed its deep concern over the situation which 
would be created by the expiration of the powers given to the 
Government of the United States by the Trade Act to waive the 
application of countervailing duties in the case of export subsi-
dies, in the absence of an injury test. It stated that it would not 
be realistic to envisage the conclusion of the negotiations with-
out an assurance of the continuance of the waiver. On this 
point, the Council fully endorsed the position of the 
Commission; 
on October 17, 1978, after the decision of the United States 
Congress to adjourn its work until after January 15, 1979, with-
out having taken a decision on the waiver problem. The Coun-
cil affirmed that an unequivocal confirmation of the application 
of the waiver was necessary to conclude the negotiations but, in 
the meantime, the Community declared that it was willing to 
pursue the negotiations; 
on November 21, 1978, after bilateral contacts between the 
Commission and Mr. Strauss (the chief U.S. negotiator). The 
Council confirmed its October position; 
on December 12 and 18, 1978, to examine progress reports 
made by the Commission on the negotiations; 
in three sessions on February 5 and 6, 1979, March 5 and 6, and 
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April 2 and 3, to analyze the results of the negotiations. The 
Council took note of the intention of the Commission to authen-
ticate the various texts and agreements which resulted from the 
negotiations, upon reservations of a final examination by the 
Committee of Article 113; 
on November 20, 1979, when it decided to conclude the agree-
ments resulting from the MTN. 26 
Many of these deliberations dealt with controversies between 
members of the Community. As a result, many of the Council's final 
recommendations are compromise solutions to problems. The de-
bate on the maximum percentage of tariff reductions provides a case 
in point. The Commission favored a forty percent maximum; and 
Germany, as high a maximum as possible. The final position 
adopted by the Council contained an apparent contradiction that re-
sulted from these divergent goals.27 
Just as the Commission played a prominent role in the Tokyo 
Round negotiations, the European Parliament played a surprisingly 
very small role.28 The EEC Treaty does not require that the Council 
consult Parliament while negotiating "commercial agreements." 
Consultation, however, is required for association agreements under 
Article 238. There are important arguments which plead for consul-
tation of the Parliament in respect of trade agreements, such as the 
MTN. First, trade agreements often take place in a context similar 
to association agreements. Accordingly, parliamentary participation 
in these agreements should be uniform. Second, Parliament has ex-
tensive power over EEC budgetary matters. Since trade agreements, 
through tariff reductions, affect EEC resources, Parliament, as a 
budgetary authority, ought to have some input into this decision-
making process. Finally, national parliaments generally must ap-
prove trade agreements. This suggests that the legislative insight of 
the European Parliament might properly be considered by the Coun-
cil during negotiations. 
On October 15, 1973, the Council adopted the Luns II procedure 
for Trade Agreements to compensate somewhat for the absence of a 
26. Problems related to the Tokyo Round were also discussed at other sessions of the 
Council, on December 3 and 4, 1973; January 20 and 21, 1974; April 5 and October 18, 1977; 
March 7, May 2, and June 6, 1978; May 8, June 12, !uly 24, and October 22 and 29, 1979. 
27. See point 7 of the conclusions of the Council of January 17, 1978. 
28. See generally, Weiler, supra note 17, at 151, 169; Quintin, Participation de l'Assemb/ee 
parlementaire europeenne au deroulement de la procedure de negociation des accords com• 
merciaux, ll Rev. trim. dr. eur. 211 (1975); RENGELING, Zu DEN BEFUGNISSEN DES 
EUROPAISCHEN PARLAMENTS BEIM ABSCHLUSS VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE IM RAHMEN 
DER GEMEINSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG, FESTSCHRIFT FUR H.J. SCHLOCHAUER 877-98 (1981), 
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formal consultation. 29 The procedure provides for three phases: 
before the beginning of the negotiations, the Parliament may 
debate the orientations forwarded by the Council to the compe-
tent parliamentary committees; 
at the end of the negotiations, but before signature, the Presi-
dent of the Council or its representative informs confidentially 
and unofficially the competent committees30 of the agreement; 
after the signature but before the conclusion, the Council in-
forms the Parliament of the content31 of the agreement. Nota-
bly, this procedure does not specifically provide for 
parliamentary intervention during the negotiations. The Coun-
cil felt that such debates would hurt the BBC's negotiating posi-
tion. The procedure, however, does not absolutely bar these 
debates. Parliamentary committees retain the right to request 
confidential information and debate it publicly if they so 
desire.32 
In practice, Parliament made little use of the Luns II procedure 
during the Tokyo Round. Only three debates were held from 1973-
1978, and they resulted in little more than expressions of general 
support for the BBC's position and a desire to reach a "substantial 
and balanced" final result. The reasons for Parliament's inability to 
participate actively in the trade negotiations are multifold. First, al-
though external trade relations are governed by the Community, the 
Parliament has little influence over the internal policies of the Mem-
ber States. Second, Parliament feared that extensive consultation 
might weaken the position of the Commission in its dealings with the 
Council. Third, the secrecy of foreign negotiations that results from 
"international etiquette" made public debates of the Tokyo Round 
both difficult and improper.33 Finally, the technical complexity of -
29. Formally adopted on October 15, 1973, the procedure had been suggested and already 
applied at the end of 1972. The first case of application was the conclusion of the first com-
mercial agreement with Egypt (1972). See E. GRABlTZ & T. LAUFER, DAS EUR0PAISCHE 
PARLAMENT 165 (1980). 
30. In French: "substance." 
31. In French: "teneur." 
32. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 171 (giving an example of the effectiveness of the proce-
dure in the case of the preferential trade agreement with Egypt in 1972: "The relevant parlia-
mentary committees were informed confidentially prior to the signature on 18 December 1972. 
An amendment by way of protocol was inserted as a result of comments made by the Commit-
tee of External Economic Relations. It was then debated in Parliament, on 10 May, which 
once again called for a better consultation procedure and implementation of all suggestions in 
the Giraudo report (which led to the resolution of 17 February 1973). The agreement was 
finally concluded in October 1973."). 
33. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 154-57. See also Quintin, supra note 28. 
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nontariff negotiations placed much of the Tokyo Round beyond the 
expertise of the European Parliament. 
4. Terminating the Negotiations: March -April 1979 
The final step in EEC negotiations is the initialling that serves to 
authenticate relevant documents. The Commission, as the EEC in-
stitution responsible for negotiations, is empowered to take this ac-
tion without formal authorization from the Council. The Tokyo 
Round minutes and protocols were initialled on April 12, 1979. 
Although it is not legally required to do so, the Commission gen-
erally issues a report to the Council before :finalizing negotiations. 
The Tokyo Round report was presented to the Council on March 6, 
1979. Several Member States requested a supplementary report ana-
lyzing the proposed tariff concession.34 When this was provided, 
unanimity was quickly reached at the April 2-3, ·1979, session.35 
The Commission was asked to issue reports addressing the do-
mestic legislative measures for implementation adopted by the major 
developed countries. The Council declared that the EEC would 
adopt the Tokyo Round concessions only after its developed negoti-
ating partners had themselves successfully implemented the conces-
sions. Finally, it included a sentence in its minutes reserving the 
question of how power would be divided between the Community 
and the Member States until the time for definitive conclusion of the 
agreements. Since Member States thus retained some discretion 
over whether to adopt concessions authenticated by the Commission, 
this sentence later caused severe difficulties in the definitive approval 
of the Tokyo Round. 
5. The Preparation of the Conclusion in 1979: The Legal and 
Political Problems 
On February 22, 1979, COREPER instructed an ad hoc working 
group and the legal services of the Council and the Commission to 
analyze three legal issues: the need for Member States to sign the 
Tokyo Round agreement; representation of Member States in ad-
ministrative bodies created by the agreements; and the number of 
EEC votes in those administrative bodies. The Commission legal 
service advised that the EEC had authority to conclude the Tokyo 
Round agreements without consent of the Member States. Article 
113 of the EEC Treaty, as well as several decisions by the Court of 
34. See Europe, No. 2632 (April 5-6, 1979); Fin. Econ. Tijdy., Mar. 7, 1979. 
35. Italy removed its ultimate objections some days after the meeting of the Council. 
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Justice,36 conferred exclusive competence over commercial policy to 
the EEC as a whole. The ad hoc working group and the Council 
legal service agreed with this general principle but concluded that 
certain of the GAIT agreements - the "Standards," "Government 
Procurement," and "Civil Aircraft" Codes - exceeded the field of 
commercial policy. Accordingly, Member State consent would ar-
guably be necessary to adopt these Codes. The so-called "Rubber-
Agreement Opinion" of the Court of Justice resolved this dispute,37 
holding that the Community is competent to conclude all agreements 
that involve commercial policy as their primary focus. Thus, the 
Commission concluded, on October I, 1979,38 that the Community 
had the power to adopt all of the Tokyo Round agreements without 
the consent of each individual Member State. The legal issue re-
solved, there remained a political difficulty - how to avoid embar-
rassing those Member States that had insisted that their consent was 
necessary for adoption of the agreements. It was finally decided, af-
ter much debate, that the Community alone would sign the bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, but that all of the Member States 
would sign and accept the Tariff Protocol and the Codes on "Stan-
dards" and "Civil Aircraft." This solution can only be explained as 
a purely diplomatic compromise. There is no legal basis for accord-
ing a different treatment to the Code of Standards than the Code on 
Government Procurement. 
Although this arrangement was adopted for purely political rea-
sons, it did seem to have a legal impact. International liability is 
different for "mixed agreements" - signed by the EEC and the 
Member States - than it is for agreements concluded by the EEC 
alone. When a third country is injured by violation of a mixed 
agreement, that country may seek restitution from the EEC, Member 
State, or both.39 
The second legal issue addressed by the ad hoc·working group -
36. The most important of these cases is Commission of the European Communities v. 
Council of the European Communities, 1971 C. J. Comm. Rec. 275. 
37. This is important because the delegations had agreed that on the points where an 
agreement existed between the two legal services, the decision of the Council should be in 
favor of a conclusion by the Community alone; in the absence of such agreement, there should 
be a joint conclusion by the Community and its Member States. 
38. GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Final Report on the GATT Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations in Geneva (Tokyo Round) and proposal for Council decision, COM (79) 
514 final. 
39. On this problem, see Steenbergen, The Status of GA'IT in Community Law, 15 J.W.T.L. 
337, 343-44 (1981), and Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on 
Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 
24 (1982), on the impossibility of, and the desire to avoid, stating clearly where the dividing 
line between the respective powers of the EEC and its Member States lies. 
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representation of Member States in administrative bodies estab-
lished by the Tokyo Round - did not pose such severe difficulties. 
These were partially resolved in the "package deal" prepared by the 
Council on November 20, 1979. Member States are represented in 
the Community delegation while working on the Committee of Sig-
natories.40 Moreover, all Member States are to be fully informed 
about any contacts or discussion with the Committee, and the Mem-
ber States are invited to participate in all nonconfidential meetings. 
Where any matter deals explicitly with the imports or exports of an 
individual Member State, that state would be permitted to intervene 
on its own behalf.41 Since modes of participation are identical for 
committees that resulted from mixed agreements and those growing 
out of agreements entered by the EEC alone, there appears to be no 
practical reason for the Member States' insistence that the Codes of 
Standards and Civil Aircraft be subject to Member State approval. 
The final legal issue addressed by the ad hoc working group -
the number of EEC votes in administrative bodies - remains un-
resolved. EEC officials tend to de-emphasize the importance of this 
problem by arguing that consensus is a tacit rule in GA TT matters, 
so the allocation of votes is irrelevant. Although this is a satisfactory 
political solution to the issue, it leaves much to be desired from a 
legal standpoint. 
6. Parliamentary .Debate, .December 1979: Improving the 
Involvement of the Assembly 
The European Parliament supported the Commission's opinion 
that the EEC had exclusive authority to conclude the Tokyo Round 
Agreements.42 It waited until December 14, 1979, however, to ex-
press this support - three weeks after the decisive November 20 ses-
sion of the Council, and only three days before the agreements were 
concluded. During the course of the Parliamentary debates, one 
overriding concern became evident - in the future, Parliament 
wanted a more active role in the negotiation and conclusion of inter-
national agreements by the EEC. 
Paragraph 21 of the resolution ultimately passed by Parliament 
40. The insistence of (some) Member States on a participation in the groups is understand-
able for the managing of some codes, such as the Code on Standards. Although there are 
indeed some two hundred directives in that field, the national standards are multitudinous. It 
is perhaps true that Commission officials are not in the best position to defend purely individ-
ual national points of view. 
41. It seems that the Commission was not very happy with the possibility of unilateral 
intervention of a Member State and insisted on the necessity of a previous scenario. 
42. See point 19 of the resolutions. 
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evinces this concern dramatically: "[Parliament] instructs its appro-
priate committees to draw up and submit to it proposals for the par-
ticipation of the European Parliament in future trade negotiations." 
Sir Fred Catherwood, president of the Committee for Economic Ex-
ternal Relations, explained that the European Parliament "needs to 
take the place of national parliaments, which do not have the compe-
tence to discuss these things directly with the Commission and the 
Council." Many members of Parliament favored a requirement that 
would require parliamentary approval (or at least deliberation) of 
EEC international agreements before they could enter into force. 
The tenor of the debate made clear that Parliament can be expected 
to seek more active involvement in EEC international policy-making 
in the future. 
A later resolution, adopted on July 9, 1981, reconfirmed Parlia-
ment's desire for a more active role in EEC foreign policy. This reso-
lution sought a common declaration between Parliament, the 
Council, and the Commission urging conciliation in external mat-
ters; consultation by the Council before the conclusion of every 
agreement, and confidential consultation of the parliamentary com-
mittees as provided in the Luns agreement. All of these suggestions 
- which were incorporated into a resolution of February, 18, 1982 
- are to be implemented without formal amendment of the EEC 
Treaties, through agreements between the institutions concerned. 
This mechanism raises a question worthy of consideration: what 
is the legal value of inter-institutional agreements?43 These agree-
ments are obviously easier to enact than amendments to the Treaties, 
but their legal value is dubious. Some have only political value. 
Others will have legal impact, but this will usually be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. Thus, if Parliament arranges an inter-institu-
tional agreement providing a right of approval - which it does not 
seek at the moment - for international agreements, it has no legal 
guarantee that this right can be enforced against the Council. 
B. The Implementation of the MTN Results in the Community 
Legal Order 
1. The Problem of the Implementation of International Agreements 
in the Legal Order of the EEC with Special Reference to 
the Tokyo Round 
Article 228 of the EEC Treaty makes all bilateral and multilat-
eral agreements concluded by the EEC binding upon the Member 
43. See Rengeling, supra note 28, at 894. 
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States. This does not make the Member States parties to the Tokyo 
Round agreements, but it binds them through the separate legal 
structure of the Community.44 This structure makes it legally impos-
sible for a Member State to denounce a treaty concluded by the EEC 
alone.45 Mixed agreements can be denounced, but the denunciation 
applies only to those parts of the agreement .wherein the EEC ex-
ceeded its authority. Since the mixed agreements concluded in the 
Tokyo Round were the result of political, rather than legal, necessity, 
it is unlikely that Member States would be able to denounce these 
agreements. 
Agreements concluded by the EEC alone affect the domestic le-
gal order of the Member States. International Fruit Company and 
Bresciani make clear that domestic acts of transformation are not 
needed to give EEC agreements domestic effect.46 Upon conclusion 
by the Council, these international agreements immediately become 
part of the Community legal structure, subordinate to the EEC 
Treaty but superior to the acts of EEC institutions.47 
Although the Tokyo Round agreements had direct effect into do-
mestic legal orders, some of the multilateral agreements required 
specific measures of implementation to assure judicial remedies in 
the event of noncompliance. Other agreements did not require inter-
nal complements either because they corresponded to preexisting 
EEC norms or they merely prescribed rules of conduct for Member 
States. Thus, for example, there was no need for specific implemen-
tation of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures because the 
Community rules already conformed to the requirements of this 
agreement. 
· Other agreements required EEC internal complements. Regula-
tions governing EEC common agricultural policy were amended to 
comply with the obligations incurred through the Tokyo Round.48 
Tariff concessions required the adoption of regulations reducing the 
44. See Louis & BrUckner, Relations exterieures, 12 LE DROIT DE LA CoMMUNAUTE 
EcoNOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 62 (J. Megrett ed. 1980), and Bourgeois, supra note 39, at 24. 
45. See Barav, Oral Intervention, in DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COM• 
MUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS 90 (1981), 
46. See note 54 infra. 
41. See Louis & BrUckner, supra note 44, at 182 and the references quoted; Boulouis, La 
jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes relative aux relations exter-
ieures des Communautes, R.C.A.D.I. 343, 385-86 (1978); Tizzano, Recenti sviluppi in tema di 
accordi internazionali de/la CEE, DIR!TTO COMUNITAR!O E DEGLI SCAMBI INTERNAZIONALI 19, 
34 (1981). 
48. See GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Final Report on the GATT Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations in Geneva (Tokyo Round) and proposal for Council decision, COM 
(79) 514 final, at 81. 
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tariffs fixed by the External Common tariff. 49 Nontariff barriers re-
quired more elaborate domestic implementation: 
(1) The Anti-Dumping Code and the Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Duties Code were incorporated into a new regulation "for pro-
tection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries which are 
not members of the [EEC]."50 This regulation, effective January 1, 
1980, assured a strict parallelism between international and intra-com-
munity law. 
(2) The Customs Valuation Agreement was implemented through 
Council Regulation No. 1224/80 which brought a much older regula-
tion (No. 803/68) into conformity with the Tokyo Round results.51 As 
with the Anti-Dumping Code, this Regulation incorporated the Tokyo 
Round Agreement into a single community instrument. 
(3) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade posed a much 
more difficult implementation problem. Unlike the agreements dis-
cussed above, this agreement dealt with matters unrelated to the Cus-
toms Union, and thus beyond the exclusive authority of the EEC. As a 
result, there were a number of national rules and statutes governing 
these areas and the EEC was able only to adopt directives, rather than 
regulations. The Decision of the Council of January 15, 1980, ex-
plained the advantage of having directives to govern national stan-
dards. If a directive preexists, Member States may adopt "provisional 
measures" to implement EEC agreements. The Commission, however, 
retains the right - after consultation with a Committee composed of 
representatives of the Member States - to set forth final "appropriate 
measures" for implementation of the agreements, and these measures 
become binding on the Member States. In contrast, where there is no 
directive, Member States retain full power over the adoption of appro-
priate measures to implement the MTN agreement. 
(4) The Agreement on Government Procurement raised an en-
tirely different set of implementation problems. Article 228 of the EEC 
Treaty made this Agreement immediately binding on the Member 
States. However, since this Agreement contained provisions more 
favorable than existing rules governing intra-community activity, a dis-
pute arose. Some experts felt that the principle of Community prefer-
ence made the Tokyo Round rules automatically binding on all intra-
Community transactions. The Commission, believing that these coex-
isting rules created "the possibility of [public contracts] becoming sub-
ject to two sets of irreconcilable agreements,"52 chose to adopt an 
implementing directive. Existing Directive No. 77 /62/EEC53 differed 
from the terms of the Agreement on Government Procurement in two 
49. See Regulation No. 3000/79 of Dec. 20, 1979, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 342) (1979). 
50. The Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79 of Dec. 20, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L339/l) (1979). 
51. 11 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. Ll48) (1968). See proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
valuation of goods for customs purposes, COM (79) 604 final (Oct. 25, 1979). 
52. GATT Final Report, supra note 38, at 104. 
53. See COM (79) 621 final (Oct. 31, 1979), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C287/9) (1979). 
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important respects. First, it applied to supply contracts under all pub-
lic authority, rather than only those contracts concluded by central (na-
tional or federal) authorities. Second, the Directive required larger 
contracts than the Agreement before it became applicable. Ultimately, 
the Council chose to adopt Directive No. 80/767, which derogated 
from the existing directive (77 /62/EEC), without rewording it, in order 
to extend the scope of the preexisting directive. This resulted in two 
benefits: it avoided the need to consult with the German Bundesrat, 
which would have been necessary to amend directive 77 /6/EEC, due 
to a specific requirement of the German legislation, and it made fur-
ther modifications of the terms of the new Directive simpler. 
2. The Problem of .Direct Effect of Agreements 
International Fruit Company54 ("the GATT decision") specifi-
cally addressed the question of what effect the GATT would have on 
internal Community law. The court held that the possibility that the 
GATT could be derogated by contracting parties, together with the 
nonlegal dispute resolution process in the Agreement, was persuasive 
evidence that the GATT could not have direct effect on the EEC 
internal legal order. Commentators have disagreed with this inter-
pretation, insisting that the very wording of the GATT requires that 
it be given direct effect.55 National courts of Member States provide 
little help in resolving the direct effect question, since they split on 
this issue. The Italian Supreme Court left unapplied an act of Par-
liament to the extent that it failed to conform to the GA TT rules. 
German Courts, on the other hand, have denied the direct effect of 
the GATT on domestic law.56 
A second Court of Justice decision, Nederlandse Spoorwegen ,51 
stressed the need to be able to substitU;te Community law for the 
Member State's law when enforcing international commercial obli-
gations. Thus, an unpublished decision of a tribunal of Milan that 
gave effect to a provision of the GATT without reference to EEC 
jurisprudence was contrary to both the Treaty of Rome and the 
GATT system itself. 
The Bresciani58 decision, although it did not deal with the 
GATT, gives further insight into the effect of international agree-
54. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1972, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit, 1972 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1219. 
55. Waelbroeck, L'ejfet direct de /'accord re/at[/ aux echanges commerciaux du 22 Jui/let 
1972 entre la CEE el la Confederation suisse, A.S.D.I. I 13-32 (1973). 
56. See Waelbroeck, Effect of GAJT within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J.W.T.L. 614, 
619-20 (1974). 
57. Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1975 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1439. 
58. Bresciani v. Administrazione Italiana Della Finance, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J, Rep. 129. 
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ments on Member States' internal legal structures. There, the Court 
considered the effect of Article 2, paragraph I of the Yaounde Con-
vention, a provision almost identical to Article 13, paragraph 2 of the 
EEC Treaty. The Court held that the wording of the provision was 
not decisive. In addition, the absence of reciprocity in association 
agreements did not bar direct effect where the purpose of those 
agreements was to favor underdeveloped nations in an effort to en-
courage their development. In contrast, the original text of GA TT, 
discussed in International Fruit Company, centered around reciproc-
ity in trade agreements. Since the Tokyo Round also involved recip-
rocal trade agreements, the question of the direct effect of some 
dispositions of those agreements in the internal law of Member 
States is open to controversy. 
In the Po!ydor case - concerning the interpretation of the Free-
Trade Agreement between the EEC and Portugal - the Commis-
sion argued before the Court of Justice that "the concept of direct 
effect, as developed in Community law, must not, as such, be trans-
posed to the field of the Community's international relations, for two 
reasons. The first is based on the different nature and aims of inter-
national agreements. The second reason is that it is necessary to 
maintain in the context of these free-trade agreements a balance of 
the advantages and disadvantages which may exist between the par-
ties to an international treaty."59 
The Commission noted, inter alia, that the balance is substan-
tially different if private parties can enforce an international agree-
ment within the Community but cannot do so in other contracting 
states. The Commission proposed that "the Court should recognize 
direct effect only where the provisions are drafted in an entirely clear 
way for all the parties or where provisions which leave room for in-
terpretation have been clarified by the contracting parties."60 
The Court did not decide on direct effect in its Polydor decision. 
It avoided this issue by finding a distinction between the interpreta-
tion of restrictions on trade pursuant to the Treaty of Rome and the 
Free-Trade Agreement. The Court held that the two Treaties did 
not have the same purpose. The purpose of the Free-Trade Agree-
ment is to consolidate and to extend the economic relations existing 
between the Community and Portugal while the Treaty of Rome 
seeks to unite national markets into a single market having the char-
acteristics of a domestic market. 
59. Oral submissions by the Commission at the sitting of the Court, Judgment of Feb. 9, 
1982, Polydor, Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 329. 
60. These arguments have been elaborated by Bourgeois, supra note 39, at 25-26. 
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In an October 26, 1982 decision, not yet published, Hauptzo/lamt 
of Mainz and C A. Kupferberg & Cie, KG a.A., the Court has ruled 
in favor of the direct effect of Article 21, first paragraph, of the same 
Free-Trade Agreement (EEC-Portugal). The decision prohibits 
fiscal discrimination against the products imported from the other 
party of the Agreement. 
The Court of Justice stated that the contracting parties to an 
agreement could limit the internal effect of its dispositions. But, in 
the absence of the expression of such a common will, and especially 
of an indication in the agreement about the way it should be imple-
mented, it is up to each party to determine how best to achieve the 
ends fixed by the agreement. Accordingly, the fact that courts of one 
party would give direct effect to the provisions of an agreement, 
while courts of the other Party would not, is not, by itself, conclusive 
evidence of an absence of reciprocity in the implementation of the 
agreement. 
The Court also mentioned that the existence of an institutional 
framework for consultations and negotiations concerning the appli-
cation of the agreement does not prevent the courts from directly 
applying the agreement. Furthermore, the existence of specific es-
cape clauses does not by itself affect the direct applicability of some 
provisions of the agreement. Thus, the Court concluded that neither 
the nature nor the "policy" of the agreement are obstacles to a pri-
vate party trying to invoke provisions of the agreement before the 
Court. 
This conclusion has important implications. It suggests that 
there is no theoretical obstacle against the direct effect of an agree-
ment resulting from the MTN. The precision and unconditional na-
ture of the provision, which must be examined in the framework of 
each agreement, will be the test that the Court will likely apply. 
These cases also suggest that the method of approval of an inter-
national agreement by the Council - decision or regulation - is 
irrelevant to the problem of direct effect. Rather, it is the nature of a 
particular provision of Community law which determines its direct 
effect. Is the provision clear, precise, and unconditional? To what 
extent are any elements of it discretionary, i.e., to be determined by 
the final wording of the rule? The simple fact that the norm needs 
implementation measures does not deprive it of direct effect. The 
existence of a margin of discretion is the determining criterion. The 
judge cannot rely on loose standards or best endeavors clauses which 
are only rules of conduct for the authorities concerned. If there is no 
room for discretion and if the implementation measure does not con-
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form to the result pursued by the international or Community obli-
gation, the judge may check the implementation measure with the 
international or Community rule. To show a parallel, a well-estab-
lished jurisprudence exists now on the direct effect of EEC directives. 
The judge can disregard a national measure incompatible with an 
EEC directive which the State has not implemented if the obligation 
concerned is precise and unconditional.61 He can also compare the 
implementation measure and the result prescribed by the directive. 62 
The GA TT problem is somewhat more complex. It is possible 
that a citizen of a non-EEC state would contest a national measure 
of an EEC Member State before a Member State court. He would 
argue that this measure is not applicable to him in spite of its con-
formity to a Community regulation or directive, because the latter is 
not compatible with a provision of an international agreement con-
cluded by the Community. This was clearly the problem raised 
before the Court in the International Fruit Co. case, where national 
measures - the refusal to import - were based on Commission reg-
ulations that were allegedly inconsistent with the GATT. 
Even if this type of challenge is not possible, because the Court 
maintains its International Fruit holding as far as the GATT itself is 
concerned, it is not an obstacle to the recognition of direct effect of 
provisions of some other Agreement. 
On the other hand, there is no possibility of action before a na-
tional tribunal for an enterprise which complains of a violation of an 
international rule, such as the Anti-Dumping Code, by producers lo-
cated in other contracting parties, not members of the EEC. The 
Community regulation in conformity with the GA TT Code provides 
a special procedure normally initiated by a request by or on behalf 
of the industry affected.63 The national judge cannot interfere with 
this procedure and substitute his own judgment for that of the Com-
mission on the existence of dumping or of subsidies, the existence 
and extent of injury, the causal link between the dumped or subsi-
dized imports and injury, and the measures which are appropriate to 
prevent or remedy the injury.64 Those issues must be decided by, 
and applied uniformly to, the EEC as a whole. The authority to 
impose anti-dumping or countervailing duties by way of regulations 
(article 13) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community be-
61. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629, Ground 23. 
62. Nederlandse Ondernemingen v. lnspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 113-126. 
63. See Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Code of 1979 and of Regulation No. 3017 /78. 
64. See Regulation No. 3017/79, Article 6. 
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cause it is a measure of common commercial policy under article 
113. In the area of anti-dumping, the Community has not satisfied 
itself with the adoption of common principles; it has unified the rules 
and the procedure of application in such a way that the intervention 
of a Member State is purely automatic. For these reasons, the emer• 
gency decision of the tribunal of Milan65 to stop the importing of 
some fibers originating in the United States to Italy - because 
American producers were benefiting from the "artificial advantages" 
of abnormal prices of oil and natural gas - seems objectionable. 
C. Conclusion 
A number of conclusions emerge from the above analysis. First, 
there are important differences between the EEC and American legal 
systems for negotiating international trade agreements. 66 The EEC, 
unlike the United States, requires close collaboration between the 
Council - the organ of conclusion - and the Commission - the 
organ of negotiation. There is a rough balance between the Coun-
cil's right to issue directives for negotiation and the Commission's 
right to ask for modifications of those directives during the course of 
the negotiations. 
In the case of the Tokyo Round, it appears that the Commission 
generally received the directives it requested. Typical examples were 
the adoption of the Swiss Formula for tariff reductions and the tacti-
cal approach for the presentation of tariff concessions. Major dis-
putes between the two institutions occurred primarily when the 
Community had to solve highly sensitive political questions such as 
the waiver problem at the end of 1978, or the competence of the 
Community and the Member States, to conclude the Agreements. 
The absence of major difficulties between the two institutions during 
the negotiations is due to the close collaboration of the Commission 
with the Committee of Article 113. This collaboration was effective 
both for the preparation of the Community negotiating positions and 
for the actual conduct of the negotiations. For example, during the 
aborted attempt to reach a global agreement in July 1978, simultane-
ous negotiations were conducted with the titular members of the 113 
Committee under the chairmanship of an official of the Commission 
and by the Commission with the other Contracting Parties. 
A second conclusion worth noting is that the technical nature of 
65. Europe, Nos. 2885 at 6 (Apr. 9, 1980) and 2886 at 7 (Apr. 10, 1980). 
66. See Jackson, United States-EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional Problems of Economic 
Interdependence, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 453, 475 (1979). 
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the negotiations increased the role of experts. An ad hoc committee 
of national experts accompanied the Commission's officials to the 
Tokyo Round negotiations. These experts, well-acquainted with na-
tional industrial needs, looked out for industrial interests during the 
negotiations. This explains why it is difficult to find industrial or 
other interests trying to apply pressure during the actual 
negotiations. 
The central position of the Commission during the negotiations 
explains why the other contracting parties preferred to address that 
institution rather than the Council or each Member State of the 
Community. It was very difficult for third states to enter into bilat-
eral contacts in order to influence the position of the Community 
when the Community had only six members. With nine (ten) mem-
bers - or more - it is, and will be, impossible. The mediation 
function of the Commission is thus increased. 
If the process of negotiation appears to be rather effective, it is 
not democratic. In two or three Member States, national parlia-
ments have been asked to approve some agreements resulting from 
the MTN. But with the development of the commercial policy of the 
Community, their intervention will probably not be required in the 
future. If the jurisprudence of the Court is respected, mixed agree-
ments will become exceptional, required only in the case of com-
mercial treaties. The loss of power of the national parliaments is not 
balanced by the attribution of like powers to the European Parlia-
ment. Consultation with the latter is not compulsory under the 
Treaty of Rome for trade agreements. One can expect that the Euro-
pean Parliament will continue to ask for a more effective role in ex-
ternal affairs; particularly for trade agreements which traditionally 
are subject to parliamentary approval by the parliaments of the 
Member States. It is also likely that the Parliament will increasingly 
consider the political implications of future trade agreements. 
In principle, Article 113 is the legal basis for both the conclusion 
and implementation of international commercial agreements. Since 
the Parliament is not consulted on unilateral measures adopted by 
the Community to implement such agreements, it is effectively re-
moved from the entire implementation process. This is the reason 
why Sir John Steward-Clark, member of the European Parliament, 
asked the Commission to ensure that "regular annual reports are 
made available to us in the Parliament on the success of the imple-
mentation of the GATT Agreements."67 
67. 1979-1980 E. PARL. DEB. (No. 249) 250 (Dec. 13, 1979). 
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The implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements raises an-
other set of questions. We have noted the EEC's practice of adopt-
ing directives or regulations to incorporate the Agreements into 
domestic law. The risk exists that the international origin of the 
rules will disappear, particularly in the cases where national law and 
regulations have to complete Community acts. 
The implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements by the 
Community raises the problem of the effectiveness of their provi-
sions in the Community legal order. It is clear from the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice that international law has primacy over 
Community secondary legislation, but if the Court denies direct ef-
fect to the agreements, it will be impossible to give priority to the 
provision of an international agreement. The Court has decided that 
it is possible for one contracting party in an agreement based on 
"balanced and mutually advantageous arrangements" to recognize a 
direct effect and priority in its own legislation, if the other con-
tracting parties do not also recognize this effect. This author con-
cludes that as far as those agreements are part of Community law, 
with a position of superiority on secondary legislation, the national 
judge should be allowed to take those agreements into consideration 
and to give priority to them if there is a real conflict of norms be-
tween a provision of an agreement and a provision of Community 
law. 
The problem of implementation of the Tokyo Round results is 
not merely legal. It is also a problem of political will and of practical 
means. Problems raised by dumped or subsidized imports in a time 
of economic crisis, government procurement, and access to certifica-
tion are charged with political controversy. The pressures coming 
from political, national, or regional authorities and the industries 
concerned will be great. These pressures may hinder the Commis-
sion in its attempt to implement the Agreements as part of intra-
community law. The Commission does not have the necessary capa-
bility to control effectively the application of all the Agreements in 
the Member States. However precise the international and Commu-
nity rules are (and they are not always so precise), there are always 
possibilities for fraud and the resurgence of protectionism. Facing 
national administrations implementing complex national regula-
tions, the Commission cannot fully exercise its function as a watch-
dog of the Community. And it is clear that its zeal will be 
proportional to the goodwill of the partners of the Ten. 
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III. IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN JAPAN 
Mitsuo Matsushita 
299 
Since Japan is a country poor in natural resources, her traditional 
trade policy has been to import raw materials from abroad, process 
them into manufactured or semi-manufactured products, and export 
these products abroad. Therefore, the international trade environ-
ment has had a tremendous impact on the welfare of the country. 
Indeed, it is not too much to say that the dramatic economic growth 
of Japan in the 1960s and 1970s was made possible by the relatively 
free world trade system. In this sense Japan benefited a great deal 
from the Kennedy Round in the late 1960s, and probably is one of 
the countries in the world that benefited most from the Tokyo 
Round Negotiations. 
The Japanese government has been actively implementing the re-
sults of the Tokyo Round Agreements and, as explained later, the 
National Diet has enacted laws for this purpose. Some trade barriers 
have been removed or lessened by the implementation of the Tokyo 
Round Agreements. In due course, other trade barriers and restric-
tions in Japan will probably be substantially lessened by the imple-
mentation of various agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round. 
However, with regard to barriers and measures limiting Japanese 
exports to other countries ( especially to the industrialized countries 
like the United States and the Member States of the European Com-
mon Market), and foreign exports to Japan, the Tokyo Round leaves 
some questions unanswered. The United States Government has al-
leged that a number of Japanese practices are trade barriers (such as 
customs inspection processes, various safety standards, etc.). In ad-
dition, orderly marketing arrangements between Japan and the 
United States and European countries have significantly restrained 
exports from Japan to those countries. These aspects have not been 
sufficiently covered by the Tokyo Round Negotiation and the result-
ing agreements. This section will analyze the implementation of the 
Tokyo Round agreements in Japan, and will note those problems in 
international trade that were left unanswered by the negotiations. 
A. The Constitutional and Legal Framework of Japan 
Under the Japanese Constitution,68 there are three basic organs 
68. NIHONKOKU KENPO (The Constitution of Japan) entered into force May 3, 1947. An 
English translation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX (A. Blaustein and G. Flanz ed. 1973). The 
following are some of the references on the Japanese Constitution which are available in Eng-
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of the state, namely: (1) the National Diet, (2) the Cabinet, and 
(3) the Judiciary. A brief explanation of each will follow. 
The legislative branch of the Japanese government, the National 
Diet, consists of the House of Representatives and the House of 
Councillors. The National Diet is· the highest organ in the exercise 
of the state power (article 41), and the members of both houses are 
elected by the people. A legislative proposal may be introduced in 
the National Diet either by the Cabinet or by an individual member 
of the National Diet. A proposal can be introduced in either house 
except for the budget which must originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives. For a proposal to become a law it must be approved by 
both Houses. Whenever the decision of the House of Councillors is 
different from that of the House of the Representatives with regard 
to a treaty, the decision of the House of the Representatives shall be 
regarded as the decision of the National Diet as long as unanimity 
has not been obtained in a joint conference of both Houses or the 
House of Councillors has not acted on the treaty proposal within 
thirty days after it received a decision of the House of Representa-
tives approving of the treaty. 
Administrative power is vested in the Cabinet, which is com-
posed of the Prime Minister and other ministers. The Prime Minis-
ter is appointed from among the members of the National Diet by a 
resolution of the National Diet (article 67), all political parties par-
ticipating. The Prime Minister appoints the other Ministers, a ma-
jority of whom must be members of the National Diet. The Cabinet 
must resign when a resolution of no-confidence is passed in the 
House of Representatives, or when this House rejects a confidence 
resolution, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within 
ten days. The Cabinet is charged to execute general administrative 
duties including the following: (1) to execute laws; (2) to establish 
and maintain diplomatic relationships; (3) to conclude treaties; ( 4) to 
prepare the budget and introduce it in the National Diet; (5) to issue 
Cabinet orders; and (6) to declare clemency. 
The third branch of the government is the judiciary, which con-
sists of the Supreme Court and lower courts. Courts have the power 
of judicial review. Article 98(1) declares that the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land, and laws, orders, imperial decrees, and 
other regulations contrary to the provisions of the Constitution are 
lish: s. Fujii, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY (1965); D. Henderson, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 (1969). See also the 
bibliography in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, which follows the 
text of the Japanese Constitution. 
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null and void. Article 98(2) of the Constitution declares that treaties 
to which Japan is a party, and the established international law, shall 
be faithfully observed. 69 
Since the Japanese governmental system is parliamentary-cabi-
net rather than presidential, the legislative and executive powers are 
fused. However, the Judiciary is independent, and it can exercise 
judicial review of both legislative and administrative actions. 
In addition to these constitutionally mandated processes, extra-
parliamentary processes are vitally important in the policy-making 
process in Japan. Often ideas for policies are conceived in various 
ministries or in the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP), which is the 
party currently in control. When a policy is formulated within a 
ministry, officials in charge discuss the matter with key LOP persons 
and, after obtaining their informal approval, draft a legislative pro-
posal which is sent to the Legal Bureau of the Cabinet. After 
amendments are made by this Bureau, the proposal is sent back to 
the LOP for a more formal examination by the party. After this 
process, it is examined at a Cabinet meeting. After Cabinet approval 
it is introduced in the National Diet.70 As long as the LOP holds the 
majority in both Houses of the National Diet, a legislative proposal 
made by the Cabinet, after obtaining extra-parliamentary consent of 
the LOP, is almost certain to pass. If the opposition parties strongly 
oppose the proposed legislation, they may try to obstruct debate on 
the bill. However, in the area of foreign or international economic 
policies, there has been relatively little opposition raised by the mi-
nority parties to proposed bills, possibly because they were too com-
plex and technical and not very interesting to the opposition. Most 
of the international controversies in the Diet revolve around political 
issues such as the Security Treaty between the United States and 
Japan. By the same token, there was not much opposition to the 
signing and implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements. 
The Cabinet can enter into an international agreement with other 
nations without Diet approval and this agreement will bind the Jap-
anese Government as a matter of international law. However, until 
the Diet grants approval, such an agreement cannot be legally en-
forced in Japan if there is a conflicting domestic statute or if the 
agreement contains provisions which restrict the rights of citizens. 
69. Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution states: ''This Constitution shall be the supreme 
law 6f the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part 
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties con-
cluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed." CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX, supra note 68, at 8. 
70. I. MURAKAWA, SEISAKU KETTEi KATE! ("The Policy-Making Process") 125-63 (1981). 
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Despite the relative lack of opposition in the area of international 
economic policies, one cannot say that there are no conflicts in for-
eign policy-making in Japan. Quite often differences over foreign 
economic policies exist among the various agencies and ministries in 
charge of formulating and executing the policies. For example, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may have a policy of maintaining 
a friendly relationship with foreign nations and may wish to abolish 
import quotas for some agricultural products imported from over-
seas. However, the Ministry of Agriculture, Foresty and Fisheries 
(MAFF), as the advocate and promoter of Japanese agriculture, may 
have a different policy and may wish to restrict imports from abroad. 
Although, theoretically, the Cabinet is the forum in which such con-
flicts are to be resolved, it is sometimes unable to reconcile a violent 
disagreement. In these cases the LDP may moderate the conflicts or 
suggest ,a compromise solution.71 
In any event, the bureaucracy plays a vital role in Japanese poli-
tics and also in economic policy. In key ministries in the Japanese 
government, the best human resources and information about the 
industries are pooled together. It is natural then that the real power 
struggle takes place there, in the very heart of the power structure in 
Japan. In this sense, something comparable to the conflict and ten-
sion between the Congress and the Executive in the United States 
might be seen in the relationship among the key ministries.72 
These ministerial conflicts and rivalries are not openly reported, 
however. Even though it may be common knowledge among those 
people who know something about the Japanese government, there 
are no official reports on these matters. Therefore, we must be satis-
fied with reports that trickle out through newspaper accounts. Ex-
amples of such Ministerial conflicts regarding trade include the 
following. 
During the late 1970s there was an increase of imports into Japan 
of "adjusted butter" (an ingredient used in confectionary) from Eu-
rope. In 1975 imports of this item were about 3,000 tons, and they 
climbed to a high of 17,000 tons in 1980. MAFF, fearing that this 
would have some adverse effect on domestic farmers, planned an im-
port restriction. However, MF A and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) objected very strongly because these two 
ministries feared that such a restrictive measure would touch off a 
trade conflict between Japan and the European exporting countries. 
71. I. MURAKAWA, supra note 70, at 128-29. 
72. See text accompanying notes 166-73 infra. 
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Discussions were held among those ministries, and finally a compro-
mise was reached whereby MAFF would withdraw its plan to re-
strict imports of adjusted butter from Europe, and the Japanese 
government would instead request the European producers and/ or 
their governments to adopt some voluntary measure to restrain ex-
ports from those countries to Japan.73 In this instance, there was a 
conflict of policies among the agencies, the MAFF basically repre-
senting the interests of domestic producers and other ministries em-
phasizing the importance of a trade relationship among trading 
partners. 
In the U.S.-Japan negotiations on textiles and autos, there were 
also policy differences between MITI and MFA. In the 1974 textile 
negotiations, MITI emphasized the importance of protecting domes-
tic producers of the products and opposed concessions on the part of 
the Japanese government to the United States government. MF A 
emphasized the importance of friendly relations and took a more 
flexible attitude toward such concessions.74 
In the auto negotiation,75 MITI took the position that it should 
have charge of the negotiations with the United States government, 
since whatever agreement was reached between the two governments 
must be implemented domestically by way of administrative gui-
dance or legal measure, and MITI has some control and influence 
over the auto industry in Japan, whereas MF A does not. MF A, on 
the other hand, maintained that it should be commissioned with the 
task of negotiating with the United States government, since such 
negotiation was part of diplomacy over which it had "exclusive" 
control and authority. The Minister of MITI, when asked his view 
regarding the negotiating authority in the Committee on Commerce 
and Industry of the House of Representatives in the National Diet, 
answered: "Properly MITI should be in charge of this negotia-
tion."76 Eventually, a compromise was reached, whereby MF A "con-
ducted" the negotiation but MITI was extensively involved. 
73. Asahi Newspaper, Mar. 4, 1981, at 9 (morning ed.). 
74. Details on the textile negotiation and its result are available in Nichibei senikyotei ni 
kansuru gyosei sosyo kiroku (Record of the Administrative Litigation concerning the Textile 
Agreement between the United States and Japan), SEN! SANGYO RENMEI (The Federation of 
Textile Industries in Japan) (1974). This report has been translated into English and can be 
found in the course materials on Japanese Law at Harvard Law School (1977-1978). 
75. See, e.g., INTL. TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, (BNA) Nos. 70-77 (Mar.-
May 1981) and particularly No. 76, at A-1 (May 6, 1981). 
76. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Feb. 28, 1981, at 3 (morning ed.). 
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B. The Relationship Between the Constitution, Treaties and 
.Domestic Laws 
Article 73(3) of the Japanese Constitution provides that the Cabi-
net is empowered to enter into a treaty with other nations. However, 
an attached proviso requires the Cabinet to obtain prior or, depend-
ing on the circumstances, subsequent approval by the National Diet. 
This approval requirement is designed to protect individual rights 
that treaties might restrict, by granting the National Diet some con-
trol over the treaty-making power of the Cabinet. 
Not every international agreement entered into by the Cabinet 
requires Diet approval. Only if an international agreement entered 
into by the Cabinet amounts to a "treaty" under article 73(3) of the 
Constitution, must the Cabinet obtain approval from the National 
Diet. 
It is generally held that an agreement entered into by the Japa-
nese government is a "treaty" in this sense only if it contains provi-
sions binding or prohibiting the conduct of private individuals.77 
There are international agreements for which no approval by the 
National Diet is necessary. Some examples are (1) an international 
agreement pertaining to technical details of diplomacy; (2) an inter-
national agreement providing for detailed rules for implementation 
of a "treaty" which has already been approved by the National Diet; 
and (3) an international executive agreement within the framework 
of the powers delegated to the Cabinet by legislation.78 
Even where theoretically required, the approval requirement is 
not strictly observed. Often the government argues that agreements 
fall into the category of international agreements that need not to be 
submitted to the Diet. The 1974 United States-Japan Textile Agree-
ment is one example. There are also a number of commercial agree-
ments between various nations and Japan providing for rights and 
obligations of the governments involved which seem to a.ff ect the 
rights of individuals, and yet were dealt with as "executive agree-
ments" and not as "treaties." A few examples are (1) the Agreement 
between the Japanese Government and the Government of Malta 
Concerning Trade,79 (2) the Agreement between the Japanese Gov-
77. I. SATO, KENPOKAISHAKU NO SHOMONDAI (Problems in Constitutional Interpretations) 
217 (1953); Sato, Kokkai no joyakushoninken to kokankobun (Function of the Diet to Approve 
the Treaty and the Constitutional Problems of Exchange of Notes), 19 JocHI HOOAKU RONSHU 
(Sophia Law Review) 135-60 (Mar. 1976). 
78. Sato, Kokkai no joyakushoninken to kokankobun (Function of the Diet to Approve the 
Treaty and the Constitutional Problems of Exchange of Notes), id. at 148 & 154-60. 
79. MOFA Notification No. 275 (1968). 
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ernment and the Government of the Republic of Ivory Coast Con-
cerning Trade, 80 and (3) the Agreement between the Japanese 
Government and the Government of the Republic of Central Africa 
Concerning Trade.81 
Japanese government officials often take the position that if an 
international economic agreement requires domestic legislation to 
implement it, then the Cabinet need not obtain approval from the 
National Diet. Rather, the implementation of the agreement will 
take place either through domestic legislation already enacted by the 
National Diet or, if such legislation is lacking, the government will 
introduce the necessary legislation for Diet approval. When the 
United States-Japan Textile Agreement was entered into between 
the two governments, the opposition parties asked why the govern-
ment had entered into such an agreement - which would have a 
serious impact on the freedom of trade in Japan - without submit-
ting it to the National Diet. The Director General of the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau answered as follows: 
If. . .. an international agreement is enforced not as such but through a 
domestic law, then restrictions of the rights of individuals are governed 
by that domestic law. In this situation, we believe that such an agree-
ment need not be submitted to the National Diet. When our govern-
ment and a foreign government have agreed on a matter under the 
Constitution, it is not necessary to put such agreement under the demo-
cratic control of the National Diet as long as such agreement is not 
enforced directly (that is, such agreement does not impose obligations 
and restrictions upon the conduct of citizens in Japan) and is not in 
conflict with a treaty which has been approved by the National Diet. It 
is to be understood as an executive agreement of which no such ap-
proval is necessary.s2 
The GAIT was submitted to and approved by the National Diet. 
Accordingly, it is a "treaty" in the sense of Article 73(3) of the Con-
stitution, and the Cabinet probably had broad power to enter into 
executive agreements in order to implement provisions of GAIT. 
However, some Tokyo Round Codes have been submitted to the Na-
tional Diet for approval. Also, some amendments to the domestic 
legislation were made in order to incorporate these agreements into 
Japanese domestic laws on tariffs and trade. The Cabinet could have 
chosen not to submit these agreements to the National Diet for its 
approval on the theory that they are implementations of GAIT and 
80. MOFA Notification No. 118 (1970). 
81. MOFA Notification No. 259 (1970). 
82. Testimony of the Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in Hearing of the Commit-
tee of Budget of the House of Councillors, 67th Diet, the Record of the Committee Hearing No. 
7, at 15 (Jan. 9, 1971). 
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the Cabinet has already been given the power to enter into executive 
agreements for its implementation. Approval was probably sought 
because, while the provisions of GA TT were so general, much of the 
language of the Codes was more specific. Consequently the govern-
ment felt it necessary to submit them to the National Diet to make 
sure that the National Diet had no objection to the contents of the 
various codes. 
On July 27, 1979, the Japanese government signed the Geneva 
Protocol incorporating the results of the tariff negotiations in the To-
kyo Round. As to most of the other codes, the Japanese government 
signed them on December 17, 1979, on the condition that the govern-
ment would accept them when the National Diet had given its ap-
proval. These agreements were formally and officially accepted on 
April 25, 1980, after approval by the National Diet. The Tokyo 
Round Codes are thus "treaties" in the sense of the Japanese Consti-
tution. In addition, some implementing domestic laws incorporating 
the terms agreed upon in the Codes have been enacted. 
A problem arises when a treaty conflicts with a provision of the 
Constitution. For example, if a provision of one of the Tokyo 
Round Codes or implementing legislation conflicts with a constitu-
tional provision, which is given supremacy? The answer is not clear. 
One theory maintains that the Constitution prevails over a treaty be-
cause of the procedure for amending the Constitution. In order to 
amend the Constitution, a referendum is required. However, the 
conclusion of a treaty only needs the approval of the National Diet. 
Thus, should a treaty be given priority over the Constitution, it 
would mean that the Constitution, which normally requires a na-
tional referendum to amend it, can instead effectively be amended 
by the conclusion of a treaty which conflicts with the Constitution. 
This would be contrary to the basic principle of the sovereignty of 
the people that is regarded as one of the fundamental principles of 
the Constitution. 83 
On the other hand, the theory that a treaty prevails over the Con-
stitution maintains that the Japanese Constitution is based on the 
principle of internationalism, under which the Constitution - which 
is the expression of the national will of one nation, must yield to a 
treaty - which is the expression of the will of the international 
community.84 
The former theory is more persuasive than the latter, since to 
83. Professor Sato takes this position in I. SATO, NJHONKOKU KENPO GAISETSU (A General 
Explanation of the Constitution of Japan) 469 (rev. ed. 1980). 
84. I. Sato, supra note 83, at 467-68. 
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hold that a treaty prevails over the Constitution would mean that the 
most fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution (such as 
the bill of rights) could be overridden if the Cabinet decided to enter 
into a treaty repudiating such rights. On its face, this seems absurd. 
In the Sunakawa case,85 the Supreme Court implied that the 
Constitution prevails over a treaty. The case concerned the effect of 
the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Ja-
pan which was based on the Security Treaty between those two 
countries. 86 The Supreme Court stated that the Security Treaty had 
great political importance, and was not subject to judicial review by 
the courts unless some provisions of the Treaty were clearly and obvi-
ously unconstitutional. In this particular case the Supreme Court 
adopted the doctrine of "political question" and thereby avoided ju-
dicial review of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty. It is, 
however, noteworthy that, in dicta, the Court recognized the possibil-
ity of judicial review of certain treaties, when some provisions of the 
treaties seem clearly unconstitutional. 
Article 22 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the freedom 
of occupation. Freedom of occupation is interpreted to include the 
freedom of trade or business. This freedom, however, can be re-
stricted if such a restriction is necessary for the public welfare. 87 
Since the freedom of engaging in export, import, or other types of 
international economic transactions is regarded as a part of the free-
dom of occupation, these transactions are covered by Article 22 of 
the Constitution.88 Under the Tokyo Round Government Procure-
ment Code, for example, the Japanese government is, in principle, 
obligated to maintain open tendering procedures in government pro-
curement contracting. Under the domestic rules enacted to imple-
ment this code, the government agencies and some government 
corporations must use open tendering or selective tendering rather 
than an individually negotiated contract in purchasing instruments 
from suppliers. For example, a supplier who, under the individually 
negotiated contract procedure, has supplied some instruments to the 
85. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1959, Supreme Court, Japan, 13 Saiko saibansho keiji hanrei shu 
[Sai-han Keishu] 3223. 
86. In this case, a person was indicted on the charge of trespassing on a military installa-
tion of the U.S. Air Force in Japan. The indictment was made under the Criminal Special 
Measures Law (Keiji tokubetsu ho). The defendant's counsel alleged that this law, imple-
mented by the Status of Forces Agreement and the Security Treaty, violated Article 9 of the 
Constitution which prohibits Japan from exercising military power for the purpose of solving 
international conflicts. 
87. See cases cited in note 89 infra. 
88. See The COCOM Decision, Judgment of July 8, 1969, District Court, Tokyo, 20 Gy-
osei saibansho hanketsu roku [Gyo-han] 842. 
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government corporation operating telecommunications may be de-
feated in bidding under the new open tendering system, because of a 
higher price which he offers to the government corporation. This 
supplier may bring an action against the government alleging that 
the new domestic bid system based on the Government Procurement 
Code denies the constitutionally protected freedom of contract 
which should include a freedom on the part of the government cor-
poration to select a supplier as it sees fit. Moreover, he may argue 
that this contract system deprives the corporation of the right to 
choose suppliers and deprives him of the right to be chosen as the 
supplier. Or the government corporation may raise a claim alleging 
that it enjoys the right to select a supplier, which cannot be denied by 
the Government Procurement Code. What is the constitutional im-
plication of such allegations? 
A number of cases89 address the issue of whether or not domestic 
legislation restricting the rights of individuals was justifiable under 
the Constitution if the legislation was designed to achieve some so-
cioeconomic goal. The Supreme Court has held that a judgment as 
to whether or not a restriction is necessary to achieve a socioeco-
nomic goal is best made by the legislative branch of the government 
and should, in principle, be left to the discretion of the National 
Diet.90 Under this reasoning, if a law that restricts the rights of indi-
viduals is designed to achieve some social or economic policy (for 
89. See Shimizu v. Japan, Judgment of Jan. 26, 1955, Supreme Court, Japan, 26 Sai-han 
Keishu 586, as translated and reproduced in J. Maki, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 
(1964) (A translation of this decision is included in the course materials on Japanese Law at 
Harvard Law School (1977-1978)); K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 
Judgment of Apr. 30, 1975, Supreme Court, Japan, 3 Saiko saibansho minji hanrei shu (Sai-
han minshu] 665, as translated by M. Kirkpatrick and published in 8 LAW IN JAPAN 194-204 
(1975). For a comment on this case in English, see Haley, The Freedom lo Choose an Occupa-
tion and the Constitutional Limits of Legislative .Discretion - K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of 
Hiroshima Prefecture, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 188-94 (1975). 
90. In Marushin Sangyo K.K., a company was indicted for erecting a building which vio-
lated the Retail Business Adjustment Special Measures Law (Kouri shogyo chosei tokubetsu 
sochi ho, Law No. 155 of 1959). This law requires a building developer to file a report with the 
local government and obtain a license to lease or assign to small shopkeepers. The law dele-
gates to local governments the power to condition licensing on fulfillment of certain terms. 
The Ohsaka Prefecture conditioned such licensing on a zoning regulation which required that 
new buildings for shops be built at least 700 meters from existing buildings housing small 
shops. The requirement was designed to mitigate "excessive competition" among the existing 
shops, thereby protecting small "Mom and Pop" stores. The defendant Marushin Sangyo 
K.K. erected a building within the 700 meter limit and leased it to storekeepers without ob-
taining a license. Faced with a criminal indictment, the company argued that the Retail Busi-
ness Law and zoning regulation thereunder violated Article 22 of the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court held the law constitutional on the ground that the judiciary must not question 
the wisdom of the National Diet on issues involving protective legislation. Arguably the case 
supports the principle that courts should adopt 'judicial passivism" and refrain from exercis• 
ingjudicial review over the wisdom oflegislation when it involves socioeconomic or industrial 
policies. 
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example, the protection of small enterprises), the Court will not 
judge the wisdom of such restriction. Under this rule, any legislation 
designed to achieve an economic policy (including international eco-
nomic policy) will be justified as furthering the public interest goal. 
Incidental restrictions on the freedom of trade will not invalidate the 
law, unless they are flagrantly unreasonable. Domestic regulations 
to implement the Government Procurement Code are likely to be 
regarded as regulations enacted for the purpose of embodying an 
international economic policy. Thus, it is almost certain that any reg-
ulation implementing the Tokyo Round Code on Government Pro-
curement will be held constitutional. More generally, since most of 
the Tokyo Round Codes and implementing domestic laws are 
designed to achieve some economic policy goals, it is unlikely that 
they will be subject to any legitimate constitutional challenge. 
A second question arises when a Tokyo Round Code conflicts 
with a preexisting domestic law. Although there are no cases di-
rectly on point, commentators91 agree that a treaty should be given 
higher priority than a domestic law or regulation regardless of when 
the treaty was approved by the National Diet. Accordingly, if there 
is a conflict between a domestic law or regulation and a provision in 
the Tokyo Round Codes or implementing laws, the latter will prevail 
over the former. 
Articles maintaining that a treaty overrides a conflicting domestic 
law are based on Article 98(2) of the Constitution which declares 
that a treaty and the established international law shall be faithfully 
observed. To admit that a law can exist which conflicts with a treaty 
would be contrary to the command ofthis constitutional provision.92 
Also, the effectiveness of Article 98(2) of the Constitution is guaran-
teed only by maintaining the supremacy of a treaty over a conflicting 
domestic law and that this constitutional provision restrains the Na-
tional Diet from enacting a law which would deny the effect of a 
treaty the National Diet has already approved.93 It seems likely that 
courts will accept this analysis if this issue ever arises. 
Governmental inaction can also be a violation of the Tokyo 
Round Codes. For example, if the government has not taken a 
measure that it should have taken under one of the Codes, this inac-
tion can be regarded as a violation. Legal remedies for such inaction 
are discussed below. 
91. I. SATO,supra note 83, at 467; Y. TAKANO, KOKUSAIHO GAIRON (A General Theory of 
International Law) 84 (1969). 
92. I. SATO, supra note 83, at 467. See also note 2 supra. 
93. Y. TAKANO, KENPO TO JOYAKU (The Constitution and Treaties) 209 (1960). 
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Only treaties approved by the National Diet are covered by Arti-
cle 98(2) of the Constitution and given supremacy over domestic law. 
International agreements entered into by the Japanese government 
and a foreign government without approval by the National Diet, 
will not be granted supremacy. This necessarily follows from the 
fact that only approval of a treaty can guarantee that the Cabinet has 
not usurped the National Diet's legislative power. 
Of course, in practice, a court will always try to reconcile interna-
tional agreements with domestic legislation, and will not lightly find 
a conflict. 
C. Laws in Japan Regulating International Trade 
There are various public laws in Japan which regulate and con-
trol international transactions. In addition, there are many adminis-
trative regulations that implement these basic laws. One salient 
feature of these laws and their enforcement is that the enforcement 
agencies (!. e. , the various ministries) are given wide powers to enact 
rules and regulations. Unless one is familiar with these administra-
tive regulations, it is difficult to understand the realities of enforce-
ment. Moreover, there are some laws that regulate domestic affairs 
(such as various safety standard laws for appliances, foods, cars, and 
so forth) and yet have a great impact on international trade. Also 
there may be de facto barriers to trade, such as the distribution sys-
tem, business customs and practices, language and so on. Since it is 
impossible to describe all of these laws, regulations and customs, we 
must be satisfied with a description of the most basic laws on trade. 
The basic public laws in Japan regulating international trade are 
(I) the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law94 (herein-
after referred to as the Control Law), (2) the Export and Import 
Transactions Law95 (hereinafter referred to as the Transactions 
Law), (3) the Customs Tariff Law,96 and (4) the Tariff Law.97 In ad-
dition to these, there are a number of laws which affect foreign trade, 
including the Anti-Monopoly Law,98 the Export Insurance Law,99 
94. Gaikokukawase oyobi gaikokuboeki kanri ho (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law), Law No. 228 of 1949 (as amended). 
95. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho (Export and Import Transactions Law), Law No. 299 of 1952 
(as amended). 
96. Kanzei teiritsu ho (Customs Tariff Law), Law No. 54 of 1910 (as amended). 
97. Kanzei ho (Tariff Law), Law No. 61 of 1954 (as amended). 
98. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi koseitorihiki no kakuho nikansuru horitsu (Anti-Mo-
nopoly Law), Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended). 
99. Yushutsu hoken ho (Export Insurance Law), Law No. 67 of 1950 (as amended), 
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the Export Inspection Law100 and various other laws providing for 
inspection and approval of products (such as the Food Sanitation 
Law, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, the Industrial Standardization 
Law, etc. 101). This section describes export and import controls exer-
cised under these laws. 
1. Export Control 
The basic laws controlling exports from Japan are the Control 
Law and the Transactions Law. The former authorizes MITI to en-
force an export approval system on some designated commodities, 
and the latter permits private exporters to enter into export agree-
ments between themselves under some government supervision. 
Article 47 of the Control Law provides that "[E]xport of goods 
from Japan shall be permitted with the minimum restrictions 
thereon consistent with the purpose of this Law." As is clear from 
this language, the basic principle is to keep export restrictions to a 
minimum. It is also clear that export controls must be "consistent 
with the purpose of this Law." The purpose of the law, as set forth 
in article 1, is to encourage the healthy development of the national 
economy and to protect the balance of payments equilibrium. Any 
restriction of exports beyond these stated purposes would be held 
outside the scope of this law and therefore "ultra vires." 
Under Article 48 of the Control Law, MITI is authorized to en-
force an export approval system through a cabinet order. In 1949 
the Cabinet issued "the Export Trade Control Order'' 102 (hereinaf-
ter, the Export Order) authorizing MIT! to put into effect an export 
approval system. This export control has been utilized for a variety 
of purposes including, among others, to prevent rare materials (such 
as tungsten) from being drained from the domestic market, to ob-
serve international commitments (such as the embargo enforced vis-
a-vis Rhodesia, COCOM countries, Iran, etc.), to maintain public 
order (i.e., to prohibit exporting of narcotics, weapons, obscene liter-
ature, etc.), and, above all, to carry out orderly marketing 
agreements. 
The constitutionality of export controls under the Export Order 
has been challenged at least twice. In the COCOM case,103 the 
100. Yushutsu kensa ho (Export Inspection Law), Law No. 97 of 1957 (as amended). 
101. On those laws, see Japan's Import System, JETRO EXPORTERS' GUIDE 16 (1979). 
102. Yushutsu boeki kanri rei (Export Trade Control Cabinet Order), No. 378 of 1949 (as 
amended). 
103. The COCOM Decision, Judgment of July 8, 1969, District Court, Tokyo, 20 Gyo-han 
842. 
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plaintiffs had planned to exhibit some products in a trade show in 
Mainland China but their request for export approval had been de-
nied by MITI because those products were contraband under the 
COCOM agreement. The plaintiffs maintained that whereas MITI 
could only exercise export controls if the purpose of the control was 
"within the limit of necessity for the maintenance of the balance of 
international payments and the sound development of international 
trade or national economy," the export control in question was exer-
cised for international political or strategic goals and thus fell 
outside the scope of the Order. 
The Tokyo District Court agreed that the controls exerted by 
MITI were for the purpose of international politics or strategy and 
thus outside the scope of the Control Law. In particular the Court 
held that the exercise of controls infringed upon the constitutional 
guarantee of the freedom of occupation and was unconstitutional. 
But the plaintiffs were denied pecuniary indemnity since there was 
no malicious intent or negligence by the government officials who 
made this decision. 
The Textile case also challenged MITI's export control. 104 This 
time the issue was an export control to enforce the 1974 United 
States-Japan Textile Agreement in which the Japanese Government 
had agreed to restrain export of textile products from Japan to the 
United States. The Fe~eration of Textile Industries of Japan, which 
represented the Japanese textile producers, brought a suit against the 
government alleging that the contemplated control would be uncon-
stitutional in that (1) it would be contrary to the principle of freedom 
of occupation embodied in Article 22 of the Constitution; and (2) it 
would be contrary to provisions of GA TT which in principle pro-
hibit restrictions on exports. This suit was withdrawn after the Mul-
tifibre Agreement was completed in 1974 within the framework of 
GATT, and the Federation was satisfied with the treatment of Japa-
nese textile exports under that Agreement. 
MITI often uses administrative guidance105 as a means of control 
in conjunction with the Export Order. Through informal request, 
104. Details on this case can be found in Nichibei senikyotei ni kansum gyosei sosyo kirok11 
(Record of the Administrative Litigation concerning the Textile Agreement between the 
United States and Japan) (1974), supra note 74. 
105. For articles written in English on administrative guidance from a legal standpoint, see 
Narita,Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1968); Sanekata,Administrative Guidance 
and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 65 (1977); Smith, Prices and Petroleum in Japan: 
1973-1974-A Study of Administrative Guidance, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 81 (1977); Davis,Adminis-
trative Guidance in Japan, 41 SOPHIA U. Soc10-EcoN. INST. BULL. (1972); Matsushita, Admin-
istrative Guidance and Economic Regulation in Japan, 1 JAPAN Bus. L.J. 209 (Dec. 1980). 
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MITI may ask exporters to increase the price, or reduce the quantity, 
of exports to a certain country. If this guidance is ignored, MITI will 
usually invoke an order. A prominent example of this was the 1981 
auto export restraint. 106 Faced with the possibility that the United 
States Congress would pass a law establishing limits on the imports 
of autos from foreign countries, MITI decided to implement volun-
tary export restraints on Japanese autos. Accordingly, MITI "di-
rected" that each auto exporter keep the number of autos exported to 
the United States within a specified maximum indicated by MITI. If 
this maximum number was likely to be exceeded, MITI would in-
voke the compulsory export approval system under the Export Or-
der. As this example shows, administrative guidance is often ·a 
preliminary stage for initiation of export controls. 
The second basic law controlling Japanese exports is the Trans-
actions Law. The function of the Transactions Law is to authorize 
private exporters to enter into an export agreement which will be 
exempted from the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law. 107 If such an ex-
port agreement only contains terms of export trade (i.e., export price, 
quantity, etc.), then it need only be filed with MITI. Conversely, if 
the agreement contains some business terms restricting domestic 
trade (i.e., purchase terms of merchandise to be exported108), MITI's 
approval must be obtained. 
Formally the Transactions Law only provides for private export 
agreements and does not involve government export control except 
for orders issued under article 28. In practice, however, the Govern-
ment is normally involved. Usually MITI advises exporters to enter 
into export agreements whenever it foresees some possible trade con-
flict with an importing country. In this way, an export agreement 
entered into under MITI's advice is used to carry out governmental 
trade policy. MIT! sometimes advises exporters to enter into an ex-
port agreement fixing a price or setting a quantity to a specified 
country with a threat that if such advice is ignored MITI will 
promptly invoke compulsory export control as provided for in the 
Export Order.109 
106. See, e.g., INTL. TRADE REPORTER'S U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, supra note 75. 
107. Article 33 (1). 
108. Articles 5-2 (l) & 11 (4). 
109. In connection with In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 513 F. Supp. 1100 
(E.D. Pa. 1981), MITI, in a statement issued to an American court, claimed that it "directed" 
Japanese exporters of television sets to the United States to form an export cartel and fixed 
export prices. MITI also claimed that if the exporters had failed to comply with this directive, 
it would have invoked a compulsory export approval mechanism at once. For details see Mat-
sushita, Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARV. INTL, L.J. 103 (1979). 
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Also, under Article 28 of the Transactions Law, MITI is author-
ized to issue .an order binding export prices, quantity or other terms 
of business, when a private export agreement is entered and proves 
inadequate. This provision is invoked when an exporter's agreement 
is not effective due to activities of outsiders or when the terms of 
business set up by the agreement (export price or export quantity, 
etc.) are not satisfactory. If this order is issued by MITI, it is binding 
on every exporter, including the participants in the agreement. 
In the Zenith case, 110 some Japanese TV manufacturer-exporters 
were challenged by two American TV manufacturers for alleged 
dumping and cartel activities. In connection with this case, MITI 
issued a statement, which was submitted to the American court 
where the case was pending. MITI alleged that it had advised these 
enterprises to enter into the export agreement as to TV sets to be 
exported to the United States, and, had this advice not been 
honored, MITI would have invoked an order under the Export Or-
der. Such an order would have yielded a result identical to the pri-
vate export agreement entered into under MITI's device. 
Export agreements under the Transactions Law have perhaps 
been the most important policy tool for MITI to effectuate "orderly 
marketing agreements" with foreign countries, notably the United 
States. In 1968, there was an informal discussion between the offi-
cials of the U.S. government and Japanese steel industry representa-
tives regarding the voluntary export restraint to be exercised by 
Japan. Thist informal restriction was put into effect by means of an 
export agreement entered into among the Japanese exporters of steel 
to the United States. 111 In 1974, the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission decided that the domestic specialty steel industry had been 
injured due to imports from foreign countries, and the U.S. Govern-
ment took measures to restrict the quantity of imports of specialty 
steel into the United States.112 The Japanese Government advised 
the exporters to enter into a voluntary restraint agreement to supple-
ment the United States import control. Also in 1977, the U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission issued a determination that the U.S. 
television industry had been injured by imports of television sets 
110. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981), 
11 I. This arrangement, however, was challenged in the United States by a U.S. consumer 
group. See Consumers Union of the United States v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (1974), cerl. 
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). 
112. United States Intl Trade Commission, Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, Report to 
the President on Investigation TA-201-5 Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, UNITED 
STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 756 (Jan, 1976). 
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from abroad. 113 President Carter, instead of accepting the tariff in-
crease recommended by the Commission, chose to negotiate with the 
Japanese government to obtain a voluntary restraint of exports. 114 
MIT! advised exporters of television sets to enter into an agreement 
fixing the maximum number of sets to be exported to the United 
States: The agreement between the U.S. government and the Japa-
nese government stated that the Japanese government would utilize 
the Transactions Law and the private agreement entered into there-
under to effectuate this governmental agreement. 
Even though export cartel agreements are formally private in na-
ture, there is usually a strong government hand involved in such 
agreements, and realistically we can say that the Transactions Law is 
one of the important policy tools available to MIT! in enforcing ex-
port controls. 
2. Import Control 
There are several major laws designed to control imports: the 
Control Law, the Transactions Law and the Customs Tariff Law. 
Moreover, the Tariff Law provides for procedures concerning im-
ports and the collection of duties. In addition, there are also a 
number of other laws which prohibit or restrict importation of spe-
cific products into Japan. 
Article 52 of the Control Law provides for an import approval 
system. This article states: "In order to ensure healthy development 
of foreign trade and national economy, any person desiring to effect 
import may be required to obtain approval therefor as provided for 
by Cabinet Order." It should be noted that, unlike article 47 and 
article 48(2) which concern export control, there is no language in 
this article which requires that import controls be kept within the 
limits of that necessary minimum in light of "the maintenance of the 
balance of international payments and the sound development of in-
ternational trade or national economy." Although the language in 
article 52 authorizing import controls "in order tp ensure healthy de-
velopment of foreign trade and national economy" may suggest that 
an import control exercised for a purpose other than that of ensuring 
healthy development of foreign trade and national economy is "ultra 
I 13. United Slates Intl Trade Commission, Television Receivers, Color and Monochrome, 
Assembled or Nol Assembled, Finished or Nol Finished, and Subassemblies Thereof, Report lo 
the President on Investigation TA-201-19 under Section 201(/J) of the Trade Act of 1974, UNITED 
STATES INTL. TRADE COMMISSION PUBLICATION 808 (March 1977). 
114. President's Memorandum for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 13 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 761 (May 20, 1977). 
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vires," the outer limit of the power of the government to control im-
ports is not as clearly defined as in the case of export control. This 
provision may be interpreted to mean that the freedom of import is 
not emphasized as much as the freedom of export. 
It should also be noted that there is no explicit requirement of a 
finding of "injury" to a domestic industry before an import control 
under the Import Order can be initiated. In view of the fact that 
Article XIX of GATT requires a finding of injury to the domestic 
industry before invoking import control, and also in view of the fact 
that Japan is a signatory of GATT, the Japanese Government 
should probably find an injury to a domestic industry before it en-
forces an import restriction on a particular item. 
Under Article 52 of the Control Law, MITI is authorized to es-
tablish an import quota (I.Q.) system. If an I.Q. system is estab-
lished with regard to a specific item, a person desiring to import this 
item must obtain MITI's approval before he can apply for an import 
license for such a product. In the 1950s and 1960s this I.Q. system 
was widely used to restrict imports of many kinds of items. How-
ever, since the late 1960s, the number of items under the I.Q. system 
has dropped sharply due to the trend toward liberalization. 115 There 
are some residual items which are still controlled: (1) meat and 
dairy products, (2) marine products, (3) miscellaneous beans and oil-
stuff seeds, (4) fruits, vegetables and preparations thereof, (5) cereals, 
(6) coal, and (7) hides and leather products. 116 Import control under 
the Control Law is exercised for various purposes, among which the 
most important is the protection of domestic industries. 
In addition to the Control Law, there are a number of laws regu-
lating or prohibiting the importation of certain items, as specified in 
each statute. In 1982 the number was twenty-seven. 117 Some of 
these laws contain a provision which restricts or prohibits the impor-
tation of the item covered by the law. Other laws only set up stan-
dards of quality of a product to be observed by the seller of such an 
item, whether domestically manufactured or imported. Yet other 
laws require the sellers of such items to obtain a license from public 
authorities. However, they all affect imports in one way or another. 
The Transactions Law permits importers of a commodity to enter 
into an import agreement fixing a purchase price, limiting the maxi-
mum quantity to be purchased, setting a minimum standard for 
115. See NIPPON NO HIKANZEI SHOKEKI (NontariffBarriers in Japan) 130 (K. Komiya ed. 
1972). 
116. Japan's Import System, supra note IOI, at 2. 
117. Id. at 16. 
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quality, or restricting channels of import. Unlike an export agree-
ment, an import agreement can be entered into among importers of a 
commodity only if one of the following requirements is satisfied: 
(1) there must be a substantial restraint of competition or a monop-
oly in the country or place of export to Japan of the commodity in 
question; (2) an import agreement is necessary to carry out an agree-
ment between the Japanese Government and the government of the 
exporting country; or (3) a pooling of the demand for a raw material 
through an import agreement is necessary to insure that there is a 
sufficient demand in Japan for the raw material to be exploited in a 
foreign country, thereby facilitating the exploitation and develop-
ment of this raw material in the foreign country. 118 
When importers wish to enter into an import agreement they 
must file the agreement with MITI and obtain its approval. 119 As in 
the case of an export agreement, MITI often advises importers to 
enter into an import agreement. Thus, an import agreement under 
the Transactions ½aw is also a policy instrument used by MITI to 
regulate foreign trade. Import agreements of this type are deemed 
exempt from Japanese anti-monopoly laws. If necessary, MITI may 
adopt a binding import order under the Transactions Law. 120 
Import agreements are used less often than export agreements 
under the Transactions Law. However, import agreements under 
the administrative guidance of the government will probably become 
increasingly important in the future, as many Japanese industries 
lose their comparative production advantages vis-a-vis some devel-
oping countries. 
Two important examples of import agreements should be men-
tioned. The first is the Scrap-Iron case. In 1974, under the Export 
Administration Act, the United States embargoed the export of 
scrap-iron as a result of a domestic shortage. MITI initiated a corre-
sponding import control under the Control Law. When the United 
States lifted the embargo, MITI dropped its import control and ad-
vised the· importers of scrap-iron to establish an impoit agreement to 
control purchases of scrap-iron and avoid touching off new export 
controls on the American side.121 
The second case is that of Chinese silk fiber. Due to a loss of 
comparative advantage, the Japanese producers of raw silk had lost 
118. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho (Export and Import Transactions Law), Law No. 299 of 1952 
(as amended), Article 7-2 (1). 
119. Id. at article 7-2 (1). 
120. Id. at article 30 (1). 
121. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 8, 1975, at 4 (morning ed.). 
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their market share to Korean and Chinese producers. To cope with 
this situation an amendment to the Silk Price Stabilization Law was 
adopted whereby a government corporation was given the exclusive 
right to import raw silk from abroad. However, foreign producers 
could easily avoid this import regulation by processing the silk 
slightly and thereby converting it to semi-processed fibre, (which was 
very easy to convert back to raw silk.)122 MITI, concerned that Jap-
anese producers would be damaged by imports of this product, ad-
vised importers of semi-processed silk to enter into an import 
agreement to establish a price ceiling. At the same time, a binding 
order was invoked to ensure that every importer complied with this 
maximum price. 123 
The Japanese Government entered into an orderly marketing 
agreement with the Korean Government to implement a voluntary 
restraint on the export of semi-processed fibre to Japan. 124 However, 
since the Chinese Government refused to restrain exports of the 
products to Japan, MITI utilized the Transactions Law to effectuate 
an import agreement to control Chinese imports. 
The import control exercised under the Silk Price Stabilization 
Law has been challenged by necktie producers in Japan. As noted 
above, the Silk Price Stabilization Law gives a government entity the 
exclusive right to import raw silk from abroad. The government cor-
poration sells imported raw silk in the domestic market at the price 
prevailing in the domestic market, which is higher than the interna-
tional price. Accordingly, Japanese producers of neckties were 
forced to purchase raw silk at prices higher than the prices paid by 
foreign tie producers. European producers were able to purchase 
raw silk at a lower price, produce ties, and export them to Japan. 
Due to these imports of European ties, the Japanese tie producers 
lost some of their market. They brought a law suit against the Japa-
nese Government alleging that the Silk Price Stabilization Law was 
designed to protect only the domestic producers of raw silk and was 
thus unduly discriminatory against tie producers and consumers. In 
addition, they argued that the import controls under the Law vio-
lated provisions of the Constitution.125 At the time of this writing 
122. See Ikeda, Kiito-kinuseihin no yunyu chosei (Import Adjustment of Raw Silk and Silk 
Products), 623 JURISUTO 85 (1976). 
123. Tsusho Hakusho (White Paper on Foreign Trade), Kakuron (Itemized Discussion), 
MINISTRY OF INTL TRADE AND INDUS. (1981) 209-10 (1981). 
124. Ikeda, supra note 122, at 91. 
125. In January 1979 eleven private individuals and companies engaged in the tie business 
filed suit against the Government. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the amendment 
of the Silk Price Stabilization Law (which gives the government corporation exclusive right to 
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(February 1983), the suit is still pending in the Kyoto District Court. 
Another important statute regulating import trade is the Customs 
Tariff Law. This law provides for customs valuation, anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties, and tariff quotas. Some of the most im-
portant provisions of this law are highlighted below. 
Article 4 of the law provides for customs valuation. According to 
this provision, the government shall use the "transaction value" as 
the basis for the tariff. "Transaction value" is defined to be the 
amount actually paid by the importer to the exporter at the time 
when the import transaction took place. 
Article 7 of the law provides for a retaliatory tariff. The govern-
ment is given the right to impose a special surcharge on a product 
imported from a country that unfavorably discriminates against J ap-
anese ships, airlines, or commodities. Articles 8 and 9 are, respec-
tively, the provisions for countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty. 
These provisions and the amendments which were made to them as 
a result of the Tokyo Round Negotiation will be explained in detail 
below. 
Under article 9-2 an "emergency tariff' is authorized. When, due 
to a sharp decline in the price or other unforeseeable changes in the 
exporting country, there is a sudden increase of imports to Japan, 
causing material injury to a domestic industry that competes with the 
imported commodity, or when a threat thereof exists, the govern-
ment may levy a special tariff in addition to the regular tariff. In 
addition, article 9-3 provides for tariff quotas, which permit the gov-
ernment to control the quantity of imports of a product to which a 
certain level of tariff is applied. When the quantity of import of this 
product exceeds this maximum level, a higher tariff is levied on the 
product imported in excess of that maximum. 
Except for tariff quotas, these special tariffs are rarely used. The 
major reasons for the nonuse of these tariffs is because until the late 
1960s the Japanese market was guarded by an import quota system. 
Accordingly, there was little need for protective tariffs. Moreover, 
since liberalization took place; Japanese commodities (especially in-
dustrial products) have been quite competitive internationally. 
However, these protective tariffs may be used in the future as Japa-
nese industries lose international competitiveness due to high labor, 
overhead, and energy costs. 
import raw silk) violated Article 22 of the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of trade and 
Article 25 of the Constitution's guarantee of right to livelihood. 
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D. Implementing the Tokyo Round Agreements in Japan 
The ministries were assigned the task of actually negotiating the 
Tokyo Round Agreements for Japan. Representatives from a 
number of ministries composed the Japanese delegation to the nego-
tiations, and inter-ministerial conferences were used to settle internal 
disputes. The ministries also met with representatives of Japanese 
industries to aid in formulating Japan's negotiating posture. 126 
Generally speaking, the Tokyo Round Codes which required 
some changes of domestic laws or regulations for implementation 
were submitted to the National Diet for approval. One exception 
was the code on import licensing, which did not require a change in 
domestic law for implementation, but was submitted for approval 
because it dealt-,with a fundamental principle of the GA TT. Ulti-
mately, the codes on tariff reduction, subsidies and countervailing 
duties, anti-dumping, import licensing, customs valuation, technical 
barriers to trade, government procurement, and civil aviation were 
introduced in the National Diet for approval, and they were all ap-
proved and promulgated on April 25, 1980.127 The agreements on 
dairy products and bovine meat were not introduced in the National 
Diet for approval, but were signed as executive agreements. 
1. Tariff Reduction 
The Japanese government actively proposed tariff reductions 
during the Tokyo Round. On March 4, 1978, it made an advance 
reduction of tariffs on 125 items to facilitate the negotiations. Japan 
signed the Geneva Protocol on July 27, 1979, as soon as the Cabinet 
had decided to accept it. In total, the Japanese government made 
tariff concessions with regard to 2,600 industrial products and 200 
agricultural products. 128 The imbalance between industrial and ag-
ricultural items is probably due to Japan's emphasis on industrial 
products in international trade. 
The Tokyo Round tariff reductions did not require changes in 
126. There are a number of books written in Japanese on the Tokyo Round Negotiations, 
among which the following are the most comprehensive: HACHIJUNENDAI NO BOEKI RURU 
(The Trade Rules for the 1980s) (N. Shinbunsha ed. 1980); TOKYO ROUND NO ZENBO (The 
Total Picture of the Tokyo Round) (Kenkyukai ed. 1980). 
127. Agreement on Anti-Dumping, KAMPO GOGAI (Official Gazette - Special Issue) 5-10, 
May 23, 1980; Agreement on Countervailing .Duty, id. at 18-25; Agreement on Customs J/alua-
tion, id. at 41-50;Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, id. at 11-77;Agreement on Import 
Licensing, id. at 89-91; Agreement on Civil Aviation, id. at 95-100; Agreement on Government 
Procurement, id. at 110-29. 
128. For details on tariff concessions, see Tokyo Round kosyo no jishitsuteki dakelsu nitsuite 
(The Substantive Conclusion of the Tokyo Round Negotiation), 705 JURISUTO 39, 40-42 
(1979). 
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Japanese internal law. Article 3 of the Tariff Law129 provides that 
(1) tariffs shall be imposed as provided for in the Tariff Law or in the 
Customs Tariff Law; and (2) if there is a special provision for a tariff 
in a treaty to which the Japanese government is a party, a tariff shall 
be imposed in accordance with the provision of such treaty. The 
Cabinet submitted the Geneva Protocol to the National Diet for ap-
proval. When this approval was granted, the Geneva Protocol be-
came a treaty and article 3 enacted its tariff provisions automatically. 
Due to advance reduction of tariffs on many items, the effective 
Japanese tariff rate on a number of items was lower than the rate 
agreed upon in the Tokyo Round. If the Japanese government were 
to carry out reductions according to the Tokyo Round provisions, 
initial rates would have been higher than the current effective rate, 
and there would have been no tariff reductions as required by the 
Geneva Protocol. This situation did not seem desirable since the 
Japanese government had actively proposed tariff reductions. Ac-
cordingly, it was decided to reduce tariffs from the effective rate of 
the Protocol. The Tariff Special Measures Law was amended to ef-
fectuate this policy.130 
2. Customs Valuation 
Japan is a member of the Brussels Convention on Customs Valu-
ation and has enforced her valuation system in accordance with the 
principles set forth in that Convention. There was, however, some 
difference between the language used in Article 4 of the Customs 
Tariff Law, which provided for customs valuation, and the language 
contained in the Customs Valuation Code. Article 4 was amended to 
conform its language to the language in the Code. This amendment 
became effective January 1, 1981.l31 
Originally, article 4 had valued customs based on the price of an 
imported product at the port of importation, if this price was the 
result of perfect competition. Based on this general principle, de-
tailed methods for calculating customs value were provided. Under 
the amended article 4, customs valuation is based on the "transac-
tion value" of an imported commodity, which means the price actu-
ally paid or payable by the purchaser to the seller for the imported 
129. Kanzei ho (Tariff Law), Law No. 61 of 1954 (as amended). See note 6 supra. 
130. See Amano, Tokyo Round kosho no daketsu nitomonau wagakuni kanzeikankeihorei no 
seibi nitsuite, (On Adjustment and Administration of Laws relating to Tariff following the 
Conclusion of the Tokyo Round Negotiation) 721 JURISUTO 84 (1980). 
131. Kanzei teiritsu ho no kaisei nikansuru horitsu (Law to Amend the Customs Tariff 
Law), Law No. 5 of 1981. 
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goods, plus the cost of transport and some other costs to the extent 
that they are not included in the price actually paid for the goods. If 
the "transaction value" cannot be determined, then customs valua-
tion is based on the transaction value of such or similar commodity 
which was exported on the day on which the imported commodity 
was exported or some other day close in time. If neither of these 
values can be determined, customs valuation is based on a price ar-
rived at by calculating backward from the domestic sales price or a 
price arrived at by adding manufacturing costs and other costs. If 
this method is also'ineffective, then customs valuation will be based 
on a price as determined by procedures provided for in a Cabinet 
decree. It seems that under the new valuation system the value of an 
imported commodity is not necessarily lower than the value under 
the old valuation system, since the new system is based on the price 
actually paid by an importer of an imported commodity, whereas the 
old system was based on a hypothetical price which would have pre-
vailed under perfect competition. If the actual price is not lower 
than the perfectly competitive price, the new system results in a 
higher tariff value than the old system. 
The new system has the advantage of stability in evaluating the 
value of commodities, and thus encourages imports. Under the old 
system, government valuation officials had more discretion to choose 
the value on which the tariff would be based, since the perfectly 
competitive price was easily manipulable. Under the new system, 
the actual price paid by an importer is the basis for tariff valuation, 
leaving less discretion to government officials. 
There had been some complaints about the older customs valua-
tion practices in Japan. The Trade Study Group Report 132 states 
that there had been a feeling among foreign exporters that "customs 
uplifts" had taken place which had caused uncertainty about cus-
toms and commodity tax obligations. A U.S. congressional report 
also mentioned arbitrariness in evaluating the value of the imported 
commodity.133 The new valuation system should contribute toward 
a more "transparent" valuation process. 
3. Countervailing and Anti-.Dumping .Duties 
To date, the Japanese government has never issued either a coun-
132. A Special Progress Report, U.S.-JAPAN TRADE STUDY GROUP 17 (April 1980) [herein-
after cited as Special Progress Report]. 
133. United States-Japan Economic Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and 
Pac!ftc Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1980). 
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tervailing duty or an anti-dumping duty order. There are a number 
of reasons for this. First, until 1960, the Japanese economy was 
shielded from foreign imports by the quota system and other import 
controls. Accordingly, countervailing or anti-dumping duty orders 
were unnecessary. Second, by the time of liberalization of imports 
most Japanese industries were already sufficiently competitive that 
protection by those special tariffs was not necessary. Third, alterna-
tive regulatory means for import control - the Control Law, and the 
Transactions Law, for example - made countervailing and anti-
dumping duties unnecessary. As some sectors of the Japanese econ-
omy lose international competitiveness, however, it becomes increas-
ingly likely that some industries ( especially the petro-chemical 
industry) may petition the government to initiate proceedings under 
the countervailing or anti-dumping duty laws. 
The countervailing and anti-dumping duty laws are relatively 
easy for private industries to utilize. Unlike the Control Law, the 
Cabinet decrees on countervailing and anti-dumping duties explic-
itly provide for petition by private parties.134 In this sense, private 
enterprises or labor unions which feel that their interests are ad-
versely affected by imports may petition the government for relief 
even though these laws do not grant private parties the right to re-
quire that the government start a formal proceeding. 
On the whole, it may be said that the attitude of the Japanese 
government in the Tokyo Round Negotiation with regard to coun-
tervailing and anti-dumping duty matters was passive. Since the late 
1960s, there have been many instances in which Japanese products 
were challenged in foreign countries as being dumped or subsidized. 
Those claims were most frequent in the United States, but there were 
similar claims in Europe, Canada, and Australia. Major areas of 
concern were steel, electronics, and more recently, automobiles. Ac-
cordingly, the Japanese government intended to use the Tokyo 
Round Negotiations to propose codes which would narrowly limit 
the powers of national governments to enforce anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty statutes. The Japanese government was gener-
ally handicapped by a lack of experience in enforcing anti-dumping 
or countervailing duty statutes. 
Article 8 of the Customs Tariff Law provides for the imposition 
of countervailing duties. To implement the Countervailing Duty 
Code, article 8 and the Cabinet Order Concerning Countervailing 
Duty were amended. As amended, article 8 provides that when the 
134. See section III.D.4 infra • 
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importation of a commodity which has been directly or indirectly 
subsidized by a foreign government has caused, or is threatening to 
cause, a material injury to an industry in Japan producing a similar 
commodity, the Japanese Government may, pursuant to cabinet de-
cree, impose a countervailing duty up to the amount of the net sub-
sidy. The only change required by the Tokyo Round was to include 
the term "material injury" to the Customs Tariff Law. 
Before the Tokyo Round, there was no specific provision in Japa-
nese law providing for petition by an interested party. Accordingly, 
an amendment was necessary to implement the Countervailing Duty 
Code. Under Article 2(1) of the Cabinet Order, a person requesting 
the initiation of a countervailing duty investigation shall file with the 
Minister of Finance a petition in writing together with sufficient evi-
dence. The Minister then transmits a copy of this to the Minister of 
MITI. The government may then initiate an investigation. 
Under both Article 8(6) of the Customs Tariff Law and the Code, 
the investigation period is (in principle) limited to one year. This is 
due to the consideration that prolonged investigation may cause un-
reasonable uncertainty in the terms of trade. Under article 8(7) the 
government in the exporting country or the exporter can propose an 
undertaking, and the Japanese government can accept such an un-
dertaking and terminate the investigation. Under article 8(9) the 
Japanese government may effectuate a provisional measure before 
an investigation has come to a conclusion, whenever (1) a subsidized 
commodity has been imported; and (2) it is possible to draw the in-
ference that an industry in Japan has been materially injured 
thereby; and (3) a provisional measure is necessary to protect the 
industry in Japan. 
Whenever MOF, the Ministry in charge of the industry in ques-
tion, or MIT! begin an investigation, all three of these Ministries 
must be notified. These Ministries also make important policy 
choices during the investigation. When an investigation reveals that 
a final measure or a provisional measure is necessary, the Minister of 
MOF, after consulting the Tariff Council, may impose a counter-
vailing duty. 
4. Anti-Dumping Duties 
Japan has ratified as "treaties" both the GATT and the Interna-
tional Anti-Dumping Code of 1967. To implement the 1967 Code 
and Article 9 of the Customs Tariff Law, a Cabinet Order Concern-
ing Dumping was issued. Article 9 was amended, and a new Cabinet 
Order issued, to implement the Tokyo Round results. 
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As amended, article 9 provides that when the importation of a 
dumped product causes or threatens to cause material injury to an 
industry in Japan or materially retard the establishment of an indus-
try in Japan, an anti-dumping duty may be imposed to protect that 
industry. Such an anti-dumping duty must be imposed pursuant to a 
Cabinet Order. An anti-dumping duty is a duty in addition to the 
regular customs duty, and is to be equal to or less than the difference 
between the "normal value" and the dumped price of the product. 
E. Technical Barriers to Trade 
Technical barriers to trade in Japan have been a major area of 
controversy. Some of the barriers to trade seem real while others are 
imaginary. Moreover, some of the technical standards, such as emis-
sion controls and labels for consumer protection, reflect special cir-
cumstances in Japan and cannot easily be removed even if they 
create trade problems. 
It is useful to have a general understanding of the alleged Japa-
nese trade barriers.135 Typically, commentators believe that the Jap-
anese standards for product safety, health requirements, and 
inspection practices are more stringent than those in foreign coun-
tries. These standards and requirements are not designed to discrim-
inate against foreign products but simply to meet domestic needs. 
However, due to implementation and enforcement differences be-
tween Japan and foreign countries these requirements sometimes 
make it difficult for foreign products to penetrate the Japanese 
market. 136 
According to a survey conducted by the Japan Economic Jour-
nal, 137 there are five categories of complaints raised by foreign and 
domestic enterprises engaged in importing products to Japan: (1) in-
spection procedures are too cumbersome and too detailed; (2) for-
eign test results are not well accepted in Japan; (3) standards are too 
stringent compared to standards accepted by most countries; ( 4) the 
enforcement of standards is arbitrary and capricious; and (5) some-
times foreign manufacturers cannot apply for an import license. An-
other common complaint is that foreign enterprises have insufficient 
input into the formulation of technical standards. 
135. Some of the difficulties encountered by foreign exporters with regard to technical 
standards and inspections are described in Weil & Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A 
View of the Japanese Market, Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POLY. INTL. 
Bus. 845, 865-79 (1979). See also Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 13, which contains 
comments on experience of foreign exporters in this regard. 
136. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 4-5. 
137. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Jan. 4, 1982, at 7 (morning ed.). 
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While some of these complaints are well grounded, others are 
rather frivolous. Japan understands that some improvements in these 
areas are essential to opening the Japanese market and has taken 
several steps to remedy the situation. Most of these measures do not 
require amendments to laws, but can be accomplished by changing 
some internal regulations of the enforcement agencies or simply by 
changing administrative practices. 
To give foreign enterprises greater input into the formulation of 
standards, a cabinet decision passed on May 22, 1979, contained the 
following procedural principles: 
When adopting or modifying standards, public notification of in-
tention will be made, to the extent possible, sufficiently in advance. 
After such notifications are made, opportunity for interested par-
ties, whether domestic or foreign, to submit their views will be pro-
vided as much as possible, and views submitted will be given due 
consideration. For this purpose, improvement in procedures shall be 
facilitated where necessary. 
Following this decision, MITI has started to announce changes in 
standards in advance, in JETRO's Daily Bulletin. 
A common complaint was that import license approvals of sale 
were given only to importers that had been established in accordance 
with Japanese laws. The complainants alleged that once the amica-
ble relationship between a foreign exporter and a Japanese importer 
is broken up, the foreign exporter faces difficulty in obtaining import 
licensing and approval for sales in Japan, since such license and ap-
proval were given only to domestic enterprises. On April 1, 1979, 
MITI took the remedial step of creating the "commissioned testing 
system for Category A electrical appliances and materials," under 
which a foreign applicant is able to submit his products for testing by 
a "designated testing authority." After completion of a successful 
test, he receives a certificate of test results. He then sends this certifi-
cate to his importer, who forwards it to the "designated testing A 
authority" to obtain a "type test." After completion of the "type 
test," the importer receives a successful test certificate, which he 
sends to MIT!, who then issues the "type authorization."138 In short, 
under this system a foreign manufacturer or exporter can apply for 
testing and license of his product while he is .located in a foreign 
country. 
To comply with the requirements of the Tokyo Round Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Industrial Standardization 
138. Special Progress Report, Sllpra note 132, at 13. 
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Law was amended 139 to permit foreign manufacturers or importers 
to affix a "JIS" mark (Japan Industrial Standard) on goods manufac-
tured in foreign countries. The JIS mark is voluntary, and it has no 
legal effect in Japan. However, because this mark is greatly 
respected, its presence often improves consumer acceptance of prod-
ucts. Moreover, some laws require that the products or parts used for 
certain purposes meet the requirements for JIS standards. In such a 
case, this mark becomes essential for sales. 
There have been complaints that Japan refuses to accept the re-
sults of product tests conducted overseas. Retesting in Japan often 
results in undue delay in getting foreign products ready for sale in 
Japan. This problem was allegedly compounded by foreign export-
ers' limited knowledge about Japanese testing requirements which 
increased the expense of testing in Japan.140 Althou~h this problem 
has not been solved completely, MITI has made provisions to accept 
foreign test results under some circumstances. 
A Cabinet decision of May 22, 1979 set forth guidelines to en-
courage acceptance of foreign test results. As a result, some progress 
has been made in accepting foreign test results for electrical appli-
ances, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural chemicals.141 
5. Government Procurement 
a. Opening government procurement to foreign companies. Gov-
ernment procurement was probably the most controversial issue dur-
ing the Tokyo Round. The central issue, however, was not whether 
government agencies in Japan should use an open tendering system 
to enable foreign enterprises to participate in bidding. The Japanese 
government was quite willing to do this. Rather, the real problem 
was whether or not some government-affiliated organization (!.e., 
some public corporations) should open their purchases to foreign 
bidders. The purchase of instruments by Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Corporation (NIT) is the major case on point. There 
was a strong feeling in Japan that NTT purchases should not be 
opened to foreign bidding. 
The arguments against opening NTT purchases were cogently 
presented by a leader of a labor union in the National Diet.142 First, 
139. The most comprehensive work on the Industrial Standardization Law is Kogyog{iut-
suin Hyojunbu Hyojunka, Kaisei kogyo hoyjunkaho - chikujo kaisetsu (The Industrial Stand-
ardization Law, As Amended - Article by Article Comments) in NIHONKIKAKU KYOKAI 
(1980). 
140. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 13. 
141. Id. 
142. The remarks were made by Komori Masao on March 14, 1980. See generally 
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since the communication system of a country is unified, it requires 
machines and instruments of uniform quality. If foreign-made 
goods were introduced, this could disrupt efficient functioning of the 
Japanese communication system. Second, many of the countries 
that participated in the Tokyo Round Negotiation, notably some Eu-
ropean countries, excluded electric comml!nication instruments from 
the reach of the Government Procurement Code. Third, and proba-
bly most important, is the issue of unemployment. If foreign produ-
cers were free to sell instruments to NIT, this would decrease 
national employment and opportunities for small business. Accord-
ing to this testimony, there were many small enterprises in Japan 
that manufactured electric communication instruments or parts, and 
most of them were subcontractors oflarge entities such as NTT. The 
testimony alleged that there were 180 small companies, employing 
70,000 workers subcontracting to NIT. If twenty percent of NIT 
purchases were shifted to foreign producers, 14,000 workers would 
have to be laid off. 
A MITI official testified in the National Diet that the Japanese 
government would try to favor purchases from small enterprises 
rather than large companies under the Government Procurement 
Law. This law requires that government agencies, including govern-
ment-affiliated corporations, exert reasonable efforts to increase 
purchases from small business. This measure may minimize the 
hardships caused by the Tokyo Round concession. 143 
Throughout the negotiations on government procurement, the 
basic position of the Japanese Government was that a code should 
apply only to government agencies which composed the central gov-
ernment. For this reason, the Japanese offer included only those 
government agencies in Japan to which the "Accounts Law" applied. 
However, the United States Government strongly requested that 
some other government affiliated organizations ( especially the Nip-
pon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, the Japan Tobacco and 
Salt Corporation, and the Japan National Railway) be included. 
The Japanese Government agreed to include these corporations, and 
several others during the Strauss-Ushiba Conference held in Wash-
ington, D.C., in March 1979. The United States insisted that this 
offer was still not satisfactory, since some important instruments 
Tokushukanzeito nikansuru kokkai gijiroku (The Records of the National Diet on Special Tar-
iff System and Related Matters), MINISTRY OF INTL. TRADE AND INDUS., TRADE AND TARIFF 
SECTION (1981). This is a compilation of the National Diet debates on tariff and trade matters 
collected by the Tariff and Trade Section of MITI [hereinafter cited as The Record]. 
143. Id. 
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purchased by the NTT were excluded from the coverage of the offer. 
The Japanese Government reached an agreement with participating 
governments other than the United States, and continued to negoti-
ate with the United States Government. 
In December 1980, an agreement was reached between the two 
governments that NTT would open up some more areas for open 
tendering with some reservations. The Minister of Posts and Tele-
communications was to issue administrative guidance to NTT to im-
plement this agreement. 
NTT initiated the new system of purchases on January 1, 1981. 
At first, there was a strong suspicion in the United States that this 
new system would be as closed as it had previously been, despite the 
change. In fact, the first year of the Agreement showed a poor per-
formance due to NTT's demand for extremely detailed information 
from firms seeking to qualify as bidders.144 However, the Gibbons 
Report, published in December 1980 by the U.S. Congress, com-
mented favorably on NTT's effort to purchase foreign instru-
ments.145 According to a press report of December 28, 1981,146 the 
President of NTT sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and requested the Department to advise U.S. firms to utilize this new 
bid system adopted by NTT. This report stated that despite the 
opening of the NTT market, there has been insufficient participation 
by U.S. firms in supplying telecommunication instruments. 
b. The legal system of government procurement in Japan. 147 Un-
til 1972, there was a provision in Imperial Edict No. 556 (1964) 
which provided that: "In order to promote use of domestically pro-
duced articles, the Minister of each Ministry may use a single tender-
ing in purchasing commodities as designated by the Minister of 
Finance." In 1972, to establish a more open system of government 
purchasing, this provision was abolished. 
At present, there is one law and several orders concerning gov-
ernment procurement in Japan. These are (1) the Accounts Law, 
(2) the Cabinet Order concerning the Budget, Auditing and Ac-
counting (Imperial Edict No. 165 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Order of 1947"), (3) Special Provisions for the Cabinet Order 
concerning the Budget, Auditing, and Accounting (Imperial Edict 
No. 558 of 1946, hereinafter referred to as "the Special Provisions of 
144. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESs., 
REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 11-12 (Co=. Print 1981). 
145. Id. at 12. 
146. Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Dec. 28, 1981, at 7 (morning ed.). 
147. Special Progress Report, supra note 132. 
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1946"), (4) the Cabinet Order stipulating special procedures for gov-
ernment procurement of goods (Cabinet Order No. 300 of 1980, 
hereinafter referred to as "the Special Cabinet Order"), and (5) Min-
isterial Ordinance stipulating special procedures for government 
procurement of goods (Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 45 of 
1980, hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance of 1980"). 
Since some provisions of the Order of 1947, the Special Provi-
sions of 1946, and the Accounts Law were inconsistent with the To-
kyo Round Code, some adjustments were required to implement the 
Agreement. The Special Cabinet Order and the Ordinance of 1980 
have thus been issued to provide for special procedures and stipula-
tions to assure full compliance with the requirements of the Agree-
ment. In this way, the Agreement has been incorporated into 
domestic law. 
c. Single tendering. Currently, government procurement in Ja-
pan revolves around open tendering. If it is impossible to rely on 
open tendering, selective tendering, which is open to both domestic 
and foreign persons, is permitted. The use of a single tendering pro-
cedure is limited to some exceptional cases. Article 29-3 of the Ac-
counts Law provides that single tendering shall be adopted where 
the circumstances do not allow the governmental entity concerned to 
adopt open or selective tendering procedures because of the nature 
or purpose of the contract concerned, the need for extreme urgency, 
or where it is deemed that adopting open or selective tendering pro-
cedures would be disadvantageous for the agency concerned. Article 
29-3 (5) of the Accounts Law provides that, notwithstanding the 
other provisions, a single tendering procedure may be adopted in the 
cases specified by Cabinet Order. 
Article 99 of the Order of 1947 provides that a single tendering 
procedure may be used where a government agency purchases prod-
ucts directly from cooperatives composed primarily of small and me-
dium sized enterprises in order to protect them. Utilizing this 
provision, it is possible for the Japanese government to purchase 
products exclusively from small domestic enterprises. This is a po-
tential mechanism for the government agencies in Japan to avoid 
purchasing foreign products. 
The implementation of the Government Procurement Code has 
primarily been effected through amendments to various regulations 
under the Accounts Law governing purchases by the government 
agencies. The Accounts Law is applicable to purchases by agencies 
composing the National Government, which include both Houses of 
the National Diet, the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister's Office, 
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and various Ministries. In addition, some government affiliated or-
ganizations are covered by the Government Procurement Code. 
These include, among others, the Japan National Railway, the Japan 
Tobacco and Salt Corporation, the Nippon Telegraph and Tele-
phone Corporation, and twelve other government affiliated financial 
organizations. 
Since the Japan National Railway, the Japan Tobacco and Salt 
Corporation, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 
and other government-affiliated financial organizations are not sub-
ject to the Accounts Law and regulations issued thereunder, the im-
plementation has been effected through administrative guidance of 
the appropriate Ministries and by amendments to the internal rules 
and regulations which govern the purchases made by those 
organizations. 
E. Legal Remedies for Violations of the MTN Codes by the 
Government Agencies 
1. An Overview 
This Section addresses the domestic legal remedies available to 
private enterprises and citizens, domestic and foreign, when a Japa-
nese governmental agency violates one or more of the Tokyo Round 
Codes. Before discussing legal remedies, it should be mentioned that 
there are several organizations which are designed to handle com-
plaints by foreign enterprises operating in Japan. Three of these or-
ganizations will be briefly described. 
In 1977, the U.S.-Japan Trade Study Group (TSG)148 was organ-
ized. The work of the TSG is concentrated on two related issues. 
The first is to identify, analyze, and make recommendations regard-
ing laws, regulations, procedures, or practices that inhibit sales of 
American goods and services in Japan. The second is to encourage 
U.S. companies to gain a position in the Japanese market through 
participation in specific trade promotion programs and to inform 
American businessmen about the work of the TSG. 149 
The TSG is a purely private organization composed of govern-
mental and nongovernmental members, all participating as private 
148. The TSG was a bilateral group of Japanese and American volunteers from the U.S. 
business community in Tokyo, the U.S. Embassy, MIT!, the Japanese External Trade Organi-
zation, the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan-U.S. Economic Council, the For-
eign Trade Council of Japan, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and others from 
the Japanese business and government communities, all acting in an individual capacity. 
149. See Special Progress Report, supra note 132, at 1-3. 
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individuals on a voluntary basis. However, recommendations made 
by the TSG have had some impact on changing governmental prac-
tices in regulating trade. Moreover, the activities of the TSG have 
been carefully evaluated by a U.S. congressional committee. 
Faced with a huge trade deficit with Japan, the U.S. Government 
wanted to create a common entity to encourage entry of U.S.-made 
products into the Japanese market. Accordingly, a bilateral sub-cab-
inet meeting was held in early 1977. This meeting resulted in the 
establishment of the Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee 
(TFC). The TFC is jointly composed of members of the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce and of the Japanese MITI. The TFC dis-
cusses allegations of Japanese trade barriers raised by American 
exporters. Whenever there is a mutually agreeable solution to the 
difficulty, the Japanese Government takes the necessary measure to 
remedy the situation. In this sense, the TFC is an informal organiza-
tion without any legal power. However, many complaints have been 
successfully handled by this Committee, and it has substantially 
eased the entry of U.S. products into the Japanese market. 150 
In 1982, the Japanese government established the Office of Trade 
Ombudsman (O.T.O.) to deal with complaints about trade barriers 
asserted by foreign exporters. O.T.O. is composed of certain Vice-
Ministers (EPA, MF A, MOF, MITI, Ministry of Education, MHW, 
MAFF, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Posts and Telecom-
munications, Ministry of Home Affairs, Agency of Science and 
Technology) and is chaired by the Vice-Minister of the Cabinet-Sec-
retariat. Also, an executive board has been established, which con-
sists of high ranking officials of important government ministries and 
agencies. Under this system, complaints may be filed with the rele-
vant sections of these ministries and agencies and with Japanese Em-
bassies and Consulates in foreign countries. When a proper 
complaint is filed, the relevant ministry or agency shall report to the 
complainant how the complaint is being considered within ten days 
and, as promptly as possible, inform him of the final result of the 
investigation and the remedy. 
In formulating remedies, ministries and agencies are required to 
take into consideration the following factors: 
1. When formulating technical standards under domestic laws, 
efforts shall be made to make them conform to standards that are 
150. For details of the TFC activities, see Weil & Glick,Japan-Is the Markel Open? A 
View of the Japanese Market .Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POLY. INTL. 
Bus. 845 (1979). 
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internationally recognized while giving due considerations to cir-
cumstances unique to Japan. 
2. Efforts shall be made to accept the results of reliable tests 
made in foreign countries. 
3. Standards shall be made clear, and quantitative representa-
tion shall be made as much as possible. 
4. Transparency in domestic institutions shall be established as 
much as possible. 
By March 1, 1982, eleven complaints had been filed with the rel-
evant sections of the Japanese government. Among those, seven 
complaints had been filed by Japanese importers, three by U.S. ex-
porters, one by an Irish exporter, and one by a state in the United 
States.151 
Under this system, there are four types of actions which can be 
taken: (1) To take an affirmative measure to remedy the situation, (2) 
To answer to the complainant that his complaint is based on a mis-
understanding, (3) To continue consideration of the problem, and (4) 
To decide that nothing shall be changed. 
It is premature to judge whether or not this system will be the 
answer to trade barrier problems. However, if utilized properly, it 
may be an effective tool to mitigate trade barrier problems in Japan. 
2. Legal Actions for Indemnification of Damages 
Article 17 of the Constitution provides that "Every person may 
sue for redress as provided by law from the state or public entity in 
case he has suffered damage through an illegal act of any public offi-
cial." 152 This constitutional provision recognizes the individual's 
right to recover for damage resulting from wrongful conduct of a 
government official. There is little doubt that Japanese citizens can 
exercise this constitutional right to recover damages for violations of 
the Tokyo Round Codes. 
There is some question as to whether or not a foreign citizen or 
enterprise is entitled to this same protection. The answer depends on 
whether "every person" in Article 17 of the Constitution includes a 
foreign citizen or enterprise. Generally speaking, the term "every 
person" includes not only Japanese citizens but also foreign individ-
uals. Thus there are some cases153 in which the Supreme Court has 
IS I. Announcement of the Economic Planning Agency (Mar. 29, 1982). 
152. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Binder IX, supra note 68, at 2. 
153. Judgment of Dec. 25, 1957, Supreme Court, Japan, 11 Sal-han keishu 3377; Judgment 
of Oct. 4, 1978, Supreme Court, Japan, 903 Hanrei Jiho 3. 
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held that foreigners are protected by the constitutional guarantee of 
human rights. 
However, as quoted above, Article 17 of the Constitution permits 
the recovery of damage caused by tortious conduct of a government 
official in accordance with a provision of a law. The relevant law in 
this regard is the State Redress Law. 154 Article 6 provides that when 
a foreign person has sustained damage due to the tortious conduct of 
a government official, he is allowed to recover the damage as long as 
there is a guarantee of reciprocity.155 Thus, the State Redress Law 
allows recovery for damages sustained by a foreign person if his 
country likewise allows a Japanese citizen to recover for tortious acts 
committed by government officials of that country. In this sense, the 
application of state indemnification for a foreign person is limited by 
the rule of reciprocity, and there are some court cases156 to this effect. 
However, some commentators argue that the reciprocity provision of 
Article 6 violates Article 17 of the Constitution which, on its face, 
extends a remedy to "every person" damaged by the tortious conduct 
of a government official.1s1 
In any event, it is clear that a foreign person can recover damages 
caused by a tortious act of the government when his home country 
grants such a recovery to a Japanese citizen. Accordingly, a foreign 
citizen or enterprise can bring an Article 6 suit when his business 
interest has been adve!sely affected by an action of the government 
which violates one of the Tokyo Round Codes. Since most of the 
Codes have been approved by the National Diet as ''treaties" in the 
sense of Article 98 of the Constitution, they override conflicting ad-
ministrative actions of the government. To recover, the plaintiff 
must prove either a malicious intent or negligence on the part of the 
government official who engaged in the tortious conduct. However, 
such proof should not be difficult as long as the official's conduct was 
contrary to the provisions of one of the Codes, since government offi-
cials should know the contents of the treaties to which Japan is a 
party. Nevertheless, the plaintiff must prove the amount of damage 
sustained by him, as well as the causation between the illegal con-
duct of the government official and his damage. 
154. Kokka baisho ho (State Redress Law), Law No. 125 of 1947. 
155. A detailed account of the applicability of the State Redress Law to foreign persons is 
made in SHIMOYAMA, KOKKA BAISHO HO (fhe State Redress Law) (1972). 
156. Judgment of May 14, 1957, District Court, Tokyo, 8 Kakyu minshu 931; Judgment of 
Mar. 24, 1965, High Court, Tokyo, 18 Kosai minshu 188; Judgment of Sept. 4, 1969, District 
Court, Tokyo, 582 Hanrei Jiho 81. 
157. T. MIYAZAWA, KENPO II 456 (new ed. 1974); TAKADA, KlHONHO KOMMENTAR KENPO 
75 (Arikura ed. 1970); HAsHIMOTO, NIHONKOKU KENPO 374 (1980). 
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The next question is whether a foreign citizen can base his claim 
for damages on the failure of the National Diet to enact or abolish a 
law necessary to assure conformity with the obligations of the Tokyo 
Round Codes. For example, a foreign enterprise may argue that it 
has suffered a loss of profit by a discriminatory regulation which vio-
lates the Code on Technical Barriers to Trade. In a court decision 158 
addressing abolition by the National Diet of the home voting system 
for physically disabled persons, the Sapporo District Court held that 
the failure of the National Diet to replace an unconstitutional law 
with a proper law could be regarded as a tortious act by government 
and could subject the government to liability. Thus, under some cir-
cumstances, legislation or failure to enact legislation may be used as 
a basis for seeking a pecuniary recovery for damage sustained by an 
individual. 159 The question here is whether the right of compensa-
tion under the State Redress Law can be equated with the funda-
mental right of the people to vote which is regarded as the most 
fundamental among the political rights of the people. 
Generally speaking, the government is not liable for damage to 
individuals caused by a failure of government economic policies, 
since these policies are discretionary on the part of the administra-
tive branch of the government. In one case, 160 a plaintiff maintained 
that unusual consumer price rises were the result of mistaken gov-
ernmental economic policies and should result in government liabil-
ity. The Osaka High Court dismissed the claim on the ground that 
economic policies are entrusted to the administrative branch of gov-
ernment which has wide discretion in selecting policies. 
A claim for the recovery of pecuniary loss due to the failure of 
the National Diet to amend a domestic regulation to conform with 
the Tokyo Round Codes falls somewhere in between a claim based 
on voting rights and a claim based on a failure of the government's 
economic policies. This claim, however, should be regarded as hav-
ing more substance than a claim based on a purely economic policy 
matter, since most of the Codes are "treaties" in the sense of the 
Constitution. Therefore, they are given a higher status than domes-
158. Judgment of Dec. 9, 1974, District Court, Sapporo, 762 Hanrei Jiho 9. In this case, 
the plaintiff argued that the abolition of the home voting system for physically disabled per-
sons and the failure of the government to enact a law restoring this system was unconstitu-
tional, and the government was liable to compensate for any damages. The court held for the 
plaintiff. 
159. For similar cases, see Judgment of Dec. 18, 1974, District Court, Tokyo, 766 Hanrei 
Jiho 76; Judgment of Oct. 19, 1979, District Court, Tokyo, 914 Hanrei Jiho 29; Judgment of 
Jan. 17, 1980, District Court, Sapporo, 953 Hanrei Jiho 18; Judgment of May 14, 1980, District 
Court, Ohsaka, 972 Hanrei Jiho 79. 
160. Judgment of Feb. 26, 1979, High Court, Osaka, 924 Hanrei Jiho 34. 
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tic legislation and regulations. In cases where the domestic regula-
tion or legislation is unequivocally contrary to the requirements of 
one of the Codes, the failure on the part of the National Diet to 
remedy the situation may constitute actionable tortious conduct on 
the part of the government. 
3. Legal Action for Cancellation of Governmental .Determinations 
The Administrative Cases Litigation Law161 ("the Litigation 
Law") provides for legal actions against the government for cancel-
lation of governmental determinations which are wrongfully made. 
We shall examine here the conditions under which a foreign enter-
prise may challenge a governmental determination that results in a 
business disadvantage, and the process involved in seeking a court 
decision to nullify such a determination. The situation arises when, 
for example, a foreign exporter is placed at a disadvantage as a result 
of the valuation of products for customs purposes. As explained in 
the Section above, the Customs Tariff Law has been amended to 
base the customs valuation on "transaction value" of the imported 
product. . Therefore, if a determination of customs value has been 
made on the basis of some criteria other than the transaction value, 
such a valuation is contrary to both the Customs Tariff Law and the 
Code of Customs Valuation. What are the legal remedies in this 
situation? 
Article 7 of the Litigation Law provides that the Civil Procedure 
Code will govern all matters not addressed by the Litigation Law. 
Since the Litigation Law contains no provision for a suit against the 
government brought by a foreigner, Article 51 of the Civil Procedure 
Code comes into force. Article 51 of the Civil Procedure Code pro-
vides that "[a]n alien is deemed to possess the power to be a party in 
a litigation whenever he shall possess the power to be a party in a 
litigation according to the Japanese law, even though he has no such 
power according to the law of his home country." Accordingly, a 
foreigner has the power to bring a suit against the government as 
long as he has the power to be a party to litigation under the provi-
sions of the Civil Procedure Code. 
Under Article 3(2) of the Litigation Law, a person whose legal 
interest has been adversely affected by a government action may 
bring a suit against the government to nullify that action. In our situ-
ation a government decision such as refusal to grant a license to im-
port is amenable to this suit as long as the action is contrary to the 
161. Gyoseijiken sosyo ho, (Administrative Procedure Act) Law No. 139 of 1962. 
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obligations imposed on the Japanese government by the Tokyo 
Round Codes. This type of action is available to a foreign party as 
long as he has been specifically addressed by a government decision. 
For example, if a foreign enterprise has applied for a license to sell a 
product in Japan, and the Japanese government has issued a deter-
mination addressed to this party denying such a license, then the 
foreign enterprise is entitled to bring suit under Article 3(2) of the 
Litigation Law. The plaintiff in such a litigation usually seeks a 
court decision which would cancel the determination. If a govern-
mental determination is contrary to a provision of a treaty as ap-
proved' by the National Diet, then the court handling the case must 
declare that such a governmental action is illegal and is subject to 
cancellation. 
However, to qualify as a plaintiff in a suit against the government 
under Article 3(2) of the Litigation Law, the party must have some 
legal interest in the issue. This is the question of standing and must 
be decided before the court addresses the issue of the illegality of the 
governmental determination. Article 9 of the Litigation Law pro-
vides that a person who brings a suit under the Litigation Law must 
have a legal interest with respect to the cancellation of the determi-
nation in question. If a foreign enterprise has been denied a license 
or approval of sale or import, there is little doubt that it has a legal 
interest in requesting a court to cancel this administrative 
determination. 
Article 3(5) of the Litigation Law provides for a legal action to 
nullify governmental inaction. For example, if an administrative 
agency is required to decide within a reasonable period of time 
whether or not to grant an application for a license to sell, the agency 
would be liable for failure to decide within that period of time. 
However, whether or not a court will require the government 
agency to act under Article 3(5) of the Litigation Law depends upon 
the nature of the administrative action sought by the plaintiff. There 
are some types of administrative actions which are discretionary.162 
If an administrative action falls within this category it is usually im-
possible to force the government agency to make a decision. How-
ever, there are some government actions that are regarded as 
ministerial, such as approvals or disapprovals of licenses given 
to products under the safety standards and laws. If an administra-
162. For example, a decision as to whether the government should effectuate a price con-
trol, raise or lower tariffs, or tighten import control of some commodities would be regarded as 
discretionary, and the failure of those measures_ would not be amenable to a lawsuit by a 
private individual. 
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tive action is ministerial, it is usually possible to force the govern-
ment agency to act.163 
4. Violation of the MTN Codes as a Defense 
When a foreign enterprise is accused of a violation of a law or 
regulation in Japan which is contrary to the provisions of the Codes, 
the accused party can assert the nullity of the law as a defense. This 
defense can be utilized when an enterprise is accused of a criminal 
offense for a violation of, for example, safety standards or some 
other standards incorporated in law. The party making use of this 
defense must of course prove that the law or regulation under which 
he is being accused is contrary to a provision of a treaty. However, 
once this proof is established, the legal consequence is rather clear; 
that is, the court handling the case must decide that the treaty 
prevails over the conflicting domestic law or regulation. After the 
criminal action has been dropped for this reason, the party may 
bring an action against the government for indemnification of all 
damages that he can prove. 
5. Standing of Foreign Governments 
Since standing to sue for nullification of an administrative action 
is only granted to those persons whose legal interests have been ad-
versely affected, there appears to be no way in which a foreign gov-
ernment can bring a court action in Japan for cancellation of an 
action of the Japanese government in contravention of the MTN 
Codes. On the other hand, under the State Redress Law there is no 
strict standing requirement. Therefore, it is possible for any person 
to sue the government for tortious acts. However, the plaintiff must 
prove both damages and the causation between the damages and the 
illegal conduct. Foreign governments rarely suffer a property loss 
due to an action of a Japanese government official that violates the 
MTN Codes. Thus, there is little chance that a foreign government 
can assert a claim based on the State Redress Law. 
Generally, in litigation addressing the issue of a violation of the 
MTN Codes on the part of the Japanese government, foreign gov-
ernments play the limited role of filing opinions stating a position as 
to the legality of the Japanese governmental action. It is up to the 
court to decide whether or not to accept such an opinion of a foreign 
government. 164 
163. Judgment of July 14, 1978, District Court, Fukuoka, 909 Hanrei Jiho 27; Judgment of 
July 30, 1979, High Court, Ohsaka, 948 Hanrei Jiho 44. 
164. Article 310 of the Civil Procedure Code states: "If the court deems it necessary, the 
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Article 42 of the Litigation Law provides for a lawsuit against the 
Japanese government by a person or a body not having any legal 
interest in the court action. According to this provision, such an ac-
tion by a party without a legal interest is allowed only if there is a 
provision in a law to that effect. Therefore, if the MTN Codes con-
tained a provision permitting a foreign government to bring an ac-
tion in a Japanese court, foreign governments would be given 
standing to challenge an action of the Japanese government which is 
contrary to the Codes. 
F. Conclusions 
It is probably fair to state that the Tokyo Round Agreements and 
their implementation have contributed somewhat to the liberaliza-
tion of international trade in Japan. Especially in such areas as tech-
nical standards and government procurement, considerable progress 
has been made in opening up some areas to foreign imports. There 
is, however, still some dissatisfaction with the remaining trade barri-
ers in Japan. Some of those allegations are real, while others are 
based on a lack of understanding as to what has happened in Japan 
in the past several years. Closure and exclusivity in such areas as 
services, banking, the distribution system and cartels have been 
pointed out by a 1981 U.S. congressional document.I65 The Japa-
nese government is to see if such allegations are justified, and, 
whenever it finds undue restrictions and exclusions in those areas, it 
should proceed to remedy the situation. At the same time, major 
efforts are required by the Japanese government to proclaim to the 
world that the Japanese market is not as closed as is perceived in 
foreign countries. 
Even though the MTN Agreements have accomplished much, 
there are some problems in trade between Japan and other countries 
which are left unresolved. 
On the export side, most of the important trade problems be-
court may request ••. a foreign government or a foreign public body to render an expert 
opinion. • • ." MINJI SOSHO Ho Art. 3 IO. 
165. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 
1ST SESs., REPORT ON TRADE MISSION TO FAR EAST 11 (Comm. Print 1981). About Japanese 
trade barriers see generally SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON w A YS AND 
MEANS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., TASK FORCE REPORT ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE 
(Comm. Print 1979); SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE REPORT (Comm. Print 1980); United 
States-Japan Trade Economic Relations: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Asian and Pac!ftc 
Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1980); Weil & Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A View of the 
Japanese Market .Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, ll LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 845 
(1979). 
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tween Japan and the United States or European countries have been 
solved by way of orderly marketing agreements whereby the Japa-
nese government and industries undertook to restrain exports of the 
products in question. Prominent examples are textiles, steel, spe-
cialty steel, television and automobiles. The wisdom of solving trade 
problems by utilizing this technique should be closely reexamined, 
and, even if this technique is found desirable, it should be subject to 
international rules to guarantee fairness to everyone concerned. 
Some of the alleged trade barriers in Japan have not been cov-
ered by the Tokyo Round Agreements. For example, administrative 
guidance exercised by the Japanese government, the exclusivity in 
the Japanese distribution system, and the exclusivity in Japanese 
business groups, are some of the subjects which were not addressed 
during the negotiations. Some of these alleged restraints are private, 
rather than legal barriers to trade. This raises an interesting question 
as to whether non-governmental arrangements initiated by private 
enterprises, trade-related cultural barriers, or business and social 
customs may be made the subject of trade negotiation and, if so, how 
the government should go about changing those non-governmental 
arrangements. In the future, it will become necessary to give some 
thought to this question. 
As has already been explained, there are some legal remedies 
available to domestic and foreign enterprises if the Japanese govern-
ment infringes upon their rights so long as they can show that the 
government action is contrary to an obligation imposed by one of the 
MTN provisions. It is recommended that foreign enterprises bring 
such legal claims to the Japanese government whenever they feel 
that their rights have been injured by its action. It is less likely that 
Japanese domestic companies will raise such claims since Japanese 
companies are less inclined to use legal actions to resolve disputes 
with the government. Although excess litigation may result in ineffi-
ciency and unnecessary waste of time and energy, even in Japan, 
lawsuits can be an effective means to persuade governmental agen-
cies that the MTN Agreements should be strictly observed. It is 
worthwhile to give some thought to the possibility of utilizing those 
legal remedies more fully, not only to secure the rights of foreign 
enterprises in Japan, but also to better Japanese society as a whole. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND IN THE UNITED STATES 
John H. Jackson 
United States law imposes considerable complexity on MTN im-
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plementation, and constrains policy makers and diplomats in a 
number of ways. The United States legal system, however, has some 
important differences from the other two systems explored in this 
Article. Some of these differences can be mentioned at the outset. 
First, the parliamentary branch in the United States (i.e., Con-
gress) appears to be considerably more powerful than its counter-
parts elsewhere. This limits executive branch officials, and in some 
cases makes it nearly impossible to implement - or even negotiate 
- certain changes in international rules. Second, the U.S. legal sys-
tem provides a number of mechanisms for individuals to challenge 
official actions. These procedures limit the power of the executive 
branch. Third, although not so prominent as in the first century of 
the republic, there still remains some slight ambiguity about the dis-
tribution of powers between the states and the federal government. 
Even where the legal issues are clear (generally meaning the central 
government power prevails), there are sometimes practical political 
constraints preventing the federal government from acting in an area 
traditionally subject to state government control. 
This section will explore these and other themes as they relate to 
the implementation of the Tokyo Round. 
A. The Constitutional and Legal Framework of U.S. International 
Trade Relations. 
The draftsmen of the United States Constitution distrusted cen-
tralized government. Consequently, they built into the Constitution 
the principle of separation of powers, explicitly distributing powers 
among three branches of the federal government (the Presidency, 
Congress, and the Courts) and reserving certain powers to the state 
governments. 166 Thus, implementation of international agreements 
is constantly affected by the tension between these various govern-
ment powers. 
For practical reasons, the Presidency has developed a preeminent 
role in the conduct of foreign affairs. The President has authority to 
negotiate international agreements and to carry on international di-
plomacy. Over the years, Congress has delegated to the President a 
wide variety of additional powers relating to international affairs. 
Although, in the post-Watergate era, Congress has imposed some re-
straints on the President's authority over foreign affairs, the Presi-
dent remains the central figure in U.S. diplomacy. One significant 
166. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15-412 (1978); THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47-51 (J. 
Madison); No. 75 (A. Hamilton). 
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limit on Presidential foreign affairs power is Article I, Section 8 of 
the Constitution, under which the Congress claims preeminence as to 
"Commerce with foreign Nations." 
Another major restraint on the President's foreign affairs power 
is the constitutional requirement that "[t]reaties" be submitted to the 
United States Senate for "advice and consent" (requiring a two-
thirds affirmative vote) before the President can enter into them on 
behalf of the United States.167 Nevertheless, over two centuries of 
constitutional history, there have developed alternative forms for ap-
proval of international agreements. United States practice divides 
international treaty agreements into "treaties" in the U.S. constitu-
tional sense (which must be submitted to the Senate), and "executive 
agreements."168 There are several ways in which "executive agree-
ments" can be approved under United States Constitutional prac-
tice:169 (1) They can be submitted to the Congress, for approval by 
the passage of a statute which grants the authority to the President to 
accept the international agreement; (2) The Congress can pass a stat-
ute which authorizes the President, in advance, to negotiate, enter 
into, and accept for the United States an international agreement 
(and to implement it) (This is the approach of the Trade Agreements 
Acts, as to tariff agreements. 170); (3) A treaty may give the President 
advance delegated authority within limits to accept an executive 
agreement designed to implement the treaty; 171 and (4) There are 
some executive agreements which the President can enter into on the 
basis of his own "inherent" authority under the Constitution, with-
out any participation by the Congress or the Senate either before or 
after the negotiation. 172 These latter must be agreements which are 
authorized by explicit constitutional grants of authority to the Presi-
dent (such as his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces), or which can be implied as part of Presidential authorities 
167. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
168. U.S. Dept of State, CIRCULAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL, L. 784 
(1956); Stevenson, Constitutional Aspects of the Executive Agreement Procedure, 66 DEPT. ST. 
BULL. 840, (1972); L. HENKIN, supra note 166, at 173; McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Con• 
gressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Pol-
icy, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 234 (1945). 
169. Id. 
170. Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV 1980). 
171. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. 1964, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243, and accompanying executive agreements which are listed following the NATO 
treaty in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1980 277 (1980), 
172. These are the most controversial. See, e.g., L. Henkin,supra note 16<>, at 48; J. JACK-
SON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 78 (1977); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-
04 (1971); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,supra note 168, reprinted in 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 784, 785 (1956). 
December 1982] Tokyo Round 343 
under the Constitution (such as his "executive power"). 173 
In addition to legislative-executive tensions, U.S. foreign policy is 
affected by the state-federal power struggle. 174 As to domestic af-
fairs, the evolution of U.S. constitutional law has generally been in 
the direction of concentrating power in the federal government. It is 
reasonably well established today that the U.S. federal government 
has supremacy over almost all issues, leaving aside some subject 
matters which have not really been tested in the Supreme Court. 
With respect to foreign affairs, there is virtually no Supreme Court 
opinion which rules against the exercise of federal power on the 
ground that such federal power is in conflict with state power, as 
long as the exercise· of federal power was itself constitutional.175 
Thus, although the Supreme Court has held that state powers some-
times prevail over international treaties (such as in the off-shore oil 
cases), the basis for this decision was itself an exercise of federal 
power, namely, an Act of Congress.176 
Apparently only the government procurement negotiations raised 
a states' rights issue during the Tokyo Round. Arguably, purchases 
by state governments are so intimately connected with normal sover-
eign and administrative authority reserved to the states, that the fed-
eral government can not enter into an international agreement that 
interferes with those activities. Indeed, some states have exercised 
their authority in this field by enacting statutes that call for prefer-
ence to be given to the purchase of domestically produced, rather 
than foreign, goods. Such rules have been challenged both politi-
cally and judicially.177 The litigation has been generally inconclu-
sive. A California court held that a California Buy-American statute 
was unconstitutional, because the general subject of governmental 
procurement was precluded by extensive federal regulation of the 
matter, including a large number of international treaties. 178 The 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES ch. 3, §1 (5th ed. 1981); A. MASON & w. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW chs. IV, V (2d ed. 1959). 
175. There are very few Supreme Court cases concerning the exercise of federal govern-
ment power in the area of foreign affairs. Of those cases, those which have ruled that the U.S. 
government's action exceeded its authority under the Constitution, in cases other than those 
affecting civil liberties, are even fewer. 
176. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I (1960). 
177. Note, State .Buy-American Laws -Invalidity of State Al/empts to Favor American Pro-
ducers, 64 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1980). 
178. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commrs. of Dept. of Water & Power, 276 Cal. 
App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). See discussion at J. JACKSON, LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 174-80 (1977). 
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GATT, for example, touches on the question of government pro-
curement, but generally exempts government procurement from the 
various trade rules of GA TT. (It was for this reason that it was felt 
necessary to negotiate a government procurement code in the MTN.) 
A New Jersey Supreme Court case179 held that state rules regard-
ing procurement that related to a water supply did not violate the 
GATT (and implied that such rules were not preempted by federal 
government action). Both of these cases, however, recognized that if 
the federal government had acted in a way that was explicitly incon-
sistent with state regulations or rules, the federal action would 
prevail. 
During the Tokyo Round, extensive negotiation was held on gov-
ernment procurement. In this portion of the negotiation, the negoti-
ators considered whether international government procurement 
rules should apply to governmental subdivisions of a federal state. 
This author has been told that the U.S. government was prepared to 
accept some such rule, and that the negotiators believed that the fed-
eral government had the authority to do so. Apparently,foreign ob-
jections defeated this proposal. Certain other governments faced 
considerably more difficult constitutional problems on this issue than 
did the United States. (For example, the German Lander have 
much autonomy, and the constitutions of Canada and Australia raise 
important questions in this connection.) 
In short, in the area of foreign affairs, particularly economic af-
fairs, it is hard to conceive of an action taken by the federal govern-
ment that would not be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
event of direct conflict with state actions. This would be true whether 
the action was administrative or legislative, and whether it was ac-
complished by international agreement or by other properly author-
ized means. 
B. The GA TT in the United States' Law 
Originally, the United States accepted the 1947 Protocol of Provi-
sional Application implementing the GATT as an "executive agree-
ment" authorized by the 1945 extension of the Trade Agreement 
Act. Consequently, the President accepted GATT without reference 
to Congress. Some members of Congress, angered by this procedure, 
insisted that the GA TT was not a valid international agreement of 
179. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commn., 75 N.J. 
272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 43S U.S. 983 (1978). 
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the United States. 18° For several decades Congress officially refused 
to recognize the GATT.181 Although the Trade Act of 1974 seems to 
recognize the GATT as a valid legal commitment,182 this congres-
sional hostility to the GATT has affected U.S. international trade 
relations over the years. 
The original concept for GATT was that it would merely be a 
multilateral agreement appended to the new International Trade Or-
ganization when the latter came into being. The GATT itself was 
not designed to be an international organization, and presidential 
authority probably would not have extended to entry of the United 
States into an "organization." When the ITO draft charter was com-
pleted at Havana in 1948, it was submitted to governments for ac-
ceptance. However, by 1950 it was clear that Congress would not 
approve the ITO and consequently the President withdrew183 it from 
congressional consideration. The ITO Charter was then dead, and 
GATT had to fill the gap. 
Within the United States government, the GATT developments 
described above effectively resulted in a substantial shift of power to 
the President. With the de facto development of the GA TT as the 
central international organization regarding trade, more and more 
trade issues tended to find their way into the GA TT fora for discus-
sion and resolution. The GATT provided the only overall system-
atic code of conduct governing the way many nations regulated their 
international trade. Additionally, because the GATT agreements 
provide the authority for the application of a lower tariff on most 
goods, the GATT became an essential pillar of U.S. international 
trade policy. If the GA TT were somehow to be extinguished, tariffs 
in the United States could bounce back to the 1930 statutory rates -
an action which would be a devastating blow to international trade 
relations. 184 
180. See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tar!!Js and Trade in U.S. Domestic Law, 66 
MICH. L. REV. 249, 268 (1967). 
181. See id. at 265-69, and note statutory formulae used prior to 1974. 
182. See Trade Act of 1974, § 12l(d), 19 U.S.C. § 213l(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c) (Supp. IV 1980), which approve a 
number of the MTN agreements. 
183. U.S. State Dept., Press Release (Dec. 6, 1950), reprinted in 23 DEPT. ST. BULL. 977 
(1950). 
184. See Trade Act of 1974, § 125(e), 19 U.S.C. §2135(e) (1976), which provides, however, 
that the Trade Agreement tariff rates can remain in effect for one year, pending petition to 
Congress to set the tariff levels, in the event of termination of an International Trade Agree-
ment on which the rates rely. 
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C. Events Leading Up to the Trade Act of 1974 
After the completion of the Kennedy Round negotiations in June 
1967, there was a backlash in the United States political attitudes 
toward international trade. Congress refused to authorize accept-
ance of those portions of the Kennedy Round that required its con-
sent. Likewise, the Anti-Dumping Code, negotiated in the Kennedy 
Round and accepted by the President, was criticized by members of 
Congress who felt the President did not have authority to agree to 
that Code.185 The U.S. balance-of-payments problems, and the surge 
of imports into the United States toward the end of the 1960's, led 
both labor unions and industrial interests to lobby for restrictions on 
imports. 186 The President's authority, under the 1962 Trade Expan-
sion Act, to negotiate for reductions in tariffs, had expired at the end 
of June 1967.187 There was no renewal of that authority until the 
197 4 Trade Act. 
In 1970, the President appointed a commission to make recom-
mendations for United States trade policy. The "Williams Commis-
sion" report became the intellectual basis for much of the policy of 
new legislation to permit United States participation in international 
trade negotiations. 
In 1972, preparations began in earnest for the formulation of a 
new trade bill to be submitted to Congress. This bill was finally sent 
to Congress in April 1973.188 The new bill was the most comprehen-
sive international trade bill yet submitted to the Congress. It ad-
dressed not only the renewal of Presidential trade agreements 
authority, but also contained provisions on the Generalized System 
of Preferences for developing countries (GSP), extending the Most 
Favored Nation treatment (MFN) to certain Communist countries, 
185. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, GAIT, BISD 24 (15th Supp. 1968). See Barcelo, Anti-Dumping Laws as Barriers to 
Trade - The United States and the International .Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 
(1972); Long, United States Law and the International Anti-Dumping Code, 3 INTL, LAW, 464 
(1964). See also S. REP. No. 1385, Part 2, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4539. 
186. For a history of these bills, see F. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
183-85 (4th ed. 1978). See also Tar!lf and Trade Proposals: Hearings Before t/1e House Comm. 
on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 
TRADE Acr OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1435, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Trade Act of 1970, 
Amendments 925 and 1009 to R.R. 17550 Social Security Amendments of 1970: Hearings Before 
the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); SENATE COMM, ON FINANCE, 
SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1970, s. REP. No. 1431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
187. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962). 
188. H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 
1ST SESS., PRESS RELEASE AND OTHER MATERIAL RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION PRO· 
POSAL ENTITLED THE "TRADE REFORM Acr OF 1973" (Comm. Print 1973). 
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amendments to the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws of 
the United States, and a number of other matters. 
In the fall of 1973, the House of Representatives approved a re-
markably liberal trade bill. 189 As a result of the intervening oil crisis, 
however, the Senate was not nearly as receptive to the idea of freer 
trade. Furthermore, as the Watergate Crisis deepened, 19° Congress 
became increasingly reluctant to enact trade legislation that would 
delegate powers to a President whom the Congress distrusted. Many 
Congressmen also viewed the Vietnam War as an abuse of presiden-
tial powers.191 Consequently, Congress began to reassert its own au-
thority in matters of international affairs, particularly on trade. It 
was only after President Nixon resigned and President Ford came 
into office and strongly supported the Trade Act that the Senate be-
gan in earnest to finish the work. The bill was finally passed on De-
cember 19, 1974, after a number of compromises. On January 3, 
1975, the Act was signed by the President and came into force. 192 
In 1972 and 1973, many analysts recognized that the next round 
of GATT negotiations must address the increasingly troublesome 
"non-tariff barriers" (NTB's). However, under the U.S. constitu-
tional system, it is considerably more difficult for the President to 
negotiate non-tariff rather than tariff agreements. Because of their 
complexity and because of the difficulty of establishing limitations 
on delegated authority, Congress was unwilling to grant the Presi-
dent advance authority to negotiate, accept, and implement interna-
tional NTB agreements. On the other hand, because of Congress' 
failure to implement parts of the Kennedy Round, other nations 
were unwilling to negotiate with the United States if the results of all 
negotiations had to be approved by Congress.193 
189. H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
190. See, e.g., C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974); L. 
JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER (1976). 
191. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2346; S. REP. No. 
220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
192. Trade Act of 1974, 19 u.s.c. §§ 2101-2487 (1976); see 119 CONG. REC. 40,769 (1973) 
(House debate and action); 120 CONG. REC. 41,796 (1974) (same); 120 CONG. REc. 39,497, 
41,629 (1974) (Senate debate and action); H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 
REP, No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
7186; HOUSE CONF. COMM. TRADE ACT OF 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1644, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 7367. 
193. In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Ambassador William 
R. Pearce, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, said: 
our trading partners are reluctant to negotiate with us until they have some assurance that 
agreements can be implemented, and implemented rather promptly. After all, when you 
put an offer on the table, you spend some political capital. You are offering to expose 
some part of the domestic economy to competition it hasn't had before, whether it is a 
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One proposed solution to this dilemma was the "legislative veto." 
Under this approach, the President would negotiate and complete a 
tentative international agreement, consult extensively with the Con-
gress, and then submit a final agreement and implementing legisla-
tion to the Congress. If the Congress did not "veto" the action, the 
President's submissions would become law. The House of Repre-
sentatives accepted this approach, but the Senate refused, arguing 
that the approach unconstitutionally extended too much power to 
the Presidency. 194 
The ensuing search for a compromise position resulted in sec-
tions 102 and 151 of the Trade Act of 1974, sometimes called the 
"fast track" NTB authority. Under these provisions, the President 
would negotiate on various NTB matters and, ninety days before en-
tering into international agreements on these matters, would notify 
the Congress and consult with key congressional committees about 
the proposed agreements. After consultation, the President would 
complete the international agreements, and submit them to Congress 
along with proposed legislation to implement them into United 
States law. The submission would be in the form of a normal bill, 
requiring approval by both Houses of the Congress as well as the 
President. However, the 1974 Trade Act fast track procedure estab-
tariff negotiation or NTB negotiation. No country is willing to do that - ourselves in-
cluded - unless when we make an offer we have reasonable chance that, if accepted, it 
will result in agreement - and fairly soon. 
Trade Reform: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means on R.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 394 (1973) (testimony of William R. Pearce). 
194. There is an extensive debate in the United States, still continuing, about the constitu-
tionality of the legislative veto. Such a veto procedure is embodied in a number of statutes, 
including several such procedures elsewhere in the 1974 Trade Act itself. Recent writing on 
the legislative veto includes: Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to 
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, 
Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetos, 90 HARV, L. 
REV. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a 
Leash, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978); Henry II, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional 
Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGlS. 735 (1979); Miller & Bowman, Presidential Allacks on the Con-
stitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 51 
(1979); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 
IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEOJS. 
593 (1976); Volz, Legislative Veto in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 9 LAW & POLY. INTL, 
Bus. 1029 (1977); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look al Congressional Control of the Execu-
tive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (l915);seealso S. REP. No. 1298,supra note 192, at 75. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled, in Chadha v. I.N.S., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), 
cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812 (Oct. 12, 1981), that the one-house veto provision in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act permitting an override of the Attorney General's decision to suspend 
deportation of an alien was unconstitutional. A similar legislative veto provision which al-
lowed use of a one-house veto to disapprove a gas-pricing regulation by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission was struck down in Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), appeal filed, No. 81-2171, 51 U.S.L.W. 3025 (U.S. Aug. 3, 1982). 
Both cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court which, as of February 1983, had not 
rendered a decision. 
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lished three important procedural modifications: (1) a procedure re-
quiring automatic "discharge" from committee consideration, so that 
the bill would necessarily have to be considered by the full House 
and Senate within a certain period of time; (2) a procedure that pro-
hibited any amendments to the bill; and (3) a limitation on the de-
bate on the floor of the House and the Senate. Thus, within a 
reasonable period of time, normally about sixty days of legislative 
session, the Congress would act on the negotiation results. 195 
It was under this new procedure that most of the MTN results 
were approved and implemented during 1979. 
D. United States Participation in the Tokyo Round 
1. Authority to Negotiate 
The President's authority in areas of international trade and 
other economic relations is very circumscribed and often depends on 
particular statutory delegations of authority. Executive participation 
in the Tokyo Round, therefore, relied heavily on the authority 
granted by the Trade Act of 1974. Without this Act, it is doubtful 
that the United States could have participated in a meaningful 
way. 196 There are at least five categories of sources of negotiating 
authority for U.S. representatives at the MTN (three of which are 
contained in the Trade Act of 1974): 
First, section 101 of the Act granted the President "advance" au-
thority to negotiate and to implement certain specified tariff reduc-
tions.197 This section basically followed the statutory pattern and 
language of the series of U.S. trade acts beginning with the 1934 Act 
known as the "Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act." This was the 
most complete grant of authority given to the President in the 1974 
Act. No congressional approval was needed under this provision. 
The President's authority under section 101, however, expired after 
five years. 
Second, section 102 of the Act set forth explicit authority to nego-
tiate international agreements on "non-tariff barriers and other dis-
tortions of trade," and provided the "fast track" NTB authority.198 
195. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1976). See S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 74-77, 107-
1 I; H.R. REP. No. 1644, supra note 192, at 31. 
196. See Trade Agreements Act ef 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International 
Trade ef the Senate Commillee on Finance, United States Senate on S. 1376, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 393 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Finance Comm. Hearings (1979)) (statement of 
Robert S. Strauss, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations). 
197. 19 U.S.C. § 2lll (1976). 
198. See text at note 195 supra. 
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This section is carefully worded to apply the procedure only when 
"the President enters into a trade agreement under this Section." 199 
It does not purport to require this procedure as to all international 
NTB or "trade distortion" agreements, because to do so would have 
raised constitutional issues. In some cases, the President could claim 
that his own authority (whether originating in the Constitution or 
stemming from prior statutes) allowed his negotiation and perhaps 
even implementation of NTB or agreements on trade distortions; i.e., 
that 102 was unnecessary in certain cases. Additionally, the Presi-
dent always retained his general constitutional authority to negotiate 
an international agreement and submit it to Congress for approval 
without the benefit of the fast track. 
Third, the Trade Act of 1974 implicitly recognized the authority 
of the President to negotiate on some matters. For example, section 
121 includes a list of reforms that Congress desired relating to 
GATT and international trade rules. A clause of that section specifi-
cally stated, however, that approval and implementation of any 
agreements designed to achieve the desired reforms must be carried 
out pursuant to authorities granted elsewhere, i.e., that" section 121 
did not itself grant any such authority. In addition to the fast track 
procedure, this section and the legislative history200 recognized a 
number of other authorities for presidential action such as authority 
contained in some other statutes to promulgate procedural regula-
tions. For example, tlie congressional committee noted existing au-
thority of the Secretary of the Treasury to establish regulations 
regarding "country of origin" marks.201 Likewise, the President has 
diplomatic authority to agree to various procedures for the settle-
ment of disputes. 202 
Fourth, the President could always negotiate agreements that 
were not within the delegations of authority of the Trade Act of 
1974, and then, if necessary, he could submit them for approval to 
Congress under normal constitutional procedures. For example, al-
though the 1974 Trade Act Section 101 tariff agreement authority 
limited tariff cuts to sixty percent from the tariff existing just prior to 
the Act, a deeper tariff cut could be agreed upon subject to later 
approval by Congress. (A few such agreements did occur.)203 
199. 19 u.s.c. § 2112 (1976). 
200. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 87; Trade Act of 1974, § 102(a), 19 U.S,C. § 2112 
(1976). 
201. 19 u.s.c. § 1304 (1976). 
202. H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 2, 526-27 (1979) (Statement of Administrative Action); H.R. 
REP. No. 571, supra note 192, at 65; S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 232-35, 238. 
203. See notes 241-42 infra and accompanying text. 
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Finally, there was the possibility of previously delegated or in-
herent presidential authority to negotiate, accept, and implement 
agreements. This was to some extent recognized in the 1974 Trade 
Act.204 But even some authority not recognized by the 1974 Trade 
Act could supply a residuum of additional authority for the Presi-
dent and his officials for their MTN participation.205 
2. The Structure of the United States Government for Participation 
in the MTN 
In the legislation which established the authority for U.S. partici-
pation in the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations (the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962), Congress had established the position of the 
Special Trade Representative, with ambassadorial rank, reporting 
directly to the President, for the purpose of taldng charge of those 
negotiations on behalf of the United States. The 1962 Act repre-
sented certain compromises, because prior to that time the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of Commerce had competed for 
the principal authority to conduct international trade negotiations. 
After the Special Trade Representative (STR) was established, a 
staff was assembled by him (including two deputies at the ambassa-
dor rank), and a structure of interagency committees was set up to 
advise the President about trade policy matters. The most important 
of these committees was the Cabinet-level Trade Expansion Act Ad-
visory Committee, established by the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962.206 Under this were other inter-agency committees, including 
the Trade Staff Committee, which carried on most of the day-to-day 
work. Represented on these committees were officials from the De-
partments of State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and the Treas-
ury. The committees were usually chaired by an official from STR. 
In later years, they sometimes included representatives from the De-
partment of Justice's Antitrust Division, the Department of Defense, 
204. See Trade Act of 1974, § 12l(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2131 (1976); S. REP. No. 1298, supra 
note 192, at 86, 87. 
205. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, general headnote 11 (1976); S. REP. 
No. 249 (1979), supra note 202, at 257-58. 
206. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, §242. This section calls for a cabinet level advisory 
committee. Such a committee was established by regulation in 1963. This committee was 
called the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee and the regulations were codified at 48 
C.F.R. ch. I (1968). Regulations also established committees below the cabinet level. These 
other committees were (in descending order) the Trade Executive Committee, the Trade Staff 
Committee, apd the Trade Information Committee. The regulations establishing these com-
mittees were codified at 48 C.F.R. ch. II (1968). Title 48 of the United States Code was va-
cated at the end of 1968. Chapter II of the regulations was transferred to 15 C.F.R. ch. XI 
(1969), but chapter I was discontinued. The order vacating title 48 does not disclose the fate of 
the Cabinet-level committee. 
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the Council on International Economic Policy, the National Security 
Council, and other agencies. When the various departmental repre-
sentatives on this committee could agree on a position, it usually be-
came the official United States position. However, if any department 
disagreed, that department representative's superior could require 
that the matter be brought to an inter-agency committee at a higher 
level. Through this process an issue could ultimately be taken to the 
President himself for a decision. 207 
The Trade Act of 1974 did not fundamentally change this struc-
ture.208 However, the Act upgraded the STR to Cabinet rank,209 and 
permanently established his office as an agency within the Executive 
Office of the President.210 Nevertheless, at this time, the expenses 
required for STR conduct of United States representation at the 
multilateral trade negotiation were controlled jointly by the STR 
and the Department of State.211 In addition, matters relating to 
GA TT and international trade other than those of the MTN still fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Department of State. Consequently, 
there were two lines of authority to Geneva and to GA TT: the nor-
mal mission to GATT, with a Minister responsible to the State De-
partment charged with ongoing general GATT activities such as the 
annual Contracting Parties' sessions, as well as the Special Mission 
to the MTN. 
In addition to the White House staff, congressional and private 
groups desired input into the Tokyo Round negotiations. After the 
Kennedy Round, the executive branch officials who had conducted 
the negotiations were criticized for not adequately consulting with 
Congress, or with the interested business sectors, in the formulation 
of U.S. positions and negotiating strategy. Consequently, one of the 
most important changes mandated by the Trade Act of 1974 was the 
explicit expansion of congressional liaison, and the measures taken 
for consultation with private business sectors concerning negotiating 
207. See Malmgren, Managing Foreign Economic Policy, 6 FOREIGN POLY. 42, 48 (1972). 
208. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976); Trade Act of 1974, 
§ 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. IV 1981). 
209. The position of Executive Director ofCIEP, as established by the International Policy 
Act of 1972, § 208, 22 U.S.C. § 2847 (1972), did not require Senate confirmation. However, in 
1973, § 208 was amended to provide for Senate confirmation. 22 U.S.C. § 2847(a) (1976) 
(amending 22 U.S.C. § 2847). The Special Trade Representative has always required Senate 
confirmation. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 24l(a), 76 StaL 878, as amended. 
210. Trade Act of 1974, § 141, 19 U.S.C. § 2171; S. REP. No. 1298 ,supra note 192, at 105, 
See also Senate Finance Comm. Hearings (1979), supra note 196, at 442 for Senator Long's 
statement on why he fought to upgrade the position of the Special Trade Representative, 
211. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 14, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-131, 89 Stat. 611, 614 (1975). 
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positions.212 
With respect to congressional liaison, even in prior negotiating 
rounds, it had been the practice to have a congressional delegation to 
the negotiations consisting of two members of the Senate and two 
members of the House, officially accredited by the President as advi-
sors to the U.S. delegation.213 Senate and House members cannot 
devote a great deal of time to this activity, so it was felt that some-
thing more was needed. The Trade Act of 1974 specified214 that the 
STR was obligated to keep congressional advisors informed of the 
negotiation, and the Act explicitly provided that the Chairmen of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on 
Finance could designate staff members of their committees to have 
access to information as provided to official advisers. Likewise, the 
Act required that reports be made regularly to the Congress. In car-
rying out these measures, both the Senate and House Committees 
hired additional full-time staff members to follow the progress of the 
MTN. These staff members were given access both to official docu-
ments of the MTN and to U.S. executive branch cables concerning 
the MTN. When they traveled to Geneva these staff members were 
sometimes permitted to be present during negotiating sessions.215 
They also met with representatives from other countries from time to 
time. 
The Trade Act of 1974 also established an elaborate system of 
private advisory committees for trade negotiations.216 The Act re-
quired the President to establish an Advisory Committee for Trade 
Negotiations for overall policy advice, chaired by the STR. In addi-
tion, the Act authorized the establishment of three general policy ad-
visory committees, for industry, labor, and agriculture. Finally, the 
President was also authorized to establish sector advisory commit-
tees consisting of representatives of the particular private sectors 
within industry, labor, or agriculture.217 Ultimately, twenty-seven 
Industry Sector Advisory Committees (ISAC's) and several agricul-
tural sector advisory committees were established. These commit-
212. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 161-163, 135, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2211-2213, 2155 (1976). 
213. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 243, called for two members from each House of 
Congress to be accredited. The Trade Act of 1974, § 161, supra note 212, calls for delegations 
of five members from each House. 
214. Trade Act of 1974, § 16l(b), 19 U.S.C. § 22ll(b) (1916);see H.R. REP. No. 571,supra 
note 192; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192. 
215. See S. REP. No. 249,supra note 202, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 
(1979). 
216. Trade Act of 1974, § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1976); see H.R. REP. No. 571 (1973), 
supra note 192, at 38; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 101. 
217. Trade Act of 1974, supra note 216. 
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tees would meet on the call of the STR during the trade negotiations, 
to provide policy advice on the negotiations, technical advice, and 
information. 
The possibility of having private citizen members of advisory 
committees present during actual negotiations was explored and re-
jected during the drafting of the Trade Act of 1974. It was stated, 
however, that the Advisory Committee members "can go up to the 
negotiating door."218 This was intended to follow the lead of several 
foreign countries in encouraging close ties between private industries 
and the negotiating teams. 
3. Negotiating Tar!lf Reductions, and the Role of the ITC 
The Tariff Commission was an independent government agency 
with significant statutory responsibilities relating to anti-dumping 
and escape clause issues. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 required 
the Tariff Commission to hold public hearings addressing possible 
tariff reductions and their impact on United States industry. This 
information was a prerequisite to the authority of the United States 
negotiators and the President to conclude and implement an agree-
ment on tariff reductions. The Trade Act of 1974 continued this 
practice, but changed the name of the Tariff Commission to the In-
ternational Trade Commission of the United States (ITC), to make 
clear that the Agency's authority embraced non-tariff issues.219 
Although the President's most extensive authority was in the field 
of tariff reductions, there were a number of explicit statutory proce-
dures with which the executive branch had to comply, before enter-
ing into international tariff agreements. In particular, with respect to 
tariff negotiations, the President was required to submit a list of arti-
cles or products whose tariffs might be subject to negotiation. 
Within six months after receipt of this list the ITC was required to 
advise the President about the probable economic effects of modifi-
cations of duties for each article. During this time, the Commission 
was charged with investigating and analyzing such information as it 
could obtain, and holding public hearings. After the ITC issued its 
recommendations, the STR was then required to hold its own public 
hearings. Eventually, the ITC's recommendations influenced the 
218. Hearings on H.R. 10710, the Trade Reform Act of 1973, Before the Senate Comm. on 
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22S (1974) (statement of William Eberle, Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations, Mar. S, 1974); S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 104; H.R. REP. No. 
S71, supra note 192, at 38-40. 
219. Trade Act of 1974, § 171, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1976); see S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 
192, at 11S. 
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U.S. negotiating posture during the MTN.220 
4. The Countervailing Duty Problem 
One of the most perplexing issues of international trade policy is 
that of subsidies and their effect on international trade flows. The 
first problem is to determine what is a "subsidy." In a broad sense, a 
subsidy can include a wide range of government policies that have 
some effect on international trade flows. For almost a century, it has 
been established practice in international trade that an importing 
country is entitled to impose "countervailing duties" on goods bene-
fiting from foreign subsidies.221 The theory is that the countervailing 
duty offsets the advantage the subsidy gives to the imported goods. 
GATT Article VI continues this general approach, although it re-
quires that the importing country establish that the subsidized goods 
are "injuring" competing domestic industry before the importing 
country is authorized to utilize countervailing duties. 222 
The United States Countervailing Duty law originated with an 
1897 statute which provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
apply countervailing duties to imported goods which benefit from a 
"bounty or grant."223 This statute applied only to dutiable goods, 
and contained no injury test. Thus, even though GA TT Article VI 
requires an injury test, under the so-called "grandfather rights" men-
tioned above,224 the United States was technically in compliance 
with GATT obligations when it applied countervailing duties to 
goods even without an injury test, because the U.S. statute pre-dated 
GATT.22s 
As tariffs were reduced over the past several decades through in-
ternational negotiation under the GATT, various non-tariff meas-
ures began to assume greater prominence in their effect on 
international trade flows. Increasingly, the United States govern-
ment found that domestic manufacturers were urging it to apply 
countervailing duties to imported goods. For a variety of reasons, 
220. Trade Act of 1974, § 131, 19 u.s.c. § 2151 (1976); U.S. INTL. TRADE COMMISSION, 
ANNUAL REPORT 15-16 (1977); U.S. INTL. TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 25-29 
(1979). 
221. See generally Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing .Duties -Analysis and a Proposal, 
9 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 779 (1977). 
222. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened far signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 
61 Stat A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,214. 
223. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976). 
224. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
225. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976); see Department of Treasury, Countervailing .Duties in Wil-
liams Commission Papers 409; S. REP. No. 1298 (1974), supra note 192, at 185. 
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however, the Department of the Treasury, which administered these 
duties, was slow to respond. Sometimes, petitions or complaints for 
the application of countervailing duties were simply held by the 
Treasury, for years, without any action. Treasury actions were often 
the subject of congressional complaint on behalf of constituents who 
desired countervailing duties. By the time of the drafting of the 
Trade Act of 1974, a considerable amount of ill-will had built up 
between Congress and the executive branch on the issue of counter-
vailing duties. As a consequence, the Trade Act of 1974 included a 
number of measures designed to circumscribe administrative discre-
tion under the countervailing duty statute. In addition, the statute 
required publication of the Secretary of Treasury's determination on 
a countervailing duty petition. Finally the statute explicitly provided 
for judicial review even of a negative determination by the Secretary 
(that no "bounty or grant" existed).226 When judicial review had 
been sought earlier, one court had decided that the Secretary's action 
was not reviewable by the courts, but was a matter of "executive 
discretion."227 
At the same time, upon request of the executive branch, the 
Trade Act of 1974 extended, for the first time, the application of 
countervailing duties to "nondutiable goods." The argument was 
that both dutiable and nondutiable goods could harm competing 
manufacturers if they were subsidized. On the other hand, since the 
GATT grandfather rights did not extend to nondutiable goods, be-
cause the statute governing those goods did not precede GATT, 
Congress included an injury test limiting the imposition of counter-
vailing duties on non dutiable goods, but it continued the absence of 
an injury test on dutiable goods, noting that this would be a subject 
for agreement during the forthcoming trade negotiation. 
To prevent the new U.S. countervailing duty regime with its 
greatly restricted scope for executive discretion from damaging the 
prospects for trade negotiations, Congress included a temporary 
"waiver'' provision in the new countervailing duty law, which al-
lowed the United States to suspend or waive countervailing duties 
under certain conditions.228 The waiver authority, however, was to 
226. Trade Act of 1974, § 32l(f)(l) (amending 19 U.S.C. l5l6);see S. REP. No. 1298,stpra 
note 192, at 185. 
227. United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1971), 
This discretion could be analogous to "prosecutorial" discretion, especially if the practice trig-
gering the importing government's reponse is viewed as a breach of law or of international 
rules of"fair trade." In the House Ways and Means Committee report, Hammond Lead Prod-
ucts is cited as the decision necessitating the amendment mentioned in note 36. H.R. REP. No. 
571, supra note 192, at 76. 
228. These conditions included the following: (I) that there be a reasonable prospect for 
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expire January 2, 1979 (four years after the enactment of the 1974 
Act). By mid-summer of 1978, the main lines of the multilateral 
trade negotiation were declared "completed," but many details were 
still left open.229 It was clear that the results of the MTN, including 
a potential new agreement on countervailing duties and subsidies, 
could not be completed before the January 2, 1979 deadline, and 
that consequently after that date the United States government exec-
utive branch would be forced to apply countervailing duties on a 
number of goods, including dairy products from the European Eco-
nomic Community.230 Officials of the European Economic Commu-
nity made a statement that the application of such duties could cause 
them to refuse to conclude the MTN negotiations or approve the 
MTN agreements. They stated that ''we can't negotiate with this gun 
at our head."231 
In the fall of 1978, the executive branch therefore tried to per-
suade Congress to extend the deadline of the waiver authority. Un-
fortunately, this bill attracted amendments from various interest 
groups, trying to further certain particular goals they sought. For 
example, a textile group introduced an amendment to another bill 
which would have withdrawn the whole textile sector from the nego-
tiation, and there was talk of putting this amendment on the counter-
vailing duty waiver bill. In addition, certain business groups 
introduced legislation to broaden the potential of "adjustment assist-
ance for firms" (loan and tax measures for manufacturing firms suf-
fering from foreign competition).232 The waiver extension was then 
successful trade negotiations for reduction and elimination of barriers to international trade; 
(2) that adequate steps had been taken to reduce substantially or eliminate the adverse effects 
of a bounty or grant; and (3) that the imposition of such a countervailing duty would be likely 
to "seriously jeopardize the satisfactory completion" of the negotiations. This authority was 
explicitly provided to last for a four-year period from the enactment of the Act. The general 
negotiating authority on tariffs and, indeed, on non-tariff barriers, had a duration of five years. 
The shorter duration of the waiver provision for countervailing duties was understood by the 
Congress to indicate its view of the importance of negotiating new international rules concern-
ing subsidies and countervailing duties. 
Indeed, after the Act was enacted, a number of new petitions were received by the Treasury 
for the application of countervailing duties and, in nineteen cases, the Treasury felt it neces-
sary to exercise the waiver to prevent jeopardizing the negotiations. See S. REP. No. 45, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979); T.D. 75-114, 9 Cust. B. & Dec. 229 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 21720 (1975). 
229. See 214 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER: U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) C-2 (July 
11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as ITEX (BNA)); 215 ITEX (BNA) AA-1 July 18, 1978; 4 GENEVA 
Focus: A REPORT FROM THE INDUSTRY CENTER FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 1 (No. 5, Oct. 
13, 1978). 
230. 4 GENEVA Focus: A REPORT FROM THE INDUSTRY CENTER FOR TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, 3 (No. 5, Oct. 13, 1978). See also European Community News Press Release No. 
19/1978 (Oct. 16, 1978); Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1978, at 22, col. 3. 
231. See 226 ITEX (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 3, 1978); 227 ITEX (BNA) C-1 (Oct. 10, 1978), dis-
cussing the "Hollings Amendment" to the Eximbank extension. 
232. See Hearings on R.R. 1147 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on 
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procedurally linked to this bill by an amendment. Despite a rather 
intensive scramble to sort out the problems, the Congress adjourned 
in the early hours of the morning of Sunday, October 15, 1978, with-
out having extended the waiver authority.233 Consequently, the U.S. 
executive branch was faced with the unhappy prospect of trying to 
mollify the European negotiators in the light of the potential appli-
cation of countervailing duties, after January 2. Congress was not 
due to reconvene until January 15, so at the very least there was a 
two-week gap during which countervailing duties could apply. 
Moreover, since 1978 was an election year, there would undoubtedly 
be a substantial delay while the new Congress attempted to organize 
itself in 1979. 
Interestingly enough, the solution was simply to tolerate a messy 
legal situation for several months until the matter could be rectified. 
Even though the waiver provision expired on January 2, 1979, any 
administrative agency would take time to react to the new legal con-
ditions it faced. A "creative bureaucracy" can extend that time. In 
the early months of 1979, the executive branch forcefully presented 
its case to Congress for the extension of the waiver authority. In 
March, Congress agreed to extend the authority until September 30 
or until a bill to implement the negotiations was enacted or defeated, 
whichever was earlier.234 In the meantime, no countervailing duties 
had in fact been applied, and the legislation extending the waiver 
authority clearly absolved companies from any liability for the in-
terim period.235 
5. Sectoral Negotiations 
Section 104 of the Trade Act of 1974 established "sector negoti-
ating objectives" for the United States.236 This provision encouraged 
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10·11 (1979) (to extend temporarily the authority of the 
Secretary of the Treasury to waive the imposition of countervailing duties). 
233. See 228 ITEX (BNA) A-11 (Oct. 17, 1978). 
234. Pub. L. No. 96-6, 93 Stat. 10 (1979); see H.R. REP. No. IS, 96th Cong., 1st Scss. 
(1979); S. REP. No. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 30; Extension of Authority to Waive Countervailing .Duties: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), For the notice 
of administrative action to be taken by the U.S. Customs Service during the period between 
the expiration of the waiver authority and the subsequent extension of the authority, see 44 
Fed. Reg. 141 (1979) and the memorandum reprinted at page 12 of the House Ways and 
Means Committee hearings. 
235. The amendment was effective Jan. 3, 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-6, 93 Stat. 10 (1979). See 
H.R. REP. No. 15, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125 
CONG. REC. H. 3756 {daily ed. Mar. l, 1979); 125 CONG. REC. S3574 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1979), 
236. Trade Act of 1974, § 104, 19 U.S.C. 2114 (1976). See H.R. REP, No. 571, supra note 
192, at 20-23; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 196, at 22-23, 78-79; Executive Hearing on Sector 
Negotiations Befare the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); A. RIBICOFF, A 
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the United States negotiators to pursue negotiating techniques in the 
MTN which would try to establish within "appropriate product sec-
tors" equivalent competitive opportunities in the markets of all 
countries. Thus, a sectoral free trade agreement could be one result. 
Another might be, within a particular sector (such as steel) to obtain 
roughly the same level of protection in each of the major importing 
countries, whether such protection was afforded by tariffs or non-
tariff barriers.237 Obviously, this is a difficult negotiating objective 
and the groups proposing this objective were inspired by a variety of 
motives. 
Although some attempt was made to pursue a sectoral approach 
for certain sectors (particularly steel, aircraft, dairy, meat, and 
grains), generally, these attempts did not influence the final results of 
the MTN. Perhaps the most significant sector result of the MTN was 
for the aircraft sector, in which basically a free trade agreement was 
reached for a limited number of participating countries. 238 
E. Accepting the MTN Results: U.S. Law 
1. Legal Authority to Accept MTN International Agreements 
In the traditional academic terminology, the United States em-
braces a dualist philosophy in its reception of international legal ob-
ligations into its legal system. Thus it is possible for the United 
States to be bound by an international legal obligation under inter-
national law, but fail to follow that obligation in its domestic law 
(and then to be in noncompliance with its international obliga-
tion).239 This subpart focuses on the legal requirements and proce-
dures which were necessary for the United States to accept the 
international law obligations of the MTN results, leaving for the 
next part the discussion of the implementation and compliance with 
those obligations. 
In some cases the President had explicit authority to accept a 
MTN agreement. The most important illustration of this was the 
MTN tariff agreement, known as the Geneva Protocol (1979).240 Sec-
tion 101 of the 1974 Trade Act authorized presidential acceptance 
STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 9 (Comm. Print, Report to Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973). 
237. See H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 192, at 22; S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 192, at 79. 
238. See generally Piper, Unique Sectoral Agreement Establishes Free Trade Framework, 12 
LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 221 (1980). 
239. See L. HENKIN, supra note 166, at 151; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 145 (1965); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 610-11 (3d ed. 1979). 
240. Trade Act of 1974, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976). 
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and implementation of certain tariff concessions under these Proto-
cols. Pursuant to that authority, the President's ·representative to 
GATT signed these Protocols in Geneva on July 11, 1979. Effective-
ness was made contingent, however, on the passage of the Trade 
Agreements Acts of 1979.241 
This contingency was necessary becaµse some of the proposed 
tariff concessions negotiated at the Tokyo Round went beyond the 
authority of section 101, and consequently required acceptance 
under section 102. Presidential Proclamation 4707 of December 11, 
1979, implemented the tariff concessions in U.S. law relying both on 
the authority of Section 101 of the 1974 Act and on various sections 
of the 1979 Act.242 
The President probably had authority apart from the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 to accept certain other MTN agreements as 
well. For example, the agreements on Bovine Meat and Dairy Prod-
ucts basically only set up an international consultation mechanism, 
presumably a matter within inherent presidential authority.243 The 
Agreement on Licensing needed no legislation for implementation 
since the President had authority to regulate licensing under existing 
legislation.244 Consequently, it was also likely that the President had 
authority to accept the Licensing Agreement on his own authority, 
although analogous activity by the President has been challenged.245 
With the exception of the principal tariff agreements mentioned 
above, Section 2 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provided ex-
plicit authority for the President to accept all the major MTN agree-
ments, and all the bilateral MTN agreements to which the United 
States was a party.246 This statutory acceptance authority, however, 
241. 265 ITEX (BNA) C-4 (July 17, 1979) and Special Supplement at 29; GATT Doc, 
1/4914/Rev. 2 (July 23, 1980). 
242. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 2(b)(2)(A), 502, 503(a)(2)(A), 855(a), 93 Stat. 147, 
251,295. Proclamation to Carry Out the Geneva (1979) Protocol to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and for Other Purposes, Proclamation 4707 of Dec. 11, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 
72348 (1979). 
243. "Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat," GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 84 (26th Supp. 
1980) and "International Diary Arrangement," GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 91 (26th Supp. 
1980). 
244. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 257. 
245. The challenge to the 1967 Anti-dumping Code included the idea that the President 
did not have the authority to change long-standing administrative practices without congres-
sional approval. See S. REP. No. 1385, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4529, 4551. 
246. Section 2(c) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(c) (Supp. Ill 
1979), lists the following Agreements: 
(I) The Agreements on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (relating to customs valuation). 
(2) The Agreement on Government Procurement. 
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was qualified in three important ways. 
First, because the MTN had not been completely finalized at the 
time of enactment of the 1979 Act (certain corrections or later minor 
changes were expected), the statutory draftsmen were faced with the 
problem of how to authorize acceptance of nonfinalized agreements 
and yet not give the Executive a blank check to enter into agree-
ments which have not been approved by Congress. The uneasy solu-
tion was language authorizing the President to accept the "final legal 
instruments or texts" of trade agreements approved by the Congress, 
if the differences between the final text and the text earlier submitted 
to Congress were only "rectifications of a formal character or minor 
technical or clerical changes," or if the changes were only in "an-
nexes" to the agreement and the President determines that the bal-
ance of rights and obligations for the United States had been 
maintained.247 One particular exaihple of the use of this latter au-
thority was the Government Procurements Agreement. The United 
States and Japan continued to negotiate on the "entities" to be in-
cluded in the Annex to that agreement until December 1980, at 
which time agreement was reached and formalized through an ex-
change of letters. On December 23, 1980, the United States an-
nounced that it was accepting the Government Procurement Code 
and the Code came into effect on Janaury 1, 1981.248 
Second, the "acceptance" authority of section 2 of the Trade 
(3) The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
(4) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (relating to product standards). 
(5) The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing 
measures). 
(6) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (relating to anti-dumping measures). 
(7) The International Dairy Arrangement. 
(8) Certain bilateral agreements on cheese, other dairy products, and meat. 
(9) The Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat. 
(10) The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. 
(11) Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade. 
(12) Certain Bilateral Agreements to Eliminate the Wine-Gallon Method of Tax and 
Duty Assessment. 
(13) Certain other agreements to be reflected in Schedule XX of the United States to the 
General Agreement on Watch Making Requirements, and to Modify United States Tariffs 
and Trade, including Agreements -
(A) to Modify United States Tariff Nomenclature and Rates of Duty for Watches. 
(B) to Provide Duty-Free Treatment for Agricultural and Horticultural Machinery, 
Equipment, Implements, and Parts Thereof, and 
(C) to Modify United States Tariff Nomenclature and Rates of Duty for Ceramic 
Tableware. 
(14) The Agreement with the Hungarian People's Republic. 
Note the exceptional ambiguity of item number 13. 
247. Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 2(b)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(l) (Supp. III 1979). 
248. Determination Regarding Acceptance and Application of the Agreement on Govern-
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Agreements Act of 1979 imposed the limitation that "No agreement 
accepted by the President . . . shall apply between the United States 
and any other country unless the President determines that such 
country - (1) has accepted the obligations of the agreement with 
respect to the U.S., and (2) should not be denied the benefits because 
it has not accorded adequate reciprocity. to the commerce of the 
.United States, required from other industrial countries by Section 
126(c) of the 1974 Trade Act."249 This condition is obviously troub-
lesome. This problem must be distinguished, however, from Most-
Favored-Nation treatment. Even if the U.S. accepts an agreement 
but does not apply that agreement to another country, it may still 
apply its own law implementing the obligations of the agreement, in 
a non-discriminatory way, to trade of all other nations whether par-
ties to the particular agreement or not.250 Thus, in revising its anti-
dumping law to conform to the new Anti-Dumping Agreement of 
the MTN, the United States did not distinguish between trade from 
nations who are, or are not, parties to this MTN Agreement. In 
other cases, however, this was not true. 
The 1979 statute's reciprocity condition implies a legal mecha-
nism under which the United States could accept a particular MTN 
agreement without applying it to other countries, some of whom 
were also parties to the same agreement. As to the obligation to ap-
ply a MTN agreement to nations which have not accepted the same 
agreement, this is a question either of the language of the agreement 
ment Procurement, 45 Fed. Reg. 252 (1980). See also Statement Concerning Executive Order 
12260 on Agreement on Government Procurement, 46 Fed. Reg. 1657 (1981). 
249. No agreement accepted by the President under paragraph (I) shall apply between the 
United States and any other country unless the President determines that such country -
(A) has accepted the obligations of the agreement with repect to the United States, and 
(B) should not otherwise be denied the benefits of the agreement with respect to the 
United States because such country has not accorded adequate benefits, including sub-
stantially equal competitive opportunities for the co=erce of the United States to the 
extent required under section 126(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2136(c)), to the 
United States." 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
If the President determines under subsection (b) of this section that a major industrial 
country has not made concessions under trade agreements entered into under this chapter 
which provides substantially equivalent competitive opportunities for the commerce of 
the United States, he shall, either generally, with respect to such country or by Article 
produced by such country, in order to restore equivalence of competitive opportunities, 
reco=end to the Congress -
(1) legislation providing for the termination or denial of the benefits of concessions of 
trade agreements entered into under this chapter made with respect to rates of duty or 
other import restrictions by the United States; and 
(2) that any legislation necessary to carry out any trade agreement under section 2112 of 
this title shall not apply to any such country. 
Trade Act of 1974 § 126(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2136(c) (1976). 
250. E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 101 (adding title VII to the Tariff Act of 
1930), 106 (repealing Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 & other amendments). 
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itself, or of a MFN obligation in some other international agreement. 
The principal other source of such obligation is, of course, the 
GATT itself (MFN in Article I) which indeed may apply in a 
number of such cases.251 Other agreements, such as bilateral Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation agreements, could also give rise to 
a MFN obligation.252 
In addition, however, some of the MTN agreements purport to 
be "agreed interpretations" of provisions in the GA TT itself253 and 
as such could arguably be interpreted to imply an obligation to treat 
all other GATT members in the manner required by that specific 
MTN agreement. It is also theoretically possible (although not the 
case) that a MTN agreement could explicitly provide that parties to 
it would treat all GATT members, or all other nations (or some sub-
set of them) in a manner required by that Agreement.254 
, 251. The United States does not apply MFN treatment in its implementation of the results 
of three of the Multilateral Trade Agreements - The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Code, the Government Procurement Code, and the Standards Code. See Agreement on Inter-
pretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 56 (26th Supp. 1980), Agreement on Government 
Procurement, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 33 (26th Supp. 1980) and Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 8 (26th Supp. 1980). See also Hufbauer, Erb 
& Starr, The GA'IT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAW & 
POLY. INTL. Bus. 59 (1980). 
252. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation agreements such as Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 14, 1956); 
see Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 
(1958). See also Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 70l(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979), 
in which the term "country under the Agreement" is defined to include a country with respect 
to which the President determines that -
(A) there is an agreement in effect between the United States and that country which -
(i) was in force on June 19, 1979, and 
(ii) requires unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to Articles im-
ported into the United States, 
(B) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not apply between the United 
States and that country, and 
(C) the agreement described in subparagraph A does not expressly permit -
(i) actions required or permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or 
required by Congress, or 
(ii) nondiscriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation which are designed to 
prevent deceptive or unfair practices. 
The Senate Report lists agreements with seven countries which could potentially meet these 
requirements. These countries are Venezuela, Honduras, Nepal, North Yemen, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, and Liberia. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 205, at 45. 
253. E.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (relating to customs valuation), GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 116 (26th Supp. 
1980); Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures), 
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 56 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to antidumping measures), 
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 171 (26th Supp. 1980). 
254. A search of the MTN agreements revealed no such provision. 
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As to the nonapplication of a particular agreement to another 
party to that same agreement, this seeming anomaly (which "reser-
vation" rules might in some cases legitimize under international 
law)255 stems from the strong precedent of GATT Article XXXV 
which allows (under certain circumstances) ·a GATT contracting 
party to give notice of the nonapplication of the GA TT between it 
and another GATT member.256 An explicit clause in some of the 
MTN agreements allows this same type of action.257 
Third, the final important qualification of the "acceptance" au-
thority in the 1979 Act (section 2(b )(3)) prevents the President from 
accepting certain agreements (all the major multilateral agreements 
of the MTN except the tariff agreements) unless all "major industrial 
country" MTN participants also accept. The statute defines "major 
industrial country" as the European Communities (whose accept-
ance is deemed acceptance by the Member States for this purpose), 
Canada, and Japan and other countries designated by the Presi-
dent.258 Despite the condition, however, the statute allows the Presi-
dent to accept the agreement if: (1) only one major industrial 
country has not accepted and that country is not a major factor in 
the trade in products covered by the agreement, (2) the President has 
authority to deny the benefits of the agreement to that country and 
takes steps to do so, or (3) U.S. trade would benefit anyway and the 
President reports that it is in the national interest to accept the 
agreement. 
Under this clause, some difficult situations arose for the accept-
ance and implementation of the MTN agreements. The United 
States, through the 1979 Act, was the first major industrial partici-
255. Most of the MTN agreements prohibit reservations without the consent of all parties, 
see, e.g., Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Art. 23, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 116 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures, Sec. 18, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp. 1980). See 
Bishop, Reservations lo Treaties, 103 RECUEIL DES CouRS 245 (Hague Acad. of Intl. Law) 
(1961). 
256. See WORLD TRADE, supra note 3, at 100-02. 
257. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement, Part IX, ~9, GATT, BASIC IN• 
STRUMENTS 33 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Sec. 24, GA TT, 
BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, ~10, 
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 171 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Interpretation and Appli• 
cation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII ofGATT, Art. 19, Sec. 9, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
56 (26th Supp. 1980); Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Art. 9.7, GATT, BASIC INSTRU· 
MENTS 162 (26th Supp. 1980). 
258. Trade Act of 1974 § 126(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2136(d) (1976) defines the term "major indus-
trial countries" as follows: "For purposes of this section, 'major industrial country' means Ca-
nada, the European Economic Community, the individual member countries of such 
Community, Japan, and any other foreign country designated by the President for purposes of 
this subsection." 
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pant in the MTN to obtain executive authority to accept the results. 
It then acted to accept "conditionally."259 The European Economic 
Community delayed such action partly because of an internal consti-
tutional dispute over which institutions or governments had the com-
petence to authorize acceptance of the MTN agreements. The EEC, 
however, accepted the agreements by the end of 1979.26° Canada, 
also, first appeared to be delaying (partly because of an election) but 
acted before the end of 1979.261 This left Japan, which found itself 
totally unable to finish the acceptance procedure before 1980. A new 
Parliament was elected in October 1979 in Japan, and this Parlia-
ment took time to organize.262 The cabinet officials took the neces-
sary steps to recommend approval of the MTN results, and the 
Parliament finally acted in April 1980.263 The uneasy solution uti-
lized in United States law was for the President to determine that, 
(ii) in accordance with Section 2(b)(3) of the Act (93 Stat. 147), the 
acceptance of these agreements by Japan is not essential to the effective 
operation of the agreements for that period of time during which Japan 
is completing its Constitutional procedures to accept the agreements 
and in light of the stated intention of the Government of Japan to act 
in the interim in line with the agreements within its existing powers.264 
2. The Fast Track Procedure for NTB Agreements, and the 
Drefting of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
Congressional approval was required for the United States both 
to accept and implement the major nontariff agreements of the 
MTN. Under the Trade Act of 1979 this was to be accomplished by 
normal legislation, considered by Congress under the fast track pro-
cedure described above.265 The procedures operated in an interest-
ing manner, which are analyzed in this section. 
Under the fast track procedure, the President was required to no-
tify the Congress 90 days before he signed any NTB agreements, and 
to consult with key congressional committees during those 90 days. 
259. 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
260. Council Decision of Dec. 10, 1979, concerning the conclusion of the Multilateral 
Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations, O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 71/1) 
(1980); see also 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-5 (Jan. 1, 1980). 
261. See 287 ITEX (BNA), at C-2 (Dec. 18, 1979); 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-6 (Jan. l, 1980). 
262. See 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979); 4 INTL. TRADE REPORTER: U.S. IM-
PORT WEEKLY (BNA), at A-11 (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ITIM(BNA)]. 
263. See Part III supra. 
264. Presidential Determination Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Ac-
ceptance and Application of Certain International Trade Agreements, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,781, § l 
(Dec. 14, 1979). 
265. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 102, 151, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1976). 
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Congress had been kept informed generally throughout the course of 
the Tokyo Round negotiations, and key congressional committees 
had developed professional staff whose full time was devoted to fol-
lowing the course of the negotiations. When the President notified 
Congress in early January 1979 about the tentative NTB agreements, 
his officials sent Congress detailed information about the status of 
the negotiations, including the tentative drafts of various NTB agree-
ments. 266 Anticipating this, congressional staff, in consultation with 
key Senators and Congressmen, had designed a procedure for the 
consultation which closely paralleled the normal procedure followed 
in work on bills except that, in this case, no bill was yet introduced in 
the Congress. 
When a Committee of Congress begins formally to consider a bill 
that has been introduced, and to prepare that bill for report to the 
floor of the whole House, its session is often called a "markup," indi-
cating that the committee is "marking up" the bill with its proposed 
changes. The "consultations" with the executive branch during the 
90-day period prior to completion of the international agreements 
were called "non-markup" sessions, and closely followed this type of 
procedure. One important difference was that the sessions were not 
open to the public. 
The principal committees devoting time to the MTN were the 
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee. These committees met extensively with executive branch offi-
cials, including the trade negotiators, and occasionally entered into 
detailed negotiations about the matters which should be included in 
a U.S. statute implementing the international agreements. Particu-
larly close attention was given to the anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty laws.267 Perhaps most surprising, the members of 
Congress informed the executive branch that they wanted their own 
staff (including the legal staff of the House and the Senate) to de-
velop the actual text of the bill which the President would introduce. 
Other procedures also paralleled the normal legislative processes. 
On certain issues the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
266. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTINO 
NOTICE OF SEVERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 102(E)(l) OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, H.R. 
Doc. No. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), for a summary of the status of the negotiations at 
that time. 
267. See House Ways and Means Committee, Press Release No. 14 (Mar. 19, 1979); Senate 
Finance Committee, Press Release No. 112 (Apr. 5, 1979); Senate Finance Committee, Press 
Release No. 115 (May 3, 1979); Senate Finance Committee, Press Release No. 116 (May 8, 
1979); Joint Press Release No. I (May 24, 1979). 
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Senate Finance Committee did not agree, and so they held a "non-
conference" joint session,268 at which they resolved their. differences, 
to enable the two Houses to present a united front to the executive 
branch. Throughout this process the executive branch officials par-
ticipated, influenced the deliberations, and were in a position of 
some bargaining power, since it was understood that it was the Presi-
dent's bill that would ultimately be introduced and which thereafter 
could not be amended. 269 
After the international agreements were initialed in Geneva, the 
executive branch prepared the bill that the President introduced to 
Congress. Understanding political realities, the President's officials 
adopted almost in its entirety the draft bill which had been prepared 
by the congressional committees and staff. The President then ar-
ranged to have this bill introduced in June 1979.270 
Since the bill could not be amended, when the bill was intro-
duced the basic substantive work was over. Thus, from the point of 
view of Congress, the consultation period, including the "non-
markup" and the "non-conference," that went on prior to the intro-
duction of the bill, was crucial to shaping the bill in a manner that 
would gain enough support in both Houses of Congress to permit 
passage. Thus, after the bill was introduced, the normal procedures 
for enacting legislation were a formality. To no one's surprise, the 
bill passed.271 What was surprising was the overwhelming vote in 
favor of the bill: 90 to 4 in the Senate, and 395 to 7 in the House.272 
One unusual development in these congressional proceedings 
was the degree of foreign involvement they attracted. As the con-
gressional Committees' "non-markup" sessions began their work, of-
ficials of the European Economic Community realized the 
significance of these proceedings. They recognized that the statute 
Congress was formulating would have a profound effect on the im-
plementation of the MTN Agreements. Once the statute became 
U.S. law, it would be hard to persuade the U.S. Congress to change 
it. Thus, other nations might shape their own implementation of the 
268. In normal bills, a conference committee session to resolve differences in the two 
houses is typical. 
269. This was probably the most important feature of the "fast track" procedure. 
270. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979). 
271. July 23, 1979, signed July 26, 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 2501) (Supp. III 1979). 
272. See 125 CONG. REC. Sl0,340 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) and 125 CONG. REC. H5690 
(daily ed. July 11, 1979). Destler notes that five of the eleven legislators voting against the Act 
were from Wisconsin and that the dairy industry in that state objected to increases in cheese 
imports allowed in U.S. concession. See DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 202 
(1980). 
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MTN Agreements in accordance with the precedent in the United 
States. The fact that the United States procedures were moving 
faster than those of any other country would also be influential. 
Consequently, the EEC took the logical step: they hired professional 
(legal and economic) representation in Washington, D.C., to monitor 
the congressional consultations with the executive branch officials. 
These representatives reported quickly and frequently to the EEC 
officials, permitting EEC negotiators to raise certain issues with their 
American counterparts. If the Congressional-Executive Sessions be-
gan moving in an undesirable direction, the EEC could make it 
known that certain statutory formulations would be deemed a 
breach of the international obligations assumed by both the EEC 
and the United States. One example of this was the phrasing of the 
injury test for the anti-dumping and countervailing duty agreements. 
U.S. law used the word "injury," rather than the phrase "material 
injury," in its anti-dumping procedures. GATT Article VI required 
the phrase "material injury." Since U.S. law preceded the GATT, 
grandfather right exceptions could be argued. On the other hand, the 
1967 Anti-Dumping Code using the term "material injury" had been 
accepted by the United States. For more than a decade, foreign 
countries argued that the United States was not living up to its 1967 
anti-dumping code obligations. The United States argued, however, 
that even though the U.S. statute omitted the adjective "material," 
material injury had existed in fact in all U.S. anti-dumping proce-
dures. This is an exceedingly difficult proposition to refute since it 
would require a de novo examination of the complicated facts. 
The word "material" was included in the MTN Countervailing 
Duty and Anti-Dumping Agreements. Initially, however, the execu-
tive branch officials seemed willing to accept statutory formulations 
that did not include the word "material." Presumably they would 
continue to argue that a material injury test would in fact be utilized. 
The EEC negotiators let the United States know that this was unac-
ceptable, and that they would insist that the statute include the word 
"material." As a result of these negotiations, and the presentation of 
these views to the committees of Congress, the word "material" was 
finally included in the U.S. statute. Interestingly enough, however, 
the committee reports describing the meaning of the "material in-
jury" test stated that the meaning (as to anti-dumping law) was to be 
that which had been previously applied by the International Trade 
Commission in recent years under the "injury'' test. Thus, Congress 
expressed its view that "material injury" had long been the de facto 
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criterion and that the word "material" added nothing to the word 
"injury." 
The new injury test phrase will have to be applied a number of 
times before it will become evident if U.S. policy has actually 
changed. However, the whole incident demonstrates the trend in 
modem diplomacy for foreign representatives to participate in seem-
ingly domestic governmental procedures.273 
Participants suggest that, throughout this process, congressional 
committees were responsive to executive branch objectives that noth-
ing be included in the U.S. statute that would require the United 
States to default in any of its international obligations under the 
MTN results. Congressmen were careful to avoid such provisions in 
the proposed statute. In fact, after the bill was forwarded to the Con-
gress in final form, the Commission of the European Economic 
Communities issued an official statement that, in the opinion of the 
EEC officials, on the whole the bill reflected both the spirit and the 
letter of the MTN Agreements.274 
Several aspects of this procedure for enacting the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 are potentially significant. First, the Congress was 
evidently pleased with the procedure. The involvement of the con-
273. About the involvement of the EEC, see 12 BULL. EuR. COMM. 5, 75 (1979), where it is 
stated that, prompted by rumors that the future American legislation implementing the code 
on subsidies would not interpret correctly the idea of "material injury," the Community has 
approached the American authorities. See also 12 BULL. EuR. COMM. 4, 15 (1979); N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 21, 1979, at 29, col. 6; European Community News Press Release No. 14/1979 
(Apr. 25, 1979); European Community News Press Release No. 28/1979 (July 16, 1979). For 
some comments on U.S. law and the material injury test see Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping 
and Countervailing JJuty Provisions /Can/ /Wil/j [Should/ Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 L. & 
PoLY. INTL. Bus. 1361, 1421 (1979); Marks, Recent Changes in U.S. Import Restrictions, in 
AIDS AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (P. Demaret ed. 1980) 
(XXXIId Conference, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium, Oct. 18-20, 1979); Alberger, The 
concept of injury in United States trade law- the role of the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion, in AIDS AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (P. Dermaret ed. 
1980) (XXXIId Conference, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium, Oct. 18-20, 1979). 
274. "The European Commission notes that the texts agreed on in Geneva have not been 
transferred literally into this Act with all the accuracy that is required, but on the whole, the 
American Act reflects the spirit and the letter of the agreements. The Act alone does not provide 
a full guarantee that the United States will meet all its commitments. Some texts lend them-
selves to several interpretations and some procedural provisions still have to be stipulated. 
The Commission therefore intends to follow very closely the way in which the legislation is put 
into practice, in compliance with the Geneva commitments." Europe (Agence Internationale 
d'Information pour la Presse) Press Release No. 2763 (n.s.) at 7 (Oct. 6, 1979). See also Final 
Report by the Commission on the MTN where the Commission notes: "With the United States 
major agreements have been arrived at, both in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The 
United States customs tariffs will have fewer peaks and in the nontariff field the United States 
will come into line with the GAIT, particularly in relation to the criterion of "material in-
jury," for the application of countervailing duties, abolition of the American Selling Price and 
Final List systems of valuation, elimination of the discriminatory fiscal system of wine gallon 
assessment on alcoholic beverages, and significant changes in the application of the Buy Amer-
ican Act." IO BULL. EUR. COMM. 7, 8 (1979). 
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gressional committees in the drafting process gave Congress confi-
dence that the executive branch was not trying to enter agreements 
without congressional input. For example, at one point in the con-
sultative period prior to finalizing the international agreements, a 
particular criticism was voiced by members of Congress on behalf of 
small business constituents. They complained that the proposed 
agreement on Government Procurement would reduce their "small 
business preference" under existing U.S. law. Executive branch 
negotiators sensed both the importance of this issue to Congress and 
the relative unimportance of the issue to the policies underlying the 
MTN. Consequently, the U.S. negotiators immediately approached 
other countries and obtained approval from them to alter the pro-
posed agreement in such a way as to take care of the problem.275 
The incident illustrated the value of the consultation period before 
the international agreement was completed. 
Congress's satisfaction with the procedure is evidenced not only 
by statements in the committee reports and other legislative his-
tory, 276 but more concretely by the fact that the Congress extended 
the time period for this procedure by eight years beyond the period 
contained in the 1974 Act.277 In addition, Section 3(c) of the 1979 
Act adopted virtually the same procedure for amending U.S. law 
implementing the MTN Agreements, when such amendments are 
necessary to fulfill a "requirement of, amendment to, or recommen-
dation under such an agreement."278 Thus, if an international dis-
putes panel rules against the United States on a question of 
interpretation of an MTN agreement, and U.S. law prevents the 
executive from implementing the international interpretation, this 
275. A front-page story in the Washington Post of March 14, 1979, led to criticism of the 
U.S. position in the negotiations on a government procurement code. The story stated that the 
United States would agree to a relaxation of preferences for small and minority businesses in 
its government procurement practices. Members of the Subcommittee on General Oversight 
and Minority Enterprise of the House Co=ittee on Small Business expressed concern that 
small businesses would pay a price for benefits which would flow largely to multinational 
corporations. They criticized the STR for the lack of prior consultation with those in the exec-
utive and legislative branches involved with small and minority business concerns. Special 
Trade Represenatative Robert Strauss defended the administration's position in testimouy 
before the subco=ittee on March 20, 1979. On March 22, the administration announced that 
Japan and the European Co=unity had approved a change that would exclude United States 
set-aside programs for small and minority businesses from the coverage of the agreement. It 
appears that the inclusion of NASA in the U.S. entity list was part of the deal. See Washing-
ton Post, Mar. 14, 1979 at A-1, col. I; id., Mar. 21, 1979 at D-6, col. I; id., Mar. 23, 1979 at F-1, 
col. I. See generally Multinational Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gen• 
era/ Oversight and Minority Enterprises of the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong. 1st 
Sess. (1979). 
276. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 5. 
277. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § I 101 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1976)). 
278. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 3(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2504(c) (Supp. III 1979). 
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procedure could be followed to change U.S. law.279 
The fast track procedure thus holds considerable potential as a 
means of providing both executive flexibility in international deal-
ings, and congressional responsiveness to constituents. The fast 
track procedure may also soften the recurrent disagreements be-
tween these two branches of government over the issues of interna-
tional trade. 
Second, there is an unusual problem with the interpretation of 
the 1979 Act. Normally, United States courts take note of a statute's 
legislative history when interpreting a statute. This history consists, 
inter a!ia, of the committee hearings, debates, and reports, and state-
ments on the floor of both houses while considering the bill. The 
theory is that the intent of Congress, when ambiguous in the statu-
tory language itself, can sometimes be ascertained by congressional 
statements made during the drafting process. Under the fast track 
procedure, however, a bill, which could not be amended, was intro-
duced by the executive. Thus, the executive was the draftsman, and 
the executive's intent was arguably the "intent of the draftsman." 
The executive sent to Congress, along with the final draft of the bill, 
"Statements of Administrative Action" indicating its intentions in 
administering the new legislation. 280 Thus these statements are an 
important part of the legislative history, and may be the definitive 
source oflegislative intent. However, the actual history of the execu-
tive-congressional consultative process suggests a somewhat different 
approach, and the House and Senate Committee reports reflect that 
difference. Although these reports were formulated by the key con-
gressional committees in reporting on the actual bill introduced, and 
thus came at a time when no amendments were permitted to the bill, 
the reports state:28 1 
The committee emphasizes that virtually all of the provisions of H.R. 
4357 [which became the TAA of 1979] reflect the decisions of the 
House and Senate committees, as coordinated in the joint meetings 
noted above. The implementing bill was drafted in the offices of the 
House and Senate Legislative Counsel with the participation of staff 
members of the committees of jurisdiction in both Houses and repre-
sentatives from the Administration. The bill reflects the understand-
ings achieved on all issues, as explained in this report. 
Thus, the report claims to be a prime source of legislative history, 
219. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36. 
280. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATEMENTS 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
281. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at 
28. 
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just as it would be in the case of other legislation. Moreover, it also 
presents a view of the role of the Statements of Administrative Ac-
tion, and notes that those Statements "are not part of the bill and 
will not become part of U.S. statutes . . . . They will not provide 
any new, independent legal authority for executive action."282 
Finally, the role of the MTN Agreements themselves in the legis-
lative history must be considered. As will be seen below, it is clear 
that the Agreements do not themselves become U.S. law, but the 
Committee Reports state that "[t]his bill is drafted with the intent to 
permit U.S. practice to be consistent with the obligations of the 
agreements, as the United States understands those obligations."283 
It seems fair to conclude that the trade agreements (and presumably 
their preparatory work) are a secondary source for legislative history 
of the 1979 Act. 
One additional aspect of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
should be noted. This Act clearly covers a number of matters which 
are not explicitly required by any of the MTN Agreements or other 
negotiation results. Indeed, some of the matters contained in the 
Trade Agreements Act seem only remotely relevant to the MTN. 
For example, Section 111 of the Act makes some changes in Title V 
of the Trade Act of 1974 relating to the Generalized System of Pref-
erences. Among other changes, the President is authorized to desig-
nate members of OPEC, meeting certain requirements, as 
beneficiaries of the Generalized System of Preferences. N everthe-
less, although the fast track procedure purports to be a procedure for 
implementing and approving the trade negotiation results, since the 
form of the congressional action is that of a typical statute, adopted 
through the normal constitutional procedures (and not through a 
procedure such as legislative veto or delegated regulations), the stat-
ute provides its own authority for even those matters that go beyond 
implementation of the MTN results. Thus, it seems impossible to 
challenge measures of the statute on the ground that they are ultra 
vires the authority of the fast track procedure, as embodied in the 
Trade Act of 1974, and particularly Sections 102 and 151 of that Act. 
This is an important bar to constitutional challenges to the fast track 
procedure. 284 
282. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 33. 
283. S. REP. No. 249,supra note 202, at 36;seea/so H.R. REP. No. 317,supra note 270, at 
41. 
284. Title X and Title XI contain measures not necessary to implement the MTN results. 
Title X amends sections of U.S. law dealing with judicial review of administrative decisions. 
Title XI is entitled Miscellaneous Provisions and includes the following sections: 
§ 1101 Extension ofnontariffbarrier negotiating authority 
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3. United States Acceptance of the MTN Agreements 
Once the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 became law (on July 26, 
1979) the President had the authority he needed to accept the MTN 
Agreements as international obligations of the United States.285 
The President made most of the required determinations on De-
cember 14, 1979. His document authorized the signing and accept-
ance of seven of the agreements. Six of these agreements were 
signed and accepted by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Michael 
B. Smith in Geneva on December 17, 1979, the opening day of the 
three-year signing period.286 The Agreement on Trade in Civil Air-
craft was accepted on December 20, 1979. Two agreements, sched-
uled to enter into force January I, 1981, were signed, but not 
accepted at this time. The Agreement on Government Procurement 
was not accepted at this time because negotiations on "entity cover-
age" had not been completed. The Customs Valuation agreement 
was not accepted because the conditions in Section 2 of the Trade 
Agreements Act had not been met. 287 
The United States implemented the Customs Valuation Code in 
U.S. law effective July I, 1980. The President's proclamation of the 
early implementation of the Code was authorized by Section 
204(a)(2) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which required a de-
termination that the European Economic Community had accepted 
the obligations of the Code.288 A protocol to the Customs Valuation 
Code, designed to encourage developing countries to adhere to the 
Code, came into effect January I, 1981. This agreement was imple-
mented in United States law by a statute that amended one section 
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.289 
The Government Procurement Agreement was accepted by the 
United States in December 1980290 and came into force January I, 
1981. 
§ 1103 Advice from private sector 
§ I 104 Study of possible agreements with North American countries 
§ 11 IO Study of export trade policy 
§ 1111 Generalized system of preferences 
285. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 2(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(3). 
286. See 288 ITEX (BNA), at A-5 (Jan. I, 1980). 
287. Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations - Determination Re-
garding the Application of Certain International Trade Agreements, 45 Fed. Reg. I 181 (1980). 
288. Proclamation to Carry Out the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the Customs Valuation Code) and for Other Pur-
poses, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,135 (1980). 
289. Pub. L. No. 96-490, 94 Stat. 2556 (1980) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (Supp. IV 
1980)) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1976)). 
290. 287 ITEX (BNA), at A-3 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
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F. Implementing the MTN Results in U.S. Law 
1. Source of U.S. Domestic Law 
[Vol. 81:267 
Since international agreements do not always become part of the 
U.S. domestic law, the United States must be classified as a dualist 
country.291 This section discusses the form of implementation of ac-
cepted MTN results into U.S. domestic law. 
An international agreement ( or part thereof) which is found by 
the courts to be "self-executing" directly becomes a part of the do-
mestic laws, which U.S. courts must apply in specific cases.292 To 
avoid extensive analysis of this concept her~, suffice it to say that the 
U.S. courts ,determine whether an international agreement is self-ex-
ecuting by ascertaining whether the draftsmen intended it to be so, 
as manifested primarily by the language of the agreement itself, and 
secondarily by the preparatory work. Since the concept of "self-exe-
cuting" is itself a domestic U.S. constitutional question (often of lit-
tle or no interest to other national parties to the agreement), it is not 
surprising that the courts tend to look at the intent of the U.S. drafts-
men. For U.S. agreements requiring congressional approval, con-
gressional intent in granting approval becomes very important and 
perhaps determinative.293 Often it is difficult to tell either from the 
language of the agreement or its legislative history whether a partic-
u1ar international agreement is self-executing. If it is not self-execut-
ing, whenever the agreement obligates the U.S. to change its 
domestic law, such change must be implemented by other regular 
constitutional means, such as enactment of a statute, or, if the execu-
tive branch has authority, the promulgation of a regulation. 
Sections 3(a) and 3(f) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ad-
dress the self-execution and implementation of the MTN results. The 
clauses are clarified by the relevant committee reports and the State-
ment of Administrative Action. Section 3(a) of the 1979 Act states: 
No provision of any trade agreement approved by the Congress under 
section 2(a), nor the application of any such provision to any person or 
circumstances, which is in conflict with any statute of the United States 
shall be given effect under the laws of the United States. 
291. See note 239 supra; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 33.59 
(1973). 
292. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-61 (1972); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 154 (1965); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 144-49 (1962). 
293. In Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court noted that in 
interpreting treaties courts must "look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by 
the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to the 
circumstances surrounding its execution." 
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Section 3 (f) states: 
Neither the entry into force with respect to the United States of any 
agreement approved under section 2(a), nor the enactment of this Act, 
shall be construed as creating any private right of action or remedy for 
which provision is not explicitly made under this Act or under the laws 
of the United States. 
The Statement of Administrative Action on the MTN Agree-
ments states unequivocally that "[t]he Trade Agreements negotiated 
are not self-executing and accordingly do not have independent ef-
fect under U.S. law."294 The Senate and House reports follow suit, 
saying that "the trade agreements are not self-executing."295 The 
Senate Report goes on to say that "[i]mplementation of obligations 
for the United States under the agreements can only be achieved as 
is provided in the Trade Act of 1974."296 This last statement, how-
ever, probably cannot be taken at face value.297 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is itself the source of several 
U.S. domestic laws to implement the major nontariff MTN Agree-
ments. This is true for the agreements on subsidies and counter-
vailing measures, anti-dumping measures, customs valuation, 
government procurement standards, and civil aircraft. Certain other 
MTN agreements are implemented through other legal actions. For 
example, most of the Tariff Agreements could be implemented under 
the authority of Section 101 of the 1974 Trade Act. This Act (follow-
ing the forty-year pattern of U.S. trade acts) explicitly authorized the 
President to enter into tariff change agreements (within specified lim-
its). In a separate clause, it then authorized him to "proclaim such 
modification ... of any existing duty, ... [etc.] as he determines to 
be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade agree-
ment."298 This statute thus embraces a dualist philosophy. To the 
extent that the tariff obligations agreed to in the MTN exceeded the 
authority of section 101 of the 1974 act, however, legislation of ap-
proval was necessary. This is found in Title V of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979.299 Pursuant to both of these sources of authority, 
the President has proclaimed300 the staged reductions and other 
294. U.S. House OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATEMENTS 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
295. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 281, at 41. 
296. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36. 
297. As discussed above, the President has some authority not solely derived from that Act; 
see notes 240-42 supra and accompanying text. 
298. Trade Act of 1974, § 10l(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 21 l l(a)(2) (1976). 
299. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 503, 93 Stat. 144, 251-52 (codified 
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)). 
300. Proclamation No. 4707, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,348 (1979). 
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changes in U.S. tariffs, and this proclamation is the direct source of 
domestic law applied by U.S. courts and customs officials. 
In addition to tariffs, there were several MTN agreements (Dairy, 
Bovine Meat, Import Licensing)301 which the executive claimed, and 
the Congress agreed,302 did not need legislation to implement. In 
these cases no U.S. statutes needed changing. The Dairy and Meat 
agreements merely established international consultative arrange-
ments, and normal U.S. diplomatic activities would embrace these 
functions. Similarly, the President already had statutory delegations 
which authorized him or his officials to issue or change regulations 
to accommodate the procedural obligations of the Agreement on Im-
port Licensing.303 
Some MTN agreements required no direct implementation in 
U.S. law because they did not require any particular U.S. action. 
The so-called Framework Agreements, which were approved as de-
cisions of the GA TT Contracting Parties304 rather than independent 
international agreements, contained matters which, although poten-
tially very important, did not require specific actions by the United 
States except, perhaps, conducting its diplomacy in GAIT fora in 
the future. For example, one Framework Agreement permanently 
authorizes GA TT members to deviate from MFN so as to grant pref-
erences to developing countries. No country is required to act that 
way, but this text, now a "decision" of the GAIT Contracting Par-
ties,305 will, in some instances, deny a GAIT member the right to 
complain about other member nations' actions. 
While the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 thus enacted the neces-
sary measures for the United States to carry out its obligations under 
some agreements, three of its measures exclude some GA TT nations 
from their coverage. 306 Thus: 
301. International Dairy Arrangement, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 91 (26th Supp. 1980); 
Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 84 (26th Supp. 1980); 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, GATI, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 154 (26th Supp. 
1980). 
302. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979: STATE-
MENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 153 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 526, 527 
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. News 665, 774-76; s. REP. No. 249, supra 
note 202, at 257-58; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at 148, 186. 
303. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 257-58. 
304. See Texts Concerning a Framework for the Conduct of World Trade, GATI, BASIC 
INSTRUMENTS 201 (26th Supp. 1980). 
305. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Report by the Director-Gen-
eral ofGATI (GATI/1979-3); The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. II: 
Report by the Director-General ofGATI (GATI/1980-1); BASIC INSTRUMENTS (26th Supp. 
1980). 
306. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. IV 1980) (adding Title 
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§ 101 (introducing §701) applies the new U.S. countervailing 
duty law with its new injury test, only to countries that 
also accept the MTN Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (with exceptions for a few other 
countries). 
§ 301 regarding Government Procurement, likewise limits 
U.S. implementation of the MTN Agreement on this 
subject mainly to those countries that also accept that 
Agreement, or provide appropriate reciprocal actions. 
Section 441 limits certain procedural rights under the 
Technical Barriers (Standards) Agreement only to cer-
tain countries that reciprocate. 
Whether or not the U.S. law in these sections fully complies with 
MTN obligations, the domestic law of the U.S. is that stated in the 
1979 Act even ff inconsistent with United States international obliga-
tions. In implementing all other MTN agreements, whether required 
by international obligations or not, the United States has extended 
its law to all GATT or MFN countries. 
2. Executive Branch Reorganization 
For many decades, Congress has criticized the way the executive 
branch carries out United States foreign international economic pol-
icy. Congress was distressed after the Kennedy Round that the 
United States had given up too much in those negotiations.307 Like-
wise, Congress had been increasingly critical of the lack of effective 
organization of the executive branch with respect to international 
economic matters. The multiplicity of agencies and inter-agency 
conflicts had caused delays and mistakes of policy, and made it diffi-
cult for members of Congress or their constituents to know where to 
file their complaints. The extraordinary vote in favor of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979308 suggests that some of these congressional 
concerns had been lessened by the particular procedures (including 
the extensive consultation with Congress) that occurred prior to the 
introduction of the bill. Some Senators, however, desired to go fur-
ther. They urged reorganization of those parts of the executive 
branch that govern international economic affairs. Various ideas 
had been suggested, including unifying the splintered agencies in a 
new single department devoted entirely to international trade mat-
VII to Tariff Act of 1930); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, §§ 301,441, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2561 
(Supp. IV 1980). 
307. See J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 305 (1971). 
308. See text at note 272 supra. 
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ters,309 which would gather together the various executive branch 
agencies and activities relating to international trade. 
For a variety ofreasons, the idea of a new department devoted to 
trade was deemed unacceptable, both by Congress and the executive, 
but some reorganization of trade functions seemed necessary. In-
deed, some Congressmen spoke to this effect during the proceedings 
on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. They threatened to hold up 
that procedure unless some commitments were made about an exec-
utive branch reorganization.310 
Consequently, after the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was en-
acted, the President was committed to provide some reorganization. 
He did so with his reorganization Order Number 3 of September 25, 
1979. Under a statute previously enacted by the Congress, the Presi-
dent has the authority to reorganize agencies of the United States by 
issuing a reorganization order which he then lays before Congress 
for sixty days. If the Congress "vetos" that order, the President is 
not allowed to proceed with his reorganization. In this case, there 
was no congressional veto, so on November 29, 1979 the order be-
came law, authorizing the President to carry out the reorganization 
pursuant to its terms. He did so by Executive Order No. 12188 of 
January 2, 1980.311 
The most important provisions of the reorganization were those 
that shifted the administration of the countervailing duty and anti-
dumping laws from the Treasury Department to the Department of 
Commerce.312 In the Department of Commerce, a new International 
Trade Administration (ITA) was set up with three principal divi-
sions: one to handle anti-dumping and countervailing duty matters 
and to take over the Commerce Department function of export con-
trol administration; a second to be concerned with international eco-
nomic policy; and a third to continue a now embellished function for 
the Department of Commerce, of exportpromotion.313 
309. See, e.g., Ribicoff-Ruth Bill, S. 377, [Feb. 13, 1979] 244 ITEX (BNA) M-1; Byrd Bill, 
S 891, [Apr. IO, 1979] 252 ITEX (BNA) P-1; (June 19, 1979] 262 ITEX (BNA) 0-1. 
310. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International 
Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 390-91, 435 (1979) (statements of 
Senators Ribicoff and Roth). 
311. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). The reorganization statute can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. IV 
1980). 
312. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 2, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979). 
313. See Undersecretary for the International Trade Administration, Authority and Func-
tions, 45 Fed. Reg. 6141 (1980); International Trade Administration, Organization and Func-
tion Order, 45 Fed. Reg. 36,427 (1980). See also ITIM (BNA) Reference File 92: 0103-0104; 5 
ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Dec. 5, 1979); 9 ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Jan 9, 1980); 289 ITEX (BNA) at A-
8 (Jan. 8, 1980); 298 ITEX (BNA) at A-3 (Mar. 4, 1980). 
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In addition, the Reorganization Order took a number of interna-
tional economic functions away from the Department of State, and 
gave these to the office of the Special Trade Representative, renamed 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"). 
The reorganization also provided that the USTR would have pri-
mary international negotiating responsibilities on a number of eco-
nomic matters, including matters relating to anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty law.3 14 
3. MTN Implementation and the U.S. Regulatory Process 
United States law heavily emphasizes individual rights and fair 
and open procedures. A significant part of the 1979 implementing 
statute set forth detailed procedures regarding administration of sub-
jects of the MTN agreements. This was particularly true of the 
countervailing duty and anti-dumping duty law. Elaborate provi-
sions were included to govern the handling of private citizen com-
plaints about imports. A series of time limits was imposed, and the 
opportunity for public hearings clarified and broadened.315 At-
tempts were made to insulate administration of these subjects from 
"political" influences. Finally, disappointed parties were granted 
right to appeal the results of administrative rulings to the courts. 
4. Private Citizen Complaints and Section 301 Procedures: U.S. 
Export Access to Markets Abroad 
Section 252 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act provided a frame-
work for United States citizens to bring unfair foreign trade practices 
to the attention of the U.S. government. This section then author-
ized the President to take certain retaliatory countermeasures if he 
could not obtain satisfaction for the U.S. citizens through 
negotiations.316 
This procedure was revised in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974. Section 301 sets up an explicit set of procedures designed to 
give a private United States citizen a channel for bringing interna-
tional trade complaints to the attention of the United States Govern-
ment. Section 301 provides that the Office of the USTR shall receive 
the complaints and shall, on demand, hold public hearings about the 
314. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). See also 5 ITIM (BNA) at A-2 (Dec. 5, 1979); 9 ITIM (BNA) at A-2 
(Jan. 9, 1980). 
315. E.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, adding§§ 702-706 (19 U.S.C. § 1671), and 
§ 751 (19 u.s.c. § 1675). 
316. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 36. 
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validity of the complaint.317 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 amended section 301, but the 
basic structure of the complaint procedure was retained. If, after 
consideration by the USTR, the complaint is considered justified, the 
President is required tQ redress the matter, and he is authorized to 
take a variety of countermeasures - including trade restriction 
measures - against the foreign government, if negotiations prove 
unsuccessful. 318 
This procedure may be unique. It stems from a general feeling in 
the United States that individual citizens should have some right to 
redress when foreign governments violate their international obliga-
tions. 319 It also stems from congressional distrust of the executive 
branch's handling of these types of complaints. Various proposals in 
the 1979 legislative process would have gone yet further in forcing 
executive branch action against foreign governments. Nothing in the 
statute requires the President to take retaliatory actions, but the re-
quirement of public hearings320 coupled with the requirement to 
state publicly the reasons for not acting, make it politically difficult 
to ignore a reasonable complaint brought through this process. 
G. Summary and Conclusions 
The single most significant constitutional restraint on the ability 
of United States officials to negotiate international economic agree-
ments is, not surprisingly, the interaction of the executive and legis-
lative branches in the United States Government. This relationship 
colors every aspect of United States foreign relations, and particu-
larly foreign economic relations, where the Congress has a special 
claim to jurisdiction due to its enumerated power over foreign com-
merce. In spite of this constraint, however, the Tokyo Round experi-
ence demonstrates that the executive-congressional relationship, 
managed correctly, can allow effective participation in international 
negotiations and agreements. The overwhelming vote in favor of the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 may, as some have alleged, be evi-
317. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976); Procedures for Complaints Re• 
ceived Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006 (1982) (as 
amended). 
318. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title IX, 93 Stat. 144, 295-300 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (Supp. IV 1980)); Procedures for Complaints Received 
Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 15 C.F.R. pt. 2006 (1982) (as amended). 
319. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 202, at 232; H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 270, at 
173-74. 
320. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 144, 295-99 (amend-
ing §§ 301-302 of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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dence of too many concessions by the executive branch to Congress. 
Nevertheless, the close consultation between the executive branch 
and the Congress, in certain circumstances resulting in changes in 
the international negotiation, in other circumstances resulting in 
congressional changes in attitude, show the effectiveness of the 
process. This process, however, can lead to certain nontraditional 
diplomatic activities. For example, foreign nations may closely fol-
low the executive-congressional activities. At appropriate times, 
they may raise their concerns with potential congressional actions. 
Although such activity is obvious to persons experienced in govern-
ment or business, it seems to have been overlooked by those more 
involved in the theory of international law. 
The U.S. system now seems to rely fairly extensively on the sec-
tion 301 procedures. The notion that a private citizen should have 
the right almost to compel his government to take action in interna-
tional fora on his behalf seems to be very attractive to a Congress 
suspicious of the executive branch. 
The technique of resolving legal dilemmas by ignoring them was 
used during the implementation of the MTN Agreements. For ex-
ample, the President's authority to waive countervailing duties in 
certain circumstances ran out before the negotiation was :finished, 
and the application of such duties had the potential to derail the 
negotiation. Yet, in the end; the messiness was simply tolerated, and 
the legal constraint did not override important policy goals. Like-
wise, the inability of Japan to ratify formally the results of the Tokyo 
Round posed certain legal problems for the U.S. administration. 
The lawyers for the administration, however, were able to wiggle 
their way around the problem, albeit uneasily, with verbal formulae 
in the Presidential findings document. 
One might conclude, therefore, that to a certain extent the law-
yers were irrelevant - that whenever legal technicalities threatened 
to obstruct the negotiations, the law was simply ignored. One can-
not, however, conclude that this approach would always work, par-
ticularly on a matter about which constituent groups in the United 
States differed strongly. 
One of the problems inherent in the congressional-executive 
tensions is the problem of "oversell" that arises when the executive 
branch tries to persuade Congress to accept and implement interna-
tional agreements. There is a risk in this situation that executive 
branch officials will make unfulfillable promises to Congress. Per-
haps the prime example of this was the Subsidies-Countervailing 
Duty Code. There, executive branch officials made optimistic state-
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ments to the Congress, including statements about pressure that the 
United States would bring on developing countries to abide by the 
basic principles of the code. It has proved very difficult, if not im-
possible, to fulfill these promises. 
For a number of reasons, United States policies tend to a high 
degree of "legalization." The limits of congressional power, coupled 
with suspicions of the executive branch, have led Congress to pursue 
its goals through detailed legislation that limits executive branch dis-
cretion. To help reinforce these limitations, Congress has also 
designed procedures to make the decisions open and to allow public 
participation at almost every stage. In addition, the Congress, par-
ticularly in the 1979 Act, has provided elaborate Court supervision 
of the administrative process through the many possibilities for judi-
cial review. 
All this "legalization," of course, creates complexity and expense. 
These costs have, in tum, been challenged by foreign critics as trade 
barriers by themselves. To a certain extent this may be true, al-
though this author has estimated the public and private annual costs 
of the U.S. regulatory system for imports ( excluding the normal cus-
toms processes) to be less than ½o of I% of the total value of annual 
imports to the U.S.321 Yet it must be realized that there are also ben-
efits derived from this system. Its openness, comparative objectivity, 
comparative insulatioi:i from undue political influence, and compar-
ative reliance on relatively detailed published criteria, give foreign 
parties interested in exporting to the United States a degree of pre-
dictable access to the U.S. market that may not be available in any 
other system. It is hard in the U.S. system for representatives of a 
domestic industry to boast privately that they will see to it that the 
government will exclude competing imports, unless certain specified 
criteria are met. Lawyers can give· a measure of guidance both to 
domestic industry representatives desiring to exclude competing 
goods, and to importing interests, often eliminating the necessity of 
seeking any formal ( or informal) government proceeding. It is at 
least possible to hypothesize that because of the public access to, 
transparency of, and stipulated criteria for, the regulation of U.S. 
imports, more and better access to the U.S. market is available to 
321. This figure is based on approximately $68 million of annual U.S. Government costs 
for trade agencies such as USTR, ITA (Commerce), etc., plus very rough estimates of private 
lawyers fees and in-house corporate costs for the procedures occurring under U.S. law. A total 
of $101 million annual costs estimated in this manner can be compared with the 1981 total 
value of imports into the U.S. of $264 billion, and the resulting fraction is 4/100 of 1%. Al• 
lowing leeway for various estimating errors, it would seem almost certain that this ratio is less 
than 1/10 of 1%. 
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foreign producers than is the case in most other markets. If liberal 
trade is the desired goal of the system, such "legalization" may more 
efficiently promote that goal than systems that rely more heavily on 
government discretion, or nonpublic decision making. 
In addition, the "legalization" (as aggravating as it is sometimes) 
tends to reduce the "power-orientation" of the system and nudge it 
more in the direction of a "rule-oriented" system, as this author has 
elsewhere described.322 
But there are other costs to be paid by such a system. Clearly it is 
less flexible (indeed that is its objective, for flexibility generally 
means less predictability, and possibly, more subject to influence by 
extraneous or unpredictable goals). One of the questions that has 
been appropriately raised in connection with the system is whether it 
can cope with the truly large cases, such as trade problems of the 
steel or automobile sector, which often are a result of important and 
painful trends of structural adjustment. If the rules are not ade-
quately tuned to massive problems of this type, they could, when 
inflexibly administered, create problems rather than solve them. 
One answer to this criticism would be to improve and change the 
rules. But when the world's procedures for such change are as diffi-
cult, lengthy, and inflexible as they are, rule changes do not occur 
easily. Thus, rules sometimes become out-dated, or are ambiguous 
or misdirected, because they result from difficult and elaborate nego-
tiation processes. In such circumstances the rules tend to break 
down. 
These reflections do not seem to be encouraging for the future of 
international economic relations. Yet improvisation by intelligent 
officials, coupled with the discernible trend of not only greater rule 
detail and complexity, but also greater openness and predictability of 
the trade rules in the United States, offers the long-run prospect of 
greater stability of trade and economic relationships. If the rules can 
be steadily improved, and the experience with them utilized to en-
hance such improvements, then, in the opinion of this author, one is 
entitled to be modestly optimistic about the long-run prospects of 
international trade relations. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the preceding Parts, we have examined the relationship of 
322. See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD 
TRADE L. 93, 98-99 (1978); Jackson, The Birth of the GAIT-MTN System: A Constitutional 
Appraisal, 12 J. LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 21, 27-28 (1980). 
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three national constitutional systems to the processes of negotiating 
and implementing international agreements. We have focused on 
the Tokyo Round Negotiations in the context of GATT, as a case 
study, so as to add precision to our inquiries. However, we had no 
intention of simply chronicling the history of the Tokyo Round. In-
stead, it has been our purpose to examine the constitutional systems 
of the three major trading partners in the world today, with a view to 
understanding the effect of those national constitutions on potential 
future international negotiations. As this is written, it is not clear 
what the next major international economic negotiation will be. 
Preparations have begun in the GA TT, however, for some further 
multilateral activity which could possibly lead to some negotiations 
on certain subjects, such as international trade in services, or negoti-
ation concerning certain international rules relating to merchandise 
trade such as safeguards. 323 
In three different Parts, we have each explored the constitutional 
and legal constraints on international economic negotiations, within 
each of three systems. The reader will realize by now that there are 
some substantial and interesting differences between those systems. 
In addition, the reader may by now realize that there are some po-
tential problems for any international economic negotiation, lurking 
in the disparities between those systems. In this final Part, we pro-
pose to draw some comparisons and formulate some tentative hy-
potheses as to the significance of the differences between the national 
constitutional systems. As indicated at the outset of this Article, we 
. view our study as only part of the total story. Clearly, there are a 
number of other countries for which a similar examination of the 
national constitutional structures would be interesting and valuable 
for a better understanding of the potential for international eco-
nomic negotiations. It is our hope that other scholars will now util-
ize some of the same techniques we have utilized and address some 
of the same questions that we have explored. We would hope to see 
articles published in various scholarly legal journals, about other na-
tional constitutional systems and their relationship to international 
economic negotiations. 
We have divided the remainder of this final Part into five sec-
tions. In section A, we will draw some conclusions and make some 
general comparisons about the three systems examined. In section 
B, we will discuss some of the implications of our findings for future 
negotiations. In section C, we raise a question which seems to be 
323. See, e.g., GATT Press Release No. 1310 (Feb. 12, 1982). 
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more frequently on the minds of statesmen and politicians, namely, 
whether the international economic structure for trade and other 
economic affairs is workable and fair. In section D, we make one 
proposal which could add to the workability and significance of in-
ternational economic systems, although we do not have any illusions 
that this proposal is likely to be adopted in the near future. Finally, 
in section E we bring the Article to a close. 
A. The Three Constitutions Compared 
The three constitutions are very different, and these differences 
obviously have implications. Japan's constitutional system is one of 
a highly centralized governmental structure, with a parliamentary 
system. In some respects, the Japanese constitutional system is 
rather new (dating technically from the post-World War II'period). 
The European system is even newer. In this Article we have treated 
the system of the European Economic Community as a sort of "na-
tional system" for the purposes of our analysis. The Constitution of 
the EEC is in a process of rapid change. Starting with the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957, that Constitution includes the longest written consti-
tutional document of any of the three systems examined. A number 
of changes have occurred in that written document, particularly 
changes due to the addition of new Members. In addition, a number 
of changes have been and continue to be occurring in the way that 
document gets applied. In all three systems, power struggles among 
the various branches of the system occur and 'have considerable 
influence. 
In the United States, we have the oldest continuous government 
of the three, based on a written Constitution two hundred years old 
and a large supply of Supreme Court opinions interpreting that Con-
stitution. With respect to international economic relations under 
that Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has spoken relatively 
infrequently. Despite the length of its history, the United States 
Constitution still leaves a number of issues open with respect to mul-
tinational relations. 
Some brief comparisons ( others have been made in the various 
preceding chapters) can be grouped under two headings: (1) the dis-
tribution of power; and, (2) the legal process of implementing the 
Tokyo Round Agreements. 
1. The .Distribution of Power 
A prime attribute of any constitutional system is the way that it 
distributes power. Power can be distributed within a national gov-
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ernment among various branches of that government; and it can also 
be distributed in a federal system between the central government 
and the subordinate units of government (such as the states). 
a. Subordinate units of government. With respect to questions of 
power distribution between the central government and the 
subordinate units of government, these questions are the least signifi-
cant in Japan, and the most significant in the EEC. The Japanese 
government is highly centralized, and these authors could not find 
that problems of power distribution to local units, or power held by 
local units, have any significant implications for international eco-
nomic negotiations. 
In the United States, ql!esiions of distribution of powers between 
the states and the federal government in Washington, D.C., still have 
some potency, although not nearly so much as was the case a century 
ago. Basically, today, the U.S. federal government can negotiate and 
fulfill almost any international agreement which it feels it can ob-
tain, and which is approved by the governmental processes of the 
federal government. However, there are some political limitations 
on the processes of negotiating and approving international agree-
ments that stem from the federal system. For example, with respect 
to the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, it seems rea-
sonably clear that if the nations which are parties to that Code had 
provided in the Code that it would apply also to the governmental 
purchases of government subdivisions such as states in the United 
States, in that circumstance the United States federal government 
would have had the power to require the states to follow the interna-
tional agreement. However, there were at least some perceptions 
during the negotiation that there could have been some opposition 
among members of Congress to the approval of an international 
government procurement code, if such a code were designed to apply 
to state government purchases. We do not know the degree or extent 
of that potential opposition, since the issue was never put to Con-
gress. Indeed, the United States negotiators were at one point proba-
bly willing to try to have the international agreement embrace state 
government purchases, but negotiators from other nations did not 
desire such a move. 
The EEC poses the most serious problems with respect to the dis-
tribution of powers between central governmental institutions and 
member government states or subordinate government units. There 
continues to be a considerable power struggle between the central 
institutions of the EEC and the Member State governments (such as 
England or France). Extra-constitutional mechanisms, such as the 
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"European Council," ~ave been set up for participation of national 
government officials at the highest level, and this has tended to 
strengthen the retention of power by the Member States, as opposed 
to the EEC institutions. 
Within some of the Member States of the EEC, there are also 
important federalism questions. For example, in West Germany, the 
Lander retain certain significant rights and powers, and these have 
had and will continue to have some influence on the potentiality of 
international economic negotiations. 
More specifically, within the EEC the degree of centralization 
varies with the subject matter. The general subject "commercial pol-
icy," which is deemed to include tariffs and trade, and most GATT 
matters, is delegated to the central institutions of the EEC (Article 
113 of the Treaty of Rome). However, a number of other subjects 
are not, at least not explicitly, so delegated. For example, monetary 
policy tends to remain with the Member States. Some have argued 
that the codes concerning government procurement, or standards, 
touched on matters peculiarly remaining within the power and juris-
diction of the Member States. This may have clouded certain phases 
of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, but in the end, the actions of the 
EEC and its Member State governments tend to confirm the proposi-
tion that these activities as negotiated in the Tokyo Round are em-
braced within the "commercial policy" delegation of authority to the 
EEC institutions. In future international economic negotiations, 
however, it will be necessary to examine fairly closely the question of 
whether a subject matter to be taken up is within the jurisdiction of 
the EEC institutions or not. For example, it has often been stated 
that the next phase of multilateral discussions and potential negotia-
tions within GATT, will embrace trade in "services" (insurance, 
shipping, tourism, etc~). It has been argued that power to regulate 
and to enter into international negotiations with respect to trade in 
certain types of services remains with the Member States, or at least 
is not under the authority of article 113. If true, this could necessi-
tate a negotiation of a different type than that which occurred in the 
Tokyo Round. 
b. Central government institutions. Power is also distributed 
among institutions at the central or federal government level. In the 
United States, these problems are the most significant. The relation-
ship of the executive branch (the President) and the Congress is the 
single most important factor of U.S. participation in international 
economic negotiations. This relationship has a number of difficul-
ties. Although it is usually argued that the President has authority to 
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negotiate on anything in an international context, it is clear under 
the United States Constitution that the President does not have the 
sole authority to approve or finally commit the United States to an 
international agreement on many subjects. In commercial matters, 
Congress feels that it has the preeminent reserved power, and that 
the President only has those powers which have been delegated to 
him by the Congress. This imposes effective restraints on the ability 
of the President to negotiate in the international context, since the 
negotiators from other countries are not likely to be willing to nego-
tiate with him with respect to matters for which they feel he cannot 
obtain approval. There is thus a tendency on the part of the execu-
tive branch officials to be more willing to enter into international 
negotiations on subject matters which they feel are within the powers 
already delegated to the President. Alternatively, it would be neces-
sary for the President to obtain additional statutory delegations from 
the Congress before the negotiation, or to take results of a negotia-
tion back to the Congress under one procedure or another for ap-
proval. In connection with a major international economic 
negotiation, a great deal of time, effort, and thought will be utilized 
in managing these relationships between the executive branch and 
the Congress. 
In the EEC, the power distribution within the various central in-
stitutions is also highly significant. To a certain extent, these power 
relationships mirror the problems encountered in the relationship 
between the EEC institutions and the Member States. The EEC has 
a Commission on the one hand, and a Council on the other hand. 
The Council is composed of representatives of the Member States. 
This institution is reluctant to yield power to the Commission which 
is considered to reflect a more general EEC perspective. There is a 
European Parliament, now selected by popular suffrage, but its pow-
ers are extremely limited, at least at this juncture of history. There is 
also another very important central institution, namely the Court of 
Justice (sitting at Luxembourg). This court has the final say about 
legal matters interpreting the Treaty of Rome, and therefore is the 
arbitrator of the disputes about power distribution within the EEC, 
both disputes involving the central institutions and those involving 
the relationship of those institutions to the Member States. 
In the Japanese Government, the problem of distribution of 
power among the national institutions is not so great. In a parlia-
mentary system, the Executive is headed by a cabinet which is 
largely drawn from the Parliament itself, so at least in theory, there 
is not a significant tension between the Parliament and the Execu-
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tive. In Japan, the power distribution questions at the central gov-
ernment level are of a rather different nature than those in the 
United States or the EEC. This makes comparison somewhat cliffi.-
cult. Many of the problems of power distribution in the Japanese 
Government have to do with rivalry between ministries such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as compared to the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry. More specifically, the relationships be-
tween powerful Ministries and between Ministries and the Liberal 
Democratic Party, and the pressures of some powerful interest 
groups (for example, agricultural groups) may affect future negotia-
tions. When looking at the different "constitutional systems" of the 
three trading partners, to make effective comparison, and to analyze 
the power distribution questions, one has to look at different infor-
mation in Japan. The information is often not easily available, be-
cause it is rarely embodied in such things as Supreme Court cases, or 
statutes and explicit regulations which are available to the public. 
Nevertheless, there are some significant power distribution questions 
in Japan which could affect future negotiations, and have affected 
past negotiations. 
Finally, in this comparison of power distribution, one must look 
at the role of the courts. In the United States, the Supreme Court 
has an extraordinarily powerful role in arbitrating the allocation of 
power among units of government. It also has an important role in 
the enforcement of statutes and regulations, and of the Constitution 
itself. Consequently, many issues in the United States tend to be-
come 'judicial issues" and this gives the court a more significant role 
in the total process of international economic negotiations than is 
probably the case in the other two constitutional systems explored. 
In the EEC, the Court of Justice also proves to be very prominent. 
Indeed, the analogies between the Court of Justice for the EEC and 
the Supreme Court of the United States are strong and many people 
have commented upon them. Even though governments within 
Member States in Europe have not in many cases traditionally had a 
constitutional system that placed considerable power in a judicial 
body, in the EEC this is the case. 
In Japan, courts including the Supreme Court have the power of 
judicial review, and, at least in theory, they could play a role as an 
arbitrator of the allocation of actions enforced by the Ministries in 
light of the Constitution or laws. However, in reality, the Japanese 
Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely exercised this power in 
foreign trade areas. This is probably due to the paucity of court ac-
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tions which are raised by government agencies and private individu-
als, which reflects the nonlitigiousness in the national character. 
2. Implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements in National 
Legal Systems 
There is virtually no uniformity between the three constitutional 
systems as to the way that the results of the Tokyo Round became 
implemented. In the United States, as we have seen, the Congress 
generally reserved the power to approve most of the final Tokyo 
Round Agreements before the United States became committed to 
them. The statute adopted by Congress to provide this approval and 
to implement the Agreements clearly provides that the Agreements 
themselves will not be "self-executing" in the United States law. 
This means that the Agreements do not become part of the domestic 
law of the United States. Therefore, a citizen must look to the stat-
ute adopted by Congress, which implements the international agree-
ment, for the source of his rights and for judicial and administrative 
application within the United States. On the other hand, the statute 
adopted is quite long, and quite detailed. It takes much of the lan-
guage of the international agreements and applies that language ver-
batim as part of the United States law. In addition, administrative 
agencies charged with implementing various parts of that statute 
have issued regulations that are even more detailed. Thus, there is a 
vast, elaborate, explicit body of written rules that is part of the 
United States jurisprudence and designed to implement the Tokyo 
Round Agreements. Individual citizens have the right to invoke 
those rules, and to utilize the court system to assist them in such 
invocation. 
In the EEC, the situation is considerably more confused. It is not 
entirely clear whether the international agreements negotiated in the 
Tokyo Round will always be considered to have "direct effect" as 
part of the jurisprudence of national government institutions, includ-
ing the courts, in the EEC. A recent case, however, leaves open the 
possibility of such "direct effect." In some cases, the EEC has issued 
a "regulation" on the subject matter concerned; such a regulation 
becomes part of the domestic jurisprudence in the Member States of 
the EEC. In other cases, the EEC has issued a "directive" which 
directs Member States to take implementing action. Although there 
have been cases which have held a directive to have certain types of 
direct e.ff ects in Member State law, the general theory is that the 
thrust of the directive would not normally lend itself to be treated as 
part of the domestic jurisprudence. Finally, in some situations, the 
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implementation of the Tokyo Round agreement has simply been left 
to the Member States. Entering into the agreement by the EEC insti-
tutions imposes a legal requirement on the Member States to follow 
and implement the international agreement. 
In Japan, as long as the international agreements negotiated in 
the Tokyo Round have been approved by the National Diet, they are 
regarded as "treaties" in the sense of the constitutional provision 
and, as such, are given not only the power of law but also overriding 
effect upon the domestic law which comes into conflict with them. 
As touched upon earlier, such approval has been given to most of the 
agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round. Whenever there are 
differences between the approved international agreements and do-
mestic laws, it has been the practice of the Japanese Government 
that the Cabinet proposes legislative bills and the National Diet en-
acts them into laws in order to make the language of domestic laws 
conform to the language contained in the international agreements. 
This has been done with regard to some of the international agree-
ments negotiated in the Tokyo Round. With certain limitations, in-
dividuals have the right to invoke the rules contained in the 
agreements and to seek cancellation of administrative actions, regu-
lations or laws which are contrary to these rules, and also to seek 
recovery for damage sustained by them due to actions or inactions of 
the government officials contrary to the rules enunciated in the 
agreements. Here again, however, the likelihood of such court ac-
tions by Japanese citizens is rather slim due to the reluctance of the 
Japanese people to resort to court actions. 
One of the striking things that emerges from a study of this type, 
therefore, is that the processes and degree of implementation of the 
international agreements, in the three different constitutional sys-
tems, differs greatly. This could conceivably lead to some significant 
disparities with respect to effective implementation of the interna-
tional obligations. In a society where citizens have direct access to 
judicial institutions to enforce their rights, and in those procedures 
such citizens have the right to rely directly on the international 
agreements, or on statutory implementation of these agreements 
which embraces the language of the international agreements, it 
would seem plausible that the international agreements would be 
treated seriously. On the other hand, where such institutional mech-
anisms are not available to the ordinary citizen, or where whatever 
does exist contains considerable leeway for the play of governmental 
discretion, it is possible that government officials involved will find 
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themselves at some point tempted to apply the international obliga-
tions less rigorously. 
B. Implications for Future Negotiations 
There are at least two important categories of implications with 
respect to future negotiation on international economic matters 
which stem from the analysis in this Article. First, there is the ques-
tion as to in which of the types of subject matter that are likely to be 
subjects of potential negotiations are constraints resulting from the 
three constitutional systems most serious? And second, how should 
negotiators be i;i.ffected by the fact that the processes of implementa-
tion in the three different constitutional systems vary so greatly? 
With respect to the first question, one can examine the potential 
constraints of the national legal constitutional systems on negotia-
tions of a number of subjects, including trade in services, investment 
and capital flows, and subjects that have or have not been previously 
negotiated and relate to the more traditional merchandise trade mat-
ters. For example, with respect to the negotiation of services, there is 
likely to be a major jurisdictional question within the EEC as to the 
methodology of negotiating, approving and implementing interna-
tional agreements on that subject. The same is likely to be the case 
with respect to investment and capital flows. On the other hand, 
with respect to negotiations that might continue on some of the left-
over matters from the Tokyo Round negotiation, it is more likely 
that the jurisdictional question will be considered clear, and that the 
central EEC institutions will be deemed to have greater control. 
In the United States, it is likely that the Congress will have to 
give either advance authority to the executive branch to enter into 
international negotiations and agreements on subject matters such as 
services, or will retain for itself the ultimate right of approval of 
whatever emerges from the international negotiation. This will have 
a profound effect on the structure and procedures of the negotiation. 
In Japan, there will be little jurisdictional problem in negotiating 
and entering into international agreements on services and invest-
ment, since most of the powers in these areas are vested in some 
Ministries of the National Government whose Ministers compose 
the Cabinet. Problems may lie in the reluctance on the part of Min-
istries in charge of promoting and controlling these matters to adopt 
international agreements which may adversely affect the interest of 
industries under their jurisdiction. 
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C. The Structure of the International Economic System 
The basic thesis of this Article is that the international economic 
system is a complex structure involving the intertwining of national 
constitutional systems, and the international "constitutional system." 
The international constitutional system is primarily that of GA TT, 
and the other international economic organizations such as OECD, 
IMF, etc. For purposes of illustration here, we can focus on the 
GAIT. Thus, we see the GAIT (which has, as indicated in the in-
troduction, a very frail constitution, not designed to fill the role that 
it has been forced to fill) as an international institution that strongly 
depends on certain national governmental structures. Vice versa, 
some of the national governmental structures concerned (particu-
larly the United States) depend heavily on the existence of the 
GAIT and its "system." United States law makes use ofGATT in a 
number of ways. The Trade Act of 1974 and the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979 would make little sense without the existence of GAIT. 
Conversely, at the time the GAIT was originally formulated, and at 
the time the Tokyo Round agreements were being negotiated, the 
United States constitutional and other law relating to international 
trade had considerable influence on the shape of GA TT and on the 
various supplementary "codes" negotiated in the context of GAIT. 
This Article has not been an examination of the GAIT itself; that 
task has been taken up elsewhere. It is not our purpose here, there-
fore, to review some of the statements of concern about whether the 
GATT can cope with contemporary international economic 
problems and trends, and whether the GAIT needs some substantial 
revision for that purpose. Our purpose here, however, is to comment 
upon the total GA TT system in the context of the relationship of the 
GAIT to the national constitutional systems of GAIT members. In 
this context, one can see strengths and weaknesses. The GA TT has 
managed to survive despite the disparity of constitutional systems, 
and indeed, despite the disparity of economic systems. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the GA TT applies in a way that is uneven as 
between economic systems, and may also be uneven as between con-
stitutional systems. For example, there are practical effects of direct 
citizen access to national judicial or administrative procedures 
designed to enforce the international economic obligations. Is an in-
ternational agreement really fair, when it is in fact implemented in 
such varying manners in various countries? 
In addition, national constitutional structures may influence the 
ability of national representatives to negotiate effectively on behalf 
of their national interests. The United States, for example, with its 
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constant power struggle between the executive branch and the Con-
gress, may in sonie circumstances find its ability to conduct interna-
tional negotiations to be constrained, either because Congress has 
not adequately delegated power to the executive branch which con-
ducts the negotiations, or because in such a delegation the Congress 
has laid out in too explicit detail the scope or range of maneuver of 
the negotiators, thereby giving opposing negotiators some important 
intelligence about those positions. 
D. A Proposal for the Future: .Direct Citizen Access to the 
International System of Economic Obligations 
Much has been written in recent decades about the tendency of 
international law to accept as subjects of international law, individu-
als as well as national states. Without trying to get into the some-
what theoretical questions involved in those writings, we would like 
simply to point out that it has now become established that it is pos-
sible to design procedures under which private citizens or firms have 
some sort of access (usually limited) directly to international bodies 
for the purpose of asserting their rights.324 The two prime examples 
of these types of procedures which come to mind are the European 
Convention on Human Rights325 and the International Convention 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.326 Under the former, an 
individual citizen can go to an international body with a complaint 
against his own government, on the grounds that his government has 
violated its obligations under the international convention, namely 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in a manner which has 
directly affected that citizen. The international procedures then call 
for a commission to look into the complaint and possibly to help 
mediate a solution between the citizen and his government. Where 
the commission feels it is justified, it may bring the complaint to a 
court - the European Court on Human Rights. That court then has 
the authority to rule whether or not the state concerned has violated 
its obligations under the European Convention. Only states which 
have explicitly accepted this fairly far-reaching procedure under the 
324. W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 225-49 (1964), 
325. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See generally R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNA· 
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 560 (1979), 
326. Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, opened far signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159. See generally Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 331 (Hague Acad. of Intl. Law) (1972). 
December 1982] Tokyo Round 395 
appropriate convention can be brought into these procedures by 
their own citizens. 
Likewise, the ICSID - International Convention for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes - set up under the auspices of the 
World Bank, provides a mechanism by which those governments 
who have accepted the ICSID in advance can subsequently provide 
in any contract with a foreign private firm or citizen that disputes 
about such a contract will be referred to an arbitration process set up 
by ICSID. 
There are some interesting potentials in these precedents for the 
GATT and the international economic system. Although probably 
not soon acceptable to governments which participate in the GATT, 
one can envisage that at some point in the future, the policies that 
call for greater predictability of national government economic ac-
tions in an increasingly interdependent world, and the policies which 
move governments to desire a greater balance and equality of actual 
de facto implementation of the negotiated international rules on eco-
nomic matters, could lead governments to be willing to accept some 
sort of a mechanism by which individual citizens or firms could ap-
peal directly to an international body such as the GA TT for a deter-
mination about whether a government, obligated under the GA TT 
or one of the GATT codes, has taken action inconsistent with its 
international obligations. 
Several particulars are likely to be necessary in any such proce-
dure. First, a requirement that national internal administrative and 
judicial remedies be exhausted seems appropriate. Second, some 
sort of a "filter'' would probably be needed, much as is the case cur-
rently with the European procedure for human rights. Thus, some 
international body, such as a GA TT unit, could be charged with ini-
tially receiving the complaints from private citizens or firms, and 
making a preliminary investigation to see whether there was any 
merit in such complaints. This would be desired as a way to prevent 
spurious complaints from getting very far. Third, it is likely that at 
the outset, any procedure of this type would have to accommodate 
itself to the lack of effective sanctions. It is doubtful that states 
would at this stage be willing to accept such an international proce-
dure if there were truly effective sanctions which could be applied. 
This does not, however, make such a procedure useless. The mere 
fact that there could be a reliable third-party determination with re-
spect to the facts and the application of the law (the international 
obligation) would itself be salutary. To a certain extent, the mere 
fact of findings by an international arbitration panel, when such 
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findings are made public, is itself a sort of "sanction," which many 
governments try to avoid. 
Clearly, the typical governmental reaction against relinquishing 
any power, or against constraining its field of discretion, would dis-
courage a move in the direction of the procedures described. On the 
other hand, it should be recognized that there are some advantages 
for governments in such a procedure. For one thing, if the proce-
dure were carefully designed, and became reliable, governments 
might well find that the procedure would tend to de-emphasize and 
de-politicize many relatively minor trade or economic complaints 
that now exist between nations. For example, let us assume that a 
citizen in country A (we will call the citizen Mr. A ) finds that his 
exports to country B are being restrained improperly by country B, 
inconsistent with country B's international obligations. Under the 
current procedure, Mr. A must go to his own national government 
and get it to take up his matter with the foreign government. Thus, 
his case has immediately been raised to a diplomatic level, and it 
quite often means, by the nature of things, that it has been raised to a 
fairly high level of official attention and consequently of public per-
ception. On the other hand, if an appropriate international proce-
dure existed, when Mr. A came to his government to complain about 
country B, country A officials could refer Mr. A to that procedure 
and encourage him to utilize it, without, however, the government of 
country A itself taking any stand on the matter. There is then some 
possibility that the issue could be handled more expeditiously and 
routinely. The case would continue to be Mr. A 's case, and not be-
come country A's case. The issue would be Mr. A versus country B, 
instead of Mr. A and country A versus country B. Country A could 
even make noises that it did not approve of Mr. A 's position, with-
out, however, undercutting Mr. A 's rights in the international 
procedure. 
It is the view of at least one of the authors of this Article that, in 
all probability, early versions of such a procedure would require 
some kind of governmental "right of veto" on its own citizens' at-
tempts to invoke the process. However, if this right were accorded to 
national governments as a way to make them more comfortable with 
experimenting with this procedure, such "veto" could be designed so 
that during the course of time it would gradually die out (at least for 
all but the most exceptional cases). 
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E. Interdependence and Legal Systems: 
Some Concluding Remarks 
The stresses currently imposed on the international economic 
system are formidable indeed. Phrases such as the "demise of 
GATT," or the "failure of the exchange rate mechanism" are being 
heard, as political leaders scramble for ideas and policies with which 
to alleviate the economic pain of their constituents. Many of the 
traditional assumptions of the Bretton Woods system are being ques-
tioned. People are asking if comparative advantage has the same 
meaning today as in previous years, and whether "industrial policy" 
as executed by some nations is a fair way to "play'' in today's world. 
Political forces for protectionism loom large, and the traditional 
rules often seem to be bent more than they are applied. 
Arthur Dunkle, the current Director-General of GA TT, has said 
[I]ntemational economic policy commitments, in the form of agreed 
rules, have far-reaching domestic effects, . . . . They are the element 
which secures the ultimate co-ordination and mutual compatibility of 
the purely domestic economic policies. They form the basis from 
which the government can arbitrate and secure an equitable and effi-
cient balance between the diverse domestic interests: producers vs. 
consumers, export industries vs. import-competing industries . . . . 
[O]nly a firm commitment to international rules makes possible the all-
important reconciliation, which I have already alluded to, of the 
necesssary balance on the production side and on the financial side of 
the national economy .... 321 
But if the rules are so important, they must be kept abreast of the 
fast changing conditions of the world. This implies an orderly and 
intelligent system by which the rules themselves can be changed. 
The complex mix of national legal institutions and constitutions, and 
the various international institutions are not now structured in a way 
that gives one confidence that the international economic system can 
evolve in an orderly fashion. What we have tried to do in this. Article 
is to shed some light on the legal aspects of this international eco-
nomic system, and particularly on the little-studied interrelationship 
of the national legal.systems to this international system. In doing so 
we hope we have contributed both to a modestly better understand-
ing of that system and its strengths and weaknesses, and to stimulat-
ing further study of this perplexing subject. 
327. GATI Press Release No. 1312 (Mar. 5, 1982). 
